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Abstract	  
The	   First	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   began	   with	   an	   insurgency	   led	   by	   Charles	   Taylor	   on	  Christmas	  Eve	  in	  1989.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  company	  Firestone	  Liberia	  (one	  of	  many	  of	  the	  subsidiaries	   of	   the	   multinational,	   Bridgestone	   Corporation)	   had	   been	   operating	   the	  world’s	  largest	  rubber	  plantation	  in	  Liberia’s	  Margibi	  County	  for	  over	  six	  decades.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  three	  years,	  Firestone	  engaged	  with	  various	  actors	  in	  the	  Liberian	  conflict	  theatre	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  operating	  its	  rubber	  plantation.	  The	  most	  notable	  of	  these	  actors	  was	   the	  warlord,	  Charles	  Taylor,	   a	   relationship	   for	  which	  Firestone	  Liberia	  has	  received	  much	   criticism.	   This	   case	   study	   is	   situated	  within	   the	   broader	   debate	   on	   the	  role	   of	   multinational	   corporations	   in	   host	   countries	   that	   descend	   into	   conflict.	   The	  existing	   literature	  on	  the	  topic	  exposes	  a	  potentially	  ambivalent	  role	   for	  private	  actors	  as	   either	   catalysts	   for	   aggravating	   conflict	   dynamics	   or	   promoters	   of	   peace	   within	  conflict	   zones.	   This	   research	   contends	   that	   insufficient	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	  understanding	   the	  minutiae	   of	   corporate	   behaviour	   in	   contemporary	   conflict	   and	   that	  more	   in-­‐depth	   low-­‐n	   case	   studies	   are	   required	   before	   prescribing	   a	   positive	   role	   for	  companies	   in	   conflict	   zones.	   The	   findings	   of	   this	   paper	   reveal	   the	   importance	   of	  accounting	   for	   variables,	   such	   as	   conflict	   characteristics	   and	   geo-­‐economic	   and	   geo-­‐political	   conditions,	   and	   how	   these	   limit	   the	   agency	   of	   private	   actors	   in	   situations	   of	  violent	  conflict.	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CHAPTER	  ONE	  
1.	  Introduction	  
On	  Christmas	  Eve	  in	  1989,	  a	  conflict	  broke	  out	  in	  the	  small	  West	  African	  state	  of	  Liberia.	  It	   began	   with	   an	   insurgency	   launched	   from	   neighbouring	   Sierra	   Leone	   and	   quickly	  escalated	  into	  a	  violent	  and	  protracted	  war	  fought	  along	  ethnic	  lines.	  The	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  was	  a	  “peculiarly	  horrible”1	  conflict,	  characterised	  by	  mass	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  all	  warring	  factions	  (including	  state	  and	  nonstate	  actors).2	  At	  the	  time,	  Firestone	  Liberia	  (a	   subsidiary	   of	   Bridgestone/Firestone,	   Incorporated	   (BFS))	   had	   been	   operating	   the	  world’s	  largest	  rubber	  plantation	  in	  Liberia’s	  Margibi	  County	  for	  over	  six	  decades.	  As	  the	  situation	  in	  Liberia	  destabilised	  and	  violence	  became	  widespread,	  Firestone	  Liberia	  (or	  simply,	   Firestone)	   was	   faced	   with	   two	   decisions.	   The	   first	   was	   whether	   to	   withdraw	  from	   Liberia	   and	   cease	   operations	   or	   to	   keep	   the	   plantation	   operating	   in	   spite	   of	   the	  surrounding	   chaos.	  While	   its	   expatriate	   staff	  were	  evacuated	   in	   June	  1990	   following	  a	  series	  of	   incidents	  on	  the	  plantation,	  the	  company	  later	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  return	  to	  Liberia	  with	  the	  encouragement	  of	  its	  parent	  company,	  BFS.	  In	  so	  doing,	  Firestone	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  second	  decision	  regarding	  which	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict	  it	  would	  engage	  with	  to	  facilitate	  the	  process	  of	  restarting	  operations.	  Although	  not	  much	  was	  known	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  strategy	  at	  the	  time,	  these	  decisions	  have	  since	  earned	  the	  company	  considerable	  criticism.	  	  
While	   conflict	   can	   attract	   commercial	   actors	   who	   see	   war	   as	   a	   lucrative	   business	  opportunity,	   many	   legitimate	   companies	   with	   established	   operations	   also	   elect	   to	  continue	   their	   commercial	   activities	   within	   a	   host	   country	   despite	   the	   instability	  wrought	   by	   conflict.3	  In	   particular,	   companies	   whose	   operations	   involve	   immobile	  natural	   resources	   and	   who	   have	   made	   substantial	   capital	   investments	   in	   their	   host	  country	   often	   choose	   to	   “weather	   the	   ensuing	   challenges	   by	   ‘working	   around’	   the	  conflict”.4	  Thus,	  in	  times	  of	  conflict,	  legitimate	  companies	  like	  Firestone	  often	  find	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  and	  licit	  operations	  engulfed	  by	  the	  surrounding	  violence	  and	  chaos,	  forcing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Stephen	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994:	  A	  Study	  of	  Ethnic	  and	  Spiritual	  Violence,”	  African	  Affairs,	  vol.	  94,	  no.	  375	  (1995),	  https://www.jstor.org/stable/723778.	  2	  T.	  Christian	  Miller	  and	  Jonathan	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Three:	  Tough	  Talk	  in	  the	  Jungle,”	  in	  Firestone	  and	  the	  
Warlord,	  November	  18,	  2014,	  accessed	  September	  16,	  2018,	  https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-­‐and-­‐the-­‐warlord-­‐chapter-­‐3.	  3	  Karen	  Ballantine	  and	  Heiko	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict:	  An	  Assessment	  of	  Issues	  and	  Options,”	  Die	  Friedens-­‐Warte,	  vol.	  79,	  no.	  1/2	  (2004):	  39,	  https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23773715.pdf.	  4	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  40.	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them	  to	  adopt	  strategies	  that	  they	  might	  not	  necessarily	  condone.5	  These	  strategies	  can	  have	  dire	   consequences	   on	   conflict	   dynamics	   by,	   for	   example,	   affecting	   the	   balance	   of	  power	  among	  actors	  and	  hampering	  prospects	  for	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia,	  there	  is	  broad	  consensus	  that	  the	  company’s	  decision	  to	  return	  to	  Liberia	  and	  enter	  into	  a	  formal	  arrangement	  with	  Charles	  Taylor	  provided	  him	  with	   the	   necessary	   revenue	   and	   logistical	   support	   to	   withstand	   pressure	   from	   the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  Monitoring	  Group	  (ECOMOG).	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  argued	   that	   Firestone’s	   strategy	   “indirectly	   and	   perhaps	   directly	   contributed	   to	  mass	  death	  and	  destruction	  in	  Liberia,	  and	  prolonged	  the	  civil	  war	  by	  providing	  Taylor	  with	  badly	  needed	  revenue	  and	  a	  base	  of	  operations”.6	  	  
This	  reproach	  of	  Firestone’s	  behaviour	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  multinational	   corporations	   (MNCs)	   and	   their	   subsidiaries	   in	   aggravating	   conflict	  dynamics.	  However,	   this	  research	  contends	  that	   insufficient	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  understanding	   the	  minutiae	  of	  corporate	  behaviour	   in	  contemporary	  conflict.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  reveal	  the	  importance	  of	   accounting	   for	   certain	   variables,	   such	   as	   conflict	   characteristics	   and	   geo-­‐economic	  and	   geo-­‐political	   conditions,	   to	   show	   how	   these	   limit	   the	   agency	   of	   private	   actors	   in	  situations	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  
1.1.	  Problem	  Statement	  
The	   developing	  world	   has	   been	   an	   attractive	   site	   for	  MNC	   expansion	   for	   a	   number	   of	  reasons,	   including	   (but	   not	   limited	   to)	   the	   possibility	   of	   generous	   tax	   concessions,	  untapped	   market	   potential,	   low	   labour	   costs	   and	   relatively	   low	   costs	   of	   factors	   of	  production. 7 	  Another	   key	   factor	   that	   has	   drawn	   significant	   global	   foreign	   direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  to	  the	  developing	  world	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  strategic	  natural	  resources.	  However,	   many	   of	   the	   sites	   of	   these	   critical	   resources	   are	   located	   in	   states	   that	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict”;	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone,	  introduction	  to	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  Economic	  Agendas	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000),	  10.	  6	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America,	  “Preliminary	  Report:	  Bridgestone/Firestone’s	  Role	  in	  the	  Liberian	  Civil	  War,”	  September	  1996,	  accessed	  August	  12,	  2017,	  https://www.propublica.org/documents/item/1684557-­‐1996-­‐09-­‐25-­‐bfs-­‐preliminaryreportonliberia-­‐usw.html.	  	  7	  Ayo	  Whetho,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Profit	  and	  Peace:	  Multinational	  Corporations	  and	  Conflict	  Transformation	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,”	  (PhD	  dissertation,	  University	  of	  Kwazulu-­‐Natal,	  registration	  number	  205518423,	  2014),	  3,	  http://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10413/11687/Whetho_Ayo_2014.pdf;sequence=1.	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emerging	  from,	  engaged	  in	  or	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  With	  the	  disappearance	  of	  superpower	   financing	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   period,	   combatants	   have	   had	   to	   seek	   out	  alternate	  sources	  of	  revenue	  to	  sustain	  their	  military	  campaigns.	  In	  Africa,	  in	  particular,	  natural	   resources	  have	  become	  a	  particularly	   significant	   source	  of	   combatant	   revenue	  during	  conflict.8	  This	  has	  facilitated	  the	  rise	  of	  “war	  economies”,	  the	  term	  used	  to	  refer	  to	   “the	   exploitative	   reliance	   of	   warring	   factions	   on	   the	   economic	   production	   of	  territories	  they	  control”.9	  This	  has	  heightened	  the	  visibility	  of	  resource-­‐reliant	  MNCs	  in	  contemporary	  conflicts	  and	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  discussion	  around	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  corporate	  activities	  on	  the	  intensity	  and	  duration	  of	  contemporary	  conflicts.	  	  
The	   debate	   reached	   a	   new	   height	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium,	   as	   awareness	   was	  brought	  to	  the	  many	  high-­‐profile	  MNCs	  operating	  in	  war-­‐torn	  African	  states.10	  In	  2001,	  an	   investigation	   into	   the	   relationship	   between	   business	   and	   the	   illegal	   exploitation	   of	  resources	   in	   the	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	   Congo	   (DRC)	   was	   launched	   by	   a	   United	  Nations	  (UN)	  panel.	  The	  final	  report	  concluded	  that:	  	  
The	   role	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   in	   the	   exploitation	   of	   natural	   resources	   and	   the	  continuation	   of	   the	   war	   has	   been	   vital.	   A	   number	   of	   companies	   have	   been	  involved	  and	  have	   fuelled	   the	  war	  directly,	   trading	  arms	   for	  natural	   resources.	  Others	  have	  facilitated	  access	  to	  financial	  resources,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  purchase	  weapons.11	  
This	   declaration	   was	   ground-­‐breaking	   in	   that	   it	   marked	   the	   first	   time	   that	   a	   UN	  investigation	   identified	  MNCs	  as	  being	  complicit	   in	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  conflict.12	  Since	  then,	  numerous	  high-­‐profile	  MNCs	  have	  been	  “named	  and	  shamed”	   for	  their	  perceived	  roles	   in	   certain	   conflicts.	   This	   is	   reinforced	   by	   burgeoning	   academic	   research	   that	  provides	  evidence	  that	  the	  role	  of	  corporate	  actors	  can	  be	  a	  decisive	  intervening	  factor	  in	   influencing	  the	   intensity	  and	  duration	  of	  a	  conflict.	  This	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  call	   for	  companies	   to	  become	  positive	   intervening	   forces	   in	   the	  conflicts	   in	  which	  they	  find	   themselves	   embedded.	   As	   such,	   the	   existing	   literature	   exposes	   a	   potentially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  36.	  9	  Philippa	  Atkinson,	  “The	  War	  Economy	  in	  Liberia:	  A	  Political	  Analysis,”	  Relief	  and	  Rehabilitation	  Network	  
Paper,	  no.	  22	  (May	  1997),	  6,	  https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/ODI_rrn22_TheWarEconomyInLiberia.pdf.	  10	  Mark	  van	  Dorp,	  Multinational	  Corporations	  and	  Conflict:	  International	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  
Corporate	  Responsibility	  in	  Conflict-­‐affected	  Areas	  (Amsterdam:	  Stichting	  Onderzoek	  Multinationale	  Ondernemingen	  (SOMO),	  2014),	  21.	  11	  Ibid.	  12	  Ibid.	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ambivalent	  role	   for	  private	  actors	  as	  either	  catalysts	   for	  aggravating	  conflict	  dynamics	  or	  promoters	  of	  peace	  within	  conflict	  zones.13	  	  
However,	   this	  paper	   seeks	   to	   show	   that	   the	   relationship	  between	  business	   actors	   and	  conflict	  dynamics	  is	  not	  unidirectional	  nor	  is	  it	  static	  in	  nature.	  Changes	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	   a	   conflict	   affect	   the	   risks	   posed	   to	   companies	   and	   influence	   the	   strategies	   they	  adopt.14	  Moreover,	   high	   levels	   of	   violence	   and	   brutality	   create	   an	   environment	   of	   fear	  and	  intimidation	  and	  can	  severely	  limit	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  foreign	  business	  actors	  in	  a	   conflict	   environment.	  This	   is	  not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   issue	   should	  be	  approached	  with	  sympathy	   –	   as	   many	   MNCs’	   public	   relations	   representatives	   would	   prefer	   –	   but	   that	  there	  is	  a	  layer	  of	  truth	  that	  warrants	  attention.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   dynamism	   of	   the	   relationship	   that	   governs	   the	   corporate–conflict	  nexus,	  other	  variables,	  such	  as	  the	  sector	  or	  industry	  of	  the	  MNC,	  impact	  the	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  a	  company	  on	  the	  ground.15	  Of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  this	  analysis	  are	  those	  geo-­‐political	   and	   geo-­‐economic	   factors	   that	   characterise	   the	   site(s)	   of	   a	   MNC’s	  operations	   in	   the	   host	   country.	   The	   availability	   of	   valuable	   resources	   and	   strategic	  access	   to	   important	   conflict	   zones	   and	   infrastructure	  make	   the	   sites	   of	   certain	  MNCs	  attractive	   to	   combatants.	   However,	   the	   presence	   of	   armed	   actors	   at	   the	   site	   of	   its	  operations	   places	   a	   significant	   constraint	   on	   the	   choices	   available	   to	   a	   company	   that	  seeks	  to	  continue	  operating.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  there	  is	  little	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  such	  intervening	  factors	  in	  determining	  MNC	  behaviour	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  This	  paper	  asserts	  that	  the	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  companies	   in	  conflict	  zones	  are	   influenced	  by	  “a	  dynamic	  constellation	  of	  independent	  variables”16	  that	  need	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  order	  to	  rectify	  existing	  simplistic	  notions	  of	   foreign	  business	  actors	  as	  purely	  profit-­‐seeking	  entities.	  	  
In	   light	   of	   this,	   this	   study	   analyses	   Firestone	   Liberia’s	   behaviour	   during	   the	   First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  to	  reveal	  the	  complex	  reality	  of	  corporate	  behaviour	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Whetho,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Profit	  and	  Peace,”	  8.	  14	  Ibid;	  Jonathan	  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs,”	  The	  Harvard	  International	  Review,	  May	  6,	  2006,	  accessed	  January	  10,	  2018,	  http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=853.	  15	  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs.”	  16	  Luke	  Anthony	  Patey,	  A	  Complex	  Reality:	  The	  Strategic	  Behaviour	  of	  Multinational	  Oil	  Corporations	  and	  the	  
New	  Wars	  in	  Sudan	  (Copenhagen:	  Danish	  Institute	  for	  International	  Studies,	  2006),	  51.	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2.	  Research	  Questions	  
2.1.	   The	  primary	   research	   question	   for	   this	   study	   is:	  What	  are	  the	  possible	  reasons	   for	  
Firestone’s	  behaviour	  during	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War?	  	  
2.1.1.	  How	  did	  Firestone’s	  behaviour	  evolve	  over	  the	  conflict	  trajectory?	  
2.1.2.	  Where	  did	   ultimate	   decision-­‐making	   authority	   lie	   for	   Firestone	   and	  how	  did	  this	  affect	  the	  company’s	  decisions?	  
2.2.	  The	  secondary	  research	  question	  is:	  What	  are	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  findings	  for	  
monitoring	  the	  role	  of	  corporate	  actors	  in	  conflict	  zones?	  
3.	  The	  Case	  Study	  
This	  paper	  employs	  Firestone	  Liberia	  during	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	   investigate	   the	   intricacies	   of	   the	   corporate–conflict	   nexus.	   The	   period	   between	  June	  1990	  and	  November	  1992	  is	  emphasised,	  as	  this	  was	  when	  the	  company	  was	  most	  actively	  engaged	  with	  certain	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict	  theatre.	  	  
3.1.	  Firestone’s	  Corporate	  History	  and	  Structure	  
Multinational	   corporations	   typically	   have	   complex	   and	   convoluted	   organisational	  structures.	   The	   corporate	   structure	   within	   which	   Firestone	   Liberia	   is	   situated	   is	  similarly	  complicated.	  As	  such,	  the	  hierarchy	  needs	  to	  be	  broken	  down	  at	  each	  level	  to	  better	  understand	  any	  corporate	  constraints	  on	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  behaviour	  during	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War.	  	  
Harvey	  Samuel	  Firestone	  Sr	  founded	  the	  Firestone	  Tire	  and	  Rubber	  Company	  (FSTR)	  in	  1900	  in	  Akron,	  Ohio.17	  In	  1923,	  the	  company	  expanded	  its	  operations	  overseas	  when	  it	  entered	   into	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   Liberian	   government	   to	   establish	   a	   rubber	  plantation	   in	   Margibi	   County.18	  The	   Firestone	   Natural	   Rubber	   Company	   (FSNR)	   was	  established	   in	   1926	   as	   a	   subsidiary	   of	   FSTR	   and	   was	   charged	   with	   controlling	   the	  plantation	   from	   its	   headquarters	   in	   North	   America,	   while	   its	   own	   subsidiary,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Stephen	  L.	  Harp,	  A	  World	  History	  of	  Rubber:	  Empire,	  Industry,	  and	  the	  Everyday	  (Chichester:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  2016),	  97.	  18	  Bridgestone	  Americas,	  Inc.,	  “Corporation:	  History,”	  accessed	  March	  7,	  2018,	  https://www.bridgestoneamericas.com/en/corporation/history.	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Firestone	  Plantations	  Company	  (FPCO),	  executed	  operations	  on	   the	  ground.19	  Over	   the	  subsequent	   decades,	   the	   plantation	   grew	   to	   become	   the	   largest	   contiguous	   rubber	  plantation	   in	   the	  world	  and	  a	  key	  source	  of	  employment	  and	  revenue	   for	   the	  Liberian	  state.20	  Its	  parent	   company,	  FSTR,	   continued	   to	  expand	   its	  operations	  and	  diversify	   its	  product	   offerings	   in	   the	   North	   American	   market.21	  By	   1975,	   FSTR	   had	   expanded	   to	  become	  a	  multi-­‐billion	  dollar	  company	  with	  operations	  around	  the	  world.22	  	  
In	   1988,	   FSTR	   was	   sold	   to	   the	   Japanese	   conglomerate,	   the	   Bridgestone	   Corporation	  (“Bridgestone”).23	  Bridgestone	   acquired	   full	   ownership	   of	   FSTR	   and	  merged	   its	   North	  American	   operations	   to	   form	   Bridgestone/Firestone,	   Incorporated	   (now	   Bridgestone	  Americas,	  Incorporated).	  FSNR	  continued	  to	  operate	  as	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  BFS	  as	  a	  division	  within	   Bridgestone/Firestone	   Diversified	   Products	   (now	   Firestone	   Diversified	  Products).	  FPCO	  remained	  the	  company	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Harbel	  plantation,	  but	  was	  later	  renamed	   Firestone	   Liberia	   (“Firestone”).2425 	  Due	   to	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   current	  structure,	  a	  simplified	  organogram	  follows.26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Jessica	  Bergman,	  “The	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute	  and	  Flomo	  v.	  Firestone	  Natural	  Rubber	  Company:	  The	  Key	  to	  Change	  in	  Global	  Child	  Labor	  Practices?”	  Indiana	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies,	  vol.	  18,	  no.	  1	  (Winter	  2011),	  http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol18/iss1/18457.	  20	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America,	  “Preliminary	  Report,”	  3.	  21	  Bridgestone	  Americas,	  Inc.,	  “Corporation:	  History.”	  22	  Firestone,	  “1960s	  –	  1980s:	  Strength	  and	  Influence,”	  accessed	  March	  6,	  2018,	  https://www.firestonetire.com/heritage#1960-­‐1980s.	  23	  Jim	  Mackinnon,	  “Bridgestone’s	  Buy	  of	  Firestone,	  20	  Years	  Later,”	  Akron	  Beacon	  Journal,	  May	  4,	  2008,	  accessed	  October	  11,	  2017,	  https://www.ohio.com/akron/business/bridgestone-­‐s-­‐buy-­‐of-­‐firestone-­‐20-­‐years-­‐later.	  24	  Bergman,	  “The	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute.”	  25	  However,	  the	  name	  FPCO	  is	  at	  times	  used	  in	  the	  primary	  sources	  referenced	  in	  this	  study.	  26	  Bergman,	  “The	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute”;	  Nicholas	  Cook,	  “Liberia’s	  Post-­‐War	  Recovery:	  Key	  Issues	  and	  Developments,”	  in	  Politics	  and	  Economics	  of	  
Africa,	  Volume	  6,	  ed.	  by	  Olufemi	  Wusu	  (New	  York:	  Nova	  Science	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  2006);	  Bridgestone	  Americas,	  Inc.,	  “Corporation:	  Subsidiaries	  and	  Business	  Units,”	  accessed	  March	  2,	  2018,	  https://www.bridgestoneamericas.com/en/corporation/subsidiaries-­‐and-­‐business-­‐units;	  Firestone	  Natural	  Rubber	  Company,	  “Home,”	  accessed	  January	  8,	  2018,	  https://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com;	  Bridgestone	  Americas,	  Inc.,	  “Corporation:	  History.”	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Figure	  1:	  Bridgestone	  Group	  organogram27	  
Following	   Bridgestone’s	   acquisition	   of	   FSTR,	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   disjuncture	  between	   the	   parent	   company	   in	   Tokyo	   and	   its	   new	   subsidiary	   in	   North	   America.	  Communications	   from	   Bridgestone	   were	   sent	   in	   Japanese	   and	   few	   of	   the	   Japanese	  managers	   at	   BFS	   headquarters	   could	   speak	   fluent	   English,	   which	   alienated	   US	  management	  and	  made	   instituting	  changes	  on	   the	  ground	   in	  Akron	  challenging.28.	   In	  a	  complex	   organisational	   structure	   like	   that	   of	   the	   Bridgestone	   Group,	   decisions	  pertaining	   to	   issues	   at	   the	   subsidiary	   level	   tend	   to	   be	   made	   at	   lower	   levels	   in	   the	  company	  structure.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  when	  the	  parent	  company	  is	  otherwise	  involved	   in	  complex	   issues	  on	   the	  home	   front,	  as	  was	   the	  case	  at	  BFS	  headquarters	  at	  the	   time.	   As	   such,	   when	   the	   conflict	   neared	   the	   Firestone	   plantation	   in	   mid-­‐1990,	  Firestone	   Liberia’s	   management	   were	   the	   first	   to	   take	   charge	   of	   the	   situation	   on	   the	  ground.	  It	  was	  only	  once	  their	  efforts	  proved	  futile	  and	  the	  situation	  became	  one	  of	  life	  and	   death	   that	   BFS	   stepped	   in.	   The	   Bridgestone	   Corporation,	   Firestone’s	   ultimate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  *Bridgestone/Firestone	  is	  now	  Bridgestone	  North	  American	  Tire,	  LLC;	  	  **Bridgestone/Firestone	  Diversified	  Products,	  LLC	  is	  now	  Firestone	  Diversified	  Products,	  LLC.	  28	  Adam	  L.	  Penenberg,	  Blood	  Highways:	  The	  True	  Story	  Behind	  the	  Ford-­‐Firestone	  Killing	  Machine	  (Eugene,	  Oregon:	  Wayzgoose	  Press,	  2012).	  
Bridgestone	  
Corporation	  
Other	  subsidiaries	   Bridgestone/Firestone,	  Incorporated*	  
Other	  subsidiaries	   Firestone	  Natural	  Rubber	  	  Company,	  LLC	  (a	  division	  of	  Bridgestone/Firestone	  Diversiqied	  Products**)	  
Firestone	  Liberia	  (previously	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company)	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holding	  company,	  had	   little	   interference	   in	  or	   influence	  over	  the	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  its	  subsidiary	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
3.2.	  Firestone	  and	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  
As	   established,	   Firestone	   has	   a	   longstanding	   history	   with	   the	   Liberian	   state	   and	   has	  made	   substantial	   capital	   investments	   in	   the	   country	   through	   its	   plantation.	   When	  Liberia	   descended	   into	   civil	   war	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   BFS	   spokesman,	   Trevor	   Hoskins,	  announced	  to	  the	  press	  in	  Akron	  that	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  keep	  operations	  running	  even	  with	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   rebels,	   whom	   he	   referred	   to	   as	   “freedom	   fighters”.29	  The	  plantation	  remained	  active	  until	  a	  battle	  between	  the	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (NPFL)	   rebels	   and	   the	   government’s	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   Liberia	   (AFL)	   destabilised	  operations	  and	  endangered	  employees	  in	  June	  1990.	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  evacuation	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  expatriate	  staff	  and	  the	  effective	  halting	  of	  operations.	  Firestone	  and	  BFS	  remained	  intent	  on	  restarting	  operations	  and	  sent	  a	  small	  team	  of	  managers	  back	  to	  Monrovia	   in	   1991.30	  However,	   management	   experienced	   difficulties	   in	   accessing	   the	  plantation	  and	  in	  appeasing	  both	  the	  Liberian	  government	  and	  the	  rebels.	  Eventually,	  in	  January	   1992,	   Firestone	   Liberia	   signed	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   rebel	   leader,	   Charles	  Taylor,	   at	   the	   behest	   of	   the	   BFS	   Board	   of	   Directors,	   that	   committed	   the	   company	   to	  conducting	   its	   operations	   solely	   through	   National	   Patriotic	   Reconstruction	   Assembly	  Government	  (NPRAG)	  territory.	  
The	   details	   of	   Taylor’s	   relationship	   with	   Firestone	   were	   largely	   unknown	   until	   more	  recently,	  when	  a	  documentary	  entitled	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord	  aired	  in	  late	  2014.	  The	  documentary	   and	   the	   commentary	   it	   has	   inspired	   paint	   an	   unflattering	   picture	   of	  Firestone	   as	   a	   profit-­‐driven	   entity	  whose	   agreement	  with	   Taylor	   negatively	   impacted	  conflict	  dynamics	  during	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War.	  As	  such,	  the	  case	  study	  is	  situated	  within	  the	  broader	  debate	  that	  argues	  that	  “access	  to	  lucrative	  economic	  resources	  with	  the	   active	   participation	   of	   …	   [MNCs]	   has	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   …	   sustaining	  conflicts”.31	  Analysis	   of	   the	   available	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   the	   1992	   agreement	   did	  have	  negative	   consequences	   for	   conflict	  dynamics	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   gave	  Taylor	   access	   to	  financial	  resources	  and	  provided	  him	  a	  military	  base	   from	  which	  to	  operate.	  However,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America,	  “Preliminary	  Report,”	  6.	  30	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord,	  directed	  by	  Marcela	  Gaviria,	  November	  24,	  2014	  (Boston,	  Massachusetts:	  PBS	  Frontline),	  https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/firestone-­‐and-­‐the-­‐warlord/.	  31	  Pan	  Kanagaretnam	  and	  Susan	  Brown,	  Business,	  Conflict,	  and	  Peacebuilding:	  An	  Operational	  Framework	  (Canadian	  Peacekeeping	  Press	  for	  The	  Pearson	  Peacekeeping	  Centre,	  2005),	  1.	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this	  study	  investigates	  the	  possible	  motivations	  for	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  decision	  to	  deal	  with	  Taylor	  in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  limited	  choices	  available	  to	  foreign	  business	  actors	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  intervening	  factors	  are	  analysed	  to	  ascertain	  the	  agency	  available	   to	   Firestone	   Liberia,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   parent	   company,	   BFS,	   in	   navigating	   the	  Liberian	  conflict.	  	  
4.	  Significance	  of	  the	  Study	  
The	  primary	  significance	  of	   this	   study	   is	   its	   contribution	   to	   the	  ongoing	  debate	  on	   the	  role	   of	  MNCs	   in	   contemporary	   conflicts.	   The	   existing	   literature	   tends	   to	   be	   superficial	  and	  focuses	  predominantly	  on	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  MNC	  strategies	   in	  conflict	  zones.	   While	   this	   is	   important,	   little	   effort	   has	   been	   made	   to	   investigate	   the	   agency	  available	  to	  foreign	  business	  actors	  in	  situations	  of	  extreme	  violence.	  Scant	  attention	  has	  been	  dedicated	  to	  investigating	  the	  evolution	  of	  Firestone’s	  strategy	  in	  Liberia	  along	  the	  dynamic	   conflict	   trajectory,	   and	   even	   less	   to	   incorporating	   significant	   intervening	  variables	   to	   analyse	   why	   the	   company	   made	   a	   “deal	   with	   the	   devil”.32	  Some	   of	   these	  variables	   include	   Liberia’s	   entrenched	   political	   culture	   of	   predation	   and	   selfishness,	  which	   is	   addressed	   in	  Chapter	  Three.	  Additionally,	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   characteristics	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Civil	  War,	  such	  as	  the	  shocking	  nature	  of	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	   brutality,	   are	   highlighted	   in	   Chapter	   Four.	   Moreover,	   the	   relevance	   of	   resources	  available	   on	   the	   plantation	   and	   its	   geographical	   position	   within	   the	   conflict	   are	  emphasised	   in	   Chapter	   Four	   to	   show	   how	   such	   factors	   can	   constrain	   the	   choices	  available	  to	  companies	  operating	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  Thus,	  the	  Firestone	  case	  study	  is	  used	  to	   investigate	   the	   corporate–conflict	   nexus	   more	   holistically	   and	   to	   unpack	   the	  intervening	  factors	  that	  might	  affect	  corporate	  decision-­‐making	  in	  such	  situations.	  
Currently,	   numerous	   international	   initiatives,	   programmes	   and	   voluntary	   principles	  exist	  as	  guides	   for	  ensuring	  “good”	  corporate	  behaviour	   in	  conflict	  zones.33	  The	  United	  Nations	  Guiding	  Principles	  on	  Business	  and	  Human	  Rights	   (UNGPs)	  and	   the	  Voluntary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  T.	  Christian	  Miller	  and	  Jonathan	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Four:	  Deal	  with	  the	  Devil,”	  in	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord,	  November	  18,	  2014,	  accessed	  September	  16,	  2018,	  https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-­‐and-­‐the-­‐warlord-­‐chapter-­‐4.	  33	  United	  Nations,	  Guiding	  Principles	  on	  Business	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Implementing	  the	  United	  Nations	  
“Protect,	  Respect	  and	  Remedy”	  Framework,	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner,	  2011,	  accessed	  February	  8,	  2018,	  http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf;	  Secretariat	  for	  the	  Voluntary	  Principles	  on	  Security	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  “What	  are	  the	  Voluntary	  Principles?”	  Voluntary	  Principles	  on	  Security	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  accessed	  February	  8,	  2018,	  http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org.	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Principles	   on	   Security	   and	   Human	   Rights	   (VPs)	   inform	   many	   of	   the	   other	   strategies	  devised	   for	   conflict-­‐sensitive	   business	   practices.34	  However,	   these	   standards	   lack	   real	  operational	  guidance	  and	  numerous	  companies	  have	  noted	  that	  –	  even	  in	  low-­‐risk	  areas	  –	  adhering	  to	  these	  standards	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  task.	  As	  Achim	  Wennmann	  elucidates,	  the	  problem	   here	   is	   that	   the	   standards	   are	   “declaratory	   rather	   than	   operational”.35	  This	  study	   asserts	   that	   more	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   to	   understand	   what	   drives	   legitimate	  companies	   to	   enter	   into	   arrangements	  with	   combatant	   forces	   in	   conflict	   zones,	   before	  prescribing	   a	   framework	   for	   positive	   corporate	   engagement.	   The	   study	   thus	   aims	   to	  contribute	   towards	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   corporate–conflict	   nexus,	   as	   a	   step	  towards	   identifying	   potential	   mechanisms	   for	   monitoring	   corporate	   behaviour	   in	  conflict	  zones.	  	  
A	  key	  obstacle	  to	   investigating	  MNCs’	  behaviour	   in	  conflict	  zones	   is	   that	  companies	  do	  not	   often	   share	   sensitive	   information. 36 	  Thus,	   accessing	   corporate	   records	   and	  confidential	   company	   data	   is	   an	   obstacle	   to	   analysis.	   However,	   the	   documentary,	  
Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord,	  brought	  to	  light	  primary	  sources	  of	  information	  that	  have,	  to	  date,	  not	  been	  comprehensively	  dealt	  with	  in	  an	  academic	  study.	  This	  study	  seeks	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  by	  using	  these	  sources,	  along	  with	  relevant	  secondary	  sources,	   to	   analyse	   the	   strategic	  behaviour	  of	   Firestone	  during	   the	  First	   Liberian	  Civil	  War.	  Through	  the	  study	  of	  a	  prominent	  MNC	  operating	  in	  a	  conflict	  zone,	  this	  study	  aims	  to	   contribute	  more	  broadly	   towards	  a	   comprehensive	  understanding	  of	   contemporary	  conflicts.	   While	   MNCs	   are	   active	   across	   numerous	   sectors,	   this	   study	   posits	   that	  resource-­‐reliant	  MNCs	  are	  particularly	  significant	  actors	  within	  conflict	  settings	  and	  can	  act	  as	  decisive	  intervening	  variables	  in	  conflict	  dynamics.	  The	  particular	  significance	  of	  analysing	  a	  resource-­‐reliant	  MNC	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  case	  study	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  centrality	  of	  natural	  resources	  to	  the	  Liberian	  civil	  conflict.37	  While	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  Firestone	   was	   by	   no	   means	   the	   only	   company	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	   conflict,	   its	  significance	  in	  Liberia’s	  history	  and	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  allegations	  laid	  against	  it	  make	  it	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  and	  relevant	  case	  study.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ben	  Miller,	  Dost	  Bardouille	  and	  Sarah	  Cechvala,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Non-­‐State	  Actors:	  Dilemmas,	  Challenges,	  and	  a	  Way	  Forward”	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  CDA	  Collaborative	  Learning	  Projects,	  2014),	  http://cdacollaborative.org/wordpress/wp-­‐content/uploads/2016/01/Business-­‐and-­‐Armed-­‐Non-­‐State-­‐Actors-­‐Dilemmas-­‐Challenges-­‐and-­‐a-­‐Way-­‐Forward.pdf.	  35	  Achim	  Wennmann,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Conflict	  Financing:	  A	  Comprehensive	  Approach	  Beyond	  Natural	  Resources,”	  Global	  Governance,	  vol.	  13,	  no.	  3	  (July	  –	  September	  2007),	  435,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800670.	  36	  William	  Rosenau,	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency	  (Santa	  Monica,	  CA:	  RAND	  Corporation,	  2009),	  2.	  37	  Whetho,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Profit	  and	  Peace.”	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5.	  Research	  Design	  
This	  study	  is	  a	  theory-­‐generating	  case	  study	  that	  investigates	  the	  relationship	  between	  MNCs	   involved	   in	   the	   resource	   sector	   and	   relevant	   actors	   within	   a	   conflict.	   Research	  reveals	  that	  not	  all	  companies	  will	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  conflict	  dynamics	  and	  not	  all	  companies	   will	   play	   the	   same	   role.	   Moreover,	   different	   companies	   will	   be	   driven	   by	  different	  impetuses	  and	  have	  different	  degrees	  of	  agency	  depending	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  corporation.	  As	  such,	   this	   study	   analyses	   an	   individual	   case	  within	   the	   corporate–conflict	   platform	   to	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  analysis,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  broader,	  high-­‐n	  case	  study.	  The	  case	  involves	  the	  strategic	  behaviour	  of	  Firestone	  in	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War,	  which	  lasted	  from	  1989	  until	  1997.	  The	  period	  June	  1990	  to	  November	  1992	  is	  emphasised,	  as	  this	  was	  when	  Firestone	  Liberia	  was	  most	  actively	  engaged	  with	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict.	  While	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  MNCs	  in	  conflict	  is	  used	  as	  a	  blueprint	  for	  investigating	  the	  role	  played	   by	   Firestone	   in	   the	   conflict,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   study	   is	   ultimately	   to	   add	   to	   a	  general	  conceptual	  framework	  through	  its	  findings.	  
6.	  Research	  Methodology	  
This	   paper	   makes	   use	   of	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   evidence	   as	   well	   as	   historical	  approaches	   to	   investigate	   the	   subject	  matter.	   As	  mentioned,	   the	   recent	   uncovering	   of	  pertinent	   primary	   sources	   detailing	   the	   actions	   of	   Firestone	   during	   the	   First	   Liberian	  Civil	  War	  provides	   the	   foundation	   for	   this	  study.	  These	  sources	   include	   letters	  sent	  by	  Firestone	  executives	  to	  both	  the	  Liberian	  state	  and	  Taylor’s	  NPRAG,	  various	  cables	  and	  business	   reports	   that	   document	   the	   deals	  made,	   and	   personal	   accounts	   of	   the	   events	  that	  took	  place.38	  In	  addition,	  transcripts	  from	  Taylor’s	  trial	  at	  The	  Hague	  and	  interviews	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Memorandum	  of	  understanding	  between	  National	  Patriotic	  Reconstruction	  Assembly	  Government	  (NPRAG)	  and	  the	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company	  (FPCO),	  January	  18,	  1992;	  Memorandum	  of	  discussion,	  May	  22,	  1992;	  Cable,	  May	  1991;	  Cable,	  August	  1991;	  Cable,	  October	  1991;	  Cable,	  July	  1992;	  Cable,	  October	  1992;	  Cable,	  November	  1992;	  Ensminger,	  Donald,	  diary	  entries,	  June	  6–13,	  1990;	  Ensminger,	  Donald,	  letter	  from	  Donald	  Ensminger	  to	  Charles	  Taylor,	  October	  3,	  1990;	  Ensminger,	  Donald,	  “The	  Effect	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  on	  the	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company,”	  aide-­‐memoire,	  October	  10,	  1990;	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company,	  Schedule	  of	  Tax	  Payments	  to	  the	  NPRAG,	  March	  22,	  1993;	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company,	  “1992	  Production	  and	  Shipments,”	  April	  13,	  1993;	  Schremp,	  John,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Francis	  T.	  Karpeh,	  July	  8,	  1993;	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with	   key	   individuals	  who	  witnessed	   the	   civil	  war	  provide	  human	   insight	   into	   the	   role	  that	   Firestone	   played	   in	   the	   conflict’s	   dynamics.	   Official	   company	   data	   for	   the	  Bridgestone	   Group	   are	   also	   used.	   This	   study	   also	   makes	   extensive	   use	   of	   secondary	  sources,	   consisting	   of	   various	   peer-­‐reviewed	   books	   and	   journals,	   documentaries	   and	  reputable	  newspaper	  articles.	   In	  order	   to	  ensure	   the	  validity	  of	   this	   research,	  multiple	  sources	  of	  evidence	  have	  been	  employed.	  By	  confining	  the	  subject	  matter	  specifically	  to	  MNCs	  involved	  in	  the	  extraction	  of	  natural	  resources,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	   will	   be	   more	   credible	   and	   thus	   useful	   for	   further	   research	   on	   the	   topic.	  Triangulation	   research	   methodologies	   are	   thus	   employed	   to	   generate	   greater	  confidence	  in	  the	  findings.	  
7.	  Limitations	  and	  Delimitations	  
This	   study	   is	   limited	   to	   analysing	   the	   role	  of	   Firestone	   in	   the	  First	   Liberian	  Civil	  War,	  which	  took	  place	  from	  1989	  until	  1997.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  study	  looks	  at	  the	  period	  between	   1990	   and	   1992,	   when	   Firestone	   was	   most	   active	   in	   Liberia.	   While	   a	   more	  comprehensive	  study	  of	  the	  various	  MNCs	  operating	  in	  Liberia	  during	  the	  First	  Civil	  War	  is	  desirable,	  this	  study	  is	  confined	  to	  analysing	  only	  the	  role	  played	  by	  Firestone.	  While	  the	  relationship	  between	  Firestone	  and	  Taylor	  during	  his	  presidency	  would	  no	  doubt	  be	  of	  interest,	  time	  restrictions	  and	  a	  paucity	  of	  information	  on	  this	  period	  precludes	  this.	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	   acknowledged	   that	   broad	   generalisations	   cannot	   be	  made	   from	   the	  analysis	  of	  a	  single	  case	  study.	  However,	  the	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  will	  stimulate	  further	  academic	  research	  into	  the	  role	  and	  impact	  of	  MNCs	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  	  
8.	  Chapter	  Outline	  
Chapter	  Two	  comprises	  five	  sections.	  The	  first	  looks	  at	  the	  broader	  academic	  landscape	  in	   order	   to	   contextualise	   the	   literature	   pertaining	   to	   the	   role	   of	  MNCs	   in	   conflict.	   The	  second	  section	  addresses	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  while	  the	  third	  section	  identifies	  prominent	  themes	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  fourth	  section	  addresses	  the	   literature	   on	   the	   Firestone	   Liberia	   case	   study	   and	   the	   final	   section	   provides	   a	  summary	  of	  Chapter	  Two.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  identify	  patterns	  and	  gaps	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  and	  to	  provide	  an	  academic	  context	  for	  analysis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Schremp,	  John,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Charles	  Taylor,	  December	  20,	  1991;	  Schremp,	  John,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  N.	  Mornorkonmana,	  July	  5,	  1991.	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Chapter	  Three	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  sections.	  The	  first	  is	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  factors	  of	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  and	  includes	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  historic	  context	  and	  the	  Doe	  dictatorship.	  Here,	  the	  importance	  of	  Liberia’s	  cultural	  structure	  and	  history	  of	  violence	  are	  emphasised,	  as	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  regional	  and	  international	  dimensions.	  The	  following	  section	   investigates	   Firestone	   Liberia’s	   relationship	   within	   the	   state	   and	   within	   the	  context	   of	   its	   economic	   history.	   The	   third	   section	   provides	   details	   on	   the	   history	   of	  Firestone	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   the	   corporate	   structure	   of	   the	   company	   during	   the	  conflict.	  The	  final	  section	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  chapter.	  
Chapter	   Four	   is	   an	   examination	   of	   Firestone’s	   behaviour	   along	   the	   conflict	   trajectory.	  The	   chapter	   is	   structured	   chronologically	   in	   order	   to	   show	   how	   changes	   in	   conflict	  dynamics	  affected	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  Firestone	  Liberia	  and	  its	  parent	  company,	  BFS.	  Ultimately,	   the	   purpose	   of	   Chapter	   Four	   is	   to	   unpack	   the	   possible	   motivations	   for	  Firestone’s	   behaviour	  while	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   degree	   of	   agency	   available	   to	   the	  company	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  a	  particularly	  violent	  conflict.	  	  
Chapter	  Five	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	   findings	  based	  on	  the	  original	  research	  aims.	  This	  includes	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   geo-­‐economic	   and	   geo-­‐political	   factors,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   impact	   of	   conflict	   characteristics	   and	   corporate	   structure,	   on	   a	   company’s	  agency.	   The	   chapter	   concludes	   by	   addressing	   the	   consequences	   of	   these	   findings	   for	  monitoring	  the	  role	  of	  corporate	  actors	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  
9.	  Key	  Terms	  
Conflict-­‐affected	  environment	  
According	   to	   the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	   (UNCTAD),	   “a	  conflict-­‐affected	  environment	  refers	  to	  countries	  or	  regions	  where	  there	  is	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  violent	   conflict	  breaking	  out;	   that	  are	   in	   the	  midst	  of	  violent	   conflict;	  or	  have	   recently	  emerged	  from	  it,	  including	  countries	  classified	  as	  ‘post-­‐conflict’ ”.39	  	  
Corporate–conflict	  nexus	  
In	  this	  study,	  this	  term	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  role	  of	  corporate	  actors	  in	  conflict	  settings	  as	  it	  is	  discussed	  within	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  topic.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  van	  Dorp,	  Multinational	  Corporations	  and	  Conflict,	  12.	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Foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  
Foreign	   direct	   investment	   (FDI)	   refers	   to	   the	   process	   where	   a	   corporation	   in	   one	  country	  sets	  up	  a	  business	  operation	  in	  another	  country.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  establishing	  a	   new	   wholly	   owned	   affiliate	   company,	   through	   the	   acquisition	   of	   an	   existing	   local	  company	  or	  a	  joint	  venture	  in	  the	  host	  country.40	  
Multinational	  corporation	  (MNC)	  
As	  John	  Ruggie	  points	  out,	  there	  is	  no	  universally	  accepted	  definition	  for	  a	  multinational	  corporation.41	  However,	  the	  term	  is	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  business	  entity	  that	  comprises	   companies	   involved	   in	   commercial	   operations	   in	   more	   than	   one	   state.42	  According	   to	   the	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Development	   (OECD)	  Guidelines	  for	  Multinational	  Enterprises,	  “[w]hile	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  entities	  may	  be	  able	   to	   exercise	   a	   significant	   influence	   over	   the	   activities	   of	   others,	   their	   degree	   of	  autonomy	  within	  the	  enterprise	  may	  vary	  widely	   from	  one	  multinational	  enterprise	  to	  another”. 43 	  Moreover,	   the	   ownership	   structure	   can	   be	   state-­‐owned,	   private	   or	   a	  combination.44	  
Subsidiary	  
For	  this	  paper,	  a	  subsidiary	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  value-­‐adding	  commercial	  activity	  outside	  of	  a	  MNC’s	  home	  state.45	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Jessie	  Chella,	  “The	  Complicity	  of	  Multinational	  Corporations	  in	  International	  Crimes:	  An	  Examination of	  Principles”	  (PhD	  dissertation,	  Bond	  University,	  2012),	  24;	  United	  Nations,	  “Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  (FDI)	  Net	  Inflows	  and	  Net	  Outflows	  as	  Share	  of	  GDP,”	  http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology_sheets/global_econ_partnership/fdi.pdf.	  41	  John	  Gerard	  Ruggie,	  “Multinationals	  as	  Global	  Institution:	  Power,	  Authority	  and	  Relative	  Autonomy,”	  
Regulation	  &	  Governance	  (2017):	  2.	  https://www.business-­‐humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Ruggie-­‐2017-­‐Regulation_Governance.pdf.	  42	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD),	  OECD	  Guidelines	  for	  Multinational	  
Enterprises	  (Paris:	  OECD	  Publishing,	  2011),	  http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/	  48004323.pdf.	  43	  OECD,	  OECD	  Guidelines	  for	  Multinational	  Enterprises,	  17.	  44	  OECD,	  OECD	  Guidelines	  for	  Multinational	  Enterprises,	  17.	  45	  Julian	  Birkinshaw,	  “Chapter	  14:	  Strategy	  and	  Management	  in	  MNE	  Subsidiaries,”	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  
of	  International	  Business,	  ed.	  Alan	  M.	  Rugman	  and	  Thomas	  L.	  Brewer	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  380.	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  
Chapter	   Two	   is	   a	   comprehensive	   review	   of	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   corporate-­‐conflict	   nexus	   as	  well	   as	   the	   literature	   on	   Firestone	   Liberia	   during	   the	   civil	   war.	   The	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  business	  in	  conflict	  is	  contextualised	  within	  the	  broader	  debate	  of	  the	  “new	  wars”	  thesis,	  wherein	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  contemporary	  conflicts	  (and	  the	   role	   of	   natural	   resources	   within	   such	   conflicts)	   is	   emphasised.	   The	   next	   section	  addresses	  the	  broader	  academic	  landscape	  in	  which	  the	  corporate–conflict	  literature	  is	  situated	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  context	  to	  the	  debate.	  
Section	  1	  |	  The	  Broader	  Academic	  Landscape	  
The	  nature	  of	  warfare	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	   era	  has	  been	   an	   area	  of	   intense	   scholarly	  interest	  and	  debate	  in	  the	  field	  of	  conflict	  studies.	  Central	  to	  this	  has	  been	  the	  discussion	  about	   the	   characteristics	   of	   contemporary	   conflict	   and	   whether	   it	   is	   qualitatively	  different	   from	   earlier	   episodes	   of	   war. 46 	  The	   “new	   wars”	   theorists	   contend	   that	  contemporary	  conflict	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  number	  of	  civil	  wars,	  an	  increase	  in	   the	   intensity	   and	   barbarity	   of	   these	   conflicts,	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   plethora	   of	  actors	  to	  the	  conflict	   theatre.47	  Conflict	   is	   thus	  framed	  as	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  normal	  functioning	   of	   the	   state,	   where	   “war”	   and	   “peace”	   are	   understood	   as	   distinct	  categories.48	  In	   this	  way,	   the	   resort	   to	   violence	   is	   seen	   to	   be	   irrational	   and	   conflict	   is	  framed	  as	  the	  result	  of	  long-­‐suppressed	  intrastate	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  animosities.49	  	  
However,	   studies	   conducted	   by	   Mats	   Berdal,	   David	   M.	   Malone,	   David	   Keen,	   William	  Reno,	   Mark	   Duffield	   and	   Paul	   Collier,	   among	   others,	   emphasise	   the	   role	   of	   economic	  incentives	  in	  shaping	  the	  calculations	  and	  behaviour	  of	  actors	  in	  a	  conflict.50	  They	  argue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Gabriel	  I.	  H.	  Williams,	  Liberia:	  The	  Heart	  of	  Darkness,	  Accounts	  of	  Liberia’s	  Civil	  War	  and	  its	  Destabilizing	  
Effects	  on	  West	  Africa	  (Trafford	  Publishing:	  Victoria,	  Canada,	  2002),	  84.	  47	  Mark	  Duffield,	  Global	  Governance	  and	  the	  New	  Wars:	  The	  Merging	  of	  Development	  and	  Security	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  2001),	  17;	  Mary	  Kaldor,	  New	  and	  Old	  Wars:	  Organized	  Violence	  in	  a	  Global	  Era	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  3.	  48	  Robert	  D.	  Kaplan,	  “The	  Coming	  Anarchy,”	  The	  Atlantic,	  February,	  1994,	  accessed	  November	  13,	  2017,	  https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-­‐coming-­‐anarchy/304670/;	  Berdal	  and	  Malone,	  introduction	  to	  Greed	  and	  Grievance,	  6.	  49	  Berdal	  and	  Malone,	  introduction	  to	  Greed	  and	  Grievance,	  6.	  50	  Ibid.;	  	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  Economic	  Causes	  of	  Civil	  War,”	  Oxford	  Economic	  Papers,	  vol.	  50,	  no.	  4	  (October	  1998),	  https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-­‐abstract/50/4/563/2361691;	  William	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars,”	  in	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  Economic	  
Agendas	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  ed.	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000);	  	  
	   24	  
that	   the	  disappearance	  of	   superpower	   funding	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period	   initiated	  a	  trend	   of	   combatant	   self-­‐financing	   in	   contemporary	   conflict.51 	  This	   trend	   has	   been	  facilitated	  by	  economic	  globalisation,	  which	  has	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  combatants	  to	   access	   international	   trade	   networks	   (licit	   and	   illicit)	   through	   which	   they	   may	  transform	  captured	  resources	   into	  war	  materiel	  and	   financing.	  Some	  scholars	   contend	  that	   combatant	   access	   to	   international	   trade	  networks	   and	  markets	   has	   increased	   the	  economic	  benefits	  of	   conflict,	   resulting	   in	   the	  protraction	  of	  violence.52	  Duffield	  argues	  that	   the	   very	   “transnational	   and	   networked	   characteristics”53	  of	   contemporary	   war	  economies	   have	   precipitated	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   context	   in	   which	   conflict	   is	  studied.	  
In	   this	   context,	   scholars	   such	   as	   Collier,	   Keen,	   Duffield	   and	   Reno	   have	   written	  extensively	   on	   what	   they	   term	   the	   “political	   economy”	   of	   civil	   wars.	   Some,	   such	   as	  Collier,	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  agendas	  in	  initiating	  conflict,	  while	  others,	  such	  as	  Reno,	  address	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  motivations	  in	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  conflict.54	  Integral	  to	  many	  of	  these	  studies	  is	  the	  role	  of	  natural	  resources	  and,	  in	  particular,	  an	  abundance	  of	   these	   resources.	   Authors	   such	   as	   Indra	   de	   Soysa	   find	   that	   greed,	   encouraged	   by	  natural	   resource	   abundance,	   can	   fuel	   civil	   war,	   a	   phenomenon	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  David	  Keen,	  The	  Economic	  Functions	  of	  Violence	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  Adelphi	  Paper	  no.	  320	  (London:	  International	  Institute	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  1998);	  	  David	  Keen,	  “Incentives	  and	  Disincentives	  for	  Violence,”	  in	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  Economic	  Agendas	  in	  Civil	  
Wars,	  ed.	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000);	  Mark	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies,”	  in	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  Economic	  
Agendas	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  ed.	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000);	  	  Paul	  Collier,	  Anke	  Hoeffler	  and	  Måns	  Söderbom,	  “On	  the	  Duration	  of	  Civil	  War,”	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research,	  vol.	  41,	  no.	  3	  (May	  2004),	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149744;	  	  James	  D.	  Fearon,	  “Why	  Do	  Some	  Civil	  Wars	  Last	  So	  Much	  Longer	  Than	  Others?”	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research,	  vol.	  41,	  no.	  3	  (2004),	  275–301,	  DOI:	  10.1177/0022343304043769.	  51	  Karen	  Ballantine	  and	  Jake	  Sherman,	  eds,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Armed	  Conflict:	  Beyond	  Greed	  and	  
Grievance	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2003);	  Karen	  Ballantine	  and	  Heiko	  Nitzschke,	  “Beyond	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  Policy	  Lessons	  from	  Studies	  in	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  International	  Peace	  Academy	  Policy	  Report,	  2003;	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies.”	  52	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict”;	  	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies”;	  	  William	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars”;	  	  Paul	  Collier,	  “Doing	  Well	  Out	  of	  War:	  An	  Economic	  Perspective,”	  in	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  Economic	  Agendas	  
in	  Civil	  Wars,	  ed.	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000);	  Saragen	  Naidoo,	  “The	  Role	  of	  War	  Economies	  in	  Understanding	  Contemporary	  Conflicts,”	  Global	  Insight,	  no.	  2	  (September	  2000),	  http://www.igd.org.za/jdownloads/Global%20Insight/gi_2.pdf.	  53	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies,”	  46.	  54	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  Economic	  Causes	  of	  Civil	  War”;	  	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars”;	  Keen,	  “Incentives	  and	  Disincentives	  for	  Violence”;	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies”;	  Collier	  et	  al.,	  “On	  the	  Duration	  of	  Civil	  War”;	  	  Fearon,	  “Why	  Do	  Some	  Civil	  Wars	  Last	  So	  Much	  Longer	  Than	  Others?”	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“resource	  curse”.55	  More	  recent	  studies	  investigate	  how	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  location	  and	  character	   of	   resources	   affect	   their	   centrality	   to	   conflict	   dynamics.56	  This	   focus	   on	   the	  exploitation,	   taxation	   and	   exportation	   of	   natural	   resources	   drew	   both	   public	   and	  academic	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  MNCs	  in	  contemporary	  conflict	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
Section	  2	  |	  The	  Structure	  of	  the	  Existing	  Literature	  	  
2.1.	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Public	  and	  Academic	  Interest	  
The	  conversation	  around	  the	  role	  of	  business	  in	  conflict	  began	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Europe	  in	  the	   1990s,	   when	   policymakers	   and	   human	   rights	   advocates	   alike	   began	   to	   conflate	  questions	   about	   the	   increased	   global	   presence	   of	  MNCs	   and	   the	   perceived	   increase	   in	  violent	  civil	  conflict.57	  This	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGO)	  and	   international	   organisations’	   (IO)	   attention	   on	   the	   behaviour	   of	   MNCs	   in	   conflict	  settings.	  NGOs	  such	  as	  Global	  Witness,	  International	  Alert,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  and	  the	  International	   Committee	   for	   the	   Red	   Cross	   have	   been	   integral	   in	   investigating	   and	  exposing	   the	   roles	   played	   by	   private	   actors	   in	   contemporary	   conflicts.58	  Prominent	  scholarly	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  MNCs	  and	  violent	  conflict	   include	   Jane	   Nelson,59 	  Karen	   Ballantine, 60	  William	   Reno61 	  and	   Phillippe	   Le	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Indriya	  de	  Soysa,	  “The	  Resource	  Curse:	  Are	  Civil	  Wars	  Driven	  by	  Rapacity	  or	  Paucity?”	  in	  Greed	  and	  
Grievance:	  Economic	  Agendas	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  ed.	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000);	  	  Richard	  M.	  Auty,	  ed.,	  Resource	  Abundance	  and	  Economic	  Development,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  	  Philippe	  Le	  Billon,	  “The	  Geopolitical	  Economy	  of	  ‘Resource	  Wars,’ ”	  Geopolitics,	  vol.	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2004),	  https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040412331307812.	  56	  Philippe	  Le	  Billon,	  “The	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  War:	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  Political	  
Geography,	  vol.	  20,	  no.	  5	  (June	  2001),	  DOI:	  10.1016/S0962-­‐6298(01)00015-­‐4.	  57	  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs.”	  58	  Michael	  Ross,	  “The	  Natural	  Resource	  Curse:	  How	  Wealth	  Can	  Make	  You	  Poor,”	  in	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  
Violent	  Conflict:	  Options	  and	  Actions,	  ed.	  Ian	  Bannon	  and	  Paul	  Collier	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  2003),	  337;	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict.”	  59	  Jane	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace:	  The	  Private	  Sector	  as	  a	  Partner	  in	  Conflict	  Prevention	  and	  Resolution	  (London:	  The	  Prince	  of	  Wales	  Business	  Leaders	  Forum,	  International	  Alert	  and	  Council	  on	  Economic	  Priorities,	  2000),	  http://www.international-­‐alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Business%20of%20Peace.pdf.	  	  60	  Karen	  Ballantine	  and	  Heiko	  Nitzschke,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  War	  and	  Conflict	  Transformation,”	  
Berghof	  Handbook	  for	  Conflict	  Transformation,	  series	  no.	  3	  (2005),	  https://www.berghof-­‐foundation.org/publications/handbook/handbook-­‐dialogues/3-­‐transforming-­‐war-­‐economies/;	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Beyond	  Greed	  and	  Grievance”;	  Ballantine	  and	  Sherman,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Armed	  Conflict:	  Beyond	  Greed	  and	  Grievance.	  61	  William	  Reno,	  Warlord	  Politics	  and	  African	  States	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  1998);	  William	  Reno,	  “Foreign	  Firms	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  NPFL,”	  Liberian	  Studies	  Journal,	  vol.	  13,	  no.	  2	  (1993);	  	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars.”	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Billon62,	  among	  others.	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  corporate–conflict	  nexus	  sets	  the	  problem	  within	  the	   context	   of	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   period,	   when	   world	   politics	   was	   undergoing	   major	  changes.	  As	  such,	  academic	  studies	  mostly	  take	  their	  cues	  from	  the	  new	  wars	  discourse.	  They	  emphasise	  the	  intensity	  and	  duration	  of	  contemporary	  conflict	  and,	  even	  more	  so,	  the	  economic	  agendas	  of	  combatants.	  The	   literature	   thus	   fits	   into	   the	  discourse	  on	  the	  political	   economy	   of	   civil	   conflicts	   and	   investigates	   the	   role	   of	   MNCs	   in	   causing	   and	  perpetuating	  conflict	  by	  facilitating	  the	  rapaciousness	  of	  combatants.	  There	  is	  also	  broad	  recognition	   of	   the	   role	   that	   globalisation	   has	   played	   in	   aiding	   the	   rapid	   expansion	   of	  MNCs,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  opening	  up	  new	  opportunities	  for	  combatants	  to	  translate	  resources	  into	  revenue	  through	  access	  to	  global	  networks	  and	  markets.	  63	  
2.2.	  The	  Evidence	  and	  Methods	  Used	  
The	   majority	   of	   the	   existing	   literature	   is	   qualitative	   in	   nature.64	  While	   many	   of	   the	  academic	  works	   reviewed	  are	  qualitative,	   these	   studies	   typically	   employ	   triangulation	  research	  methodologies	   to	  build	   a	  more	   credible	   evidence	  base.	  Much	  of	   the	   evidence	  gathered	   for	   NGO	   and	   IO	   articles	   was	   sourced	   from	   news	   articles	   and	   (often	  anonymous)	  interviews.	  Some	  NGO	  and	  IO	  reports,	  as	  well	  as	  academic	  studies,	  also	  rely	  on	   field	   research	   carried	   out	   in	   conflict	   or	   post-­‐conflict	   zones.	   However,	   caution	   was	  taken	  when	  assessing	  these	  reports.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  NGO	  work	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Philippe	  Le	  Billon	  and	  Eric	  Nicholls,	  “Ending	  ‘Resource	  Wars’:	  Revenue	  Sharing,	  Economic	  Sanction	  or	  Military	  Intervention?”	  International	  Peacekeeping,	  vol.	  14,	  no.	  5	  (2007),	  DOI:	  10.1080/13533310701753941;	  	  Le	  Billon,	  “The	  Geopolitical	  Economy	  of	  ‘Resource	  Wars’ ”;	  	  Le	  Billon,	  “The	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  War.”	  63	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Beyond	  Greed	  and	  Grievance”;	  Kanagaretnam	  and	  Brown,	  Business,	  Conflict,	  and	  Peacebuilding;	  Bannon	  and	  Collier,	  “Natural	  Resources	  and	  Conflict”;	  	  Berdal	  and	  Malone,	  introduction	  to	  Greed	  and	  Grievance;	  	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies.”	  64	  Scholarly	  works	  include	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke	  (2003,	  2005),	  Ballantine	  and	  Sherman	  (2003),	  Bannon	  and	  Collier	  (2003),	  Patey	  (2006,	  2007),	  Reno	  (1993,	  1998,	  2000)	  and	  Duffield	  (2001),	  among	  others.	  	  Reports	  include,	  among	  others:	  Global	  Witness,	  “Taylor-­‐made:	  The	  Pivotal	  Role	  of	  Liberia’s	  Forests	  and	  Flag	  of	  Convenience	  in	  Regional	  Conflict,”	  September	  2001,	  accessed	  February	  12,	  2018,	  https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/taylormade2.pdf;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “Logging	  Off:	  How	  the	  Liberian	  Timber	  Industry	  Fuels	  Liberia’s	  Humanitarian	  Disaster	  and	  Threatens	  Sierra	  Leone”,	  August	  31,	  2002,	  accessed	  August	  12,	  2017,	  http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00038.pdf;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “A	  Rough	  Trade:	  The	  Role	  of	  Companies	  and	  Governments	  in	  the	  Angolan	  Conflict,”	  December	  1,	  1998,	  accessed	  August	  12,	  2017,	  http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/index.php?section=diamonds;	  Christian	  Aid,	  “The	  Scorched	  Earth:	  Oil	  and	  War	  in	  Sudan,”	  Relief	  Web,	  April	  6,	  2001,	  accessed	  September	  29,	  2017,	  https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/23E203642DF3801485256A15007EA387-­‐chr_aid-­‐sud14mar3.pdf.	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external	   funding,	   these	  reports	  can	  contain	  bias	  and	  sensationalism.65	  While	  this	  might	  bring	   into	  question	  the	  credibility	  of	  NGO	  reports	  as	  reliable	  knowledge,	   these	  reports	  offer	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  their	  subject	  matter	  and	  provide	  a	  useful	  divergence	  from	  the	  theoretical	   abstraction	   often	   found	   in	   academic	   studies.66	  To	   illustrate	   key	   points,	  reports	   and	   academic	   studies	   alike	   employ	   case	   studies	   that	   vary	   in	   form	   from	  examinations	   of	   a	   single	   company	   in	   one	   country	  67	  to	   multiple	   companies	   in	   one	  country,68	  to	  multiple	  examples	  of	  both.69	  	  
Section	  3	  |	  Prominent	  Themes	  in	  the	  Literature	  
3.1.	  Identification	  of	  Different	  Private	  Business	  Actors	  	  
In	   their	   study,	   Ballantine	   and	   Nitzschke	   offer	   a	   taxonomy	   to	   distinguish	   “companies	  whose	   legitimate	   business	   activities	   have	   negative	   but	   unintended	   effects	   on	   conflict	  dynamics”	   from	   those	   that	   “deliberately	   seek	   to	   profit	   from	  war	   by	   conducting	   the	   –	  often	  illicit	  and	  always	  predatory	  –	  business	  of	  war”.70	  Research	  reveals	  that	  the	  chaos	  of	  conflict	   can	   open	   up	   profitable	   opportunities	   for	   some	   commercial	   actors	   whose	  business	   models	   rely	   on	   relationships	   formed	   with	   local	   elites	   and	   strongmen.	  According	   to	   Collier,	   Hoeffler	   and	   Söderbom,	   these	   “rogue	   companies” 71 	  use	   the	  instability	  of	  conflict	  as	  a	  cover	  for	  doing	  business,	  profiting	  from	  providing	  combatants	  with	  necessary	  goods	  and	  services.	  They	  point	  to	  prominent	  private	  security	  companies,	  such	   as	  Blackwater,	   that	   have	  directly	   benefited	   from	   the	   conflict	   in	   Iraq,	   to	   illustrate	  this	  claim.72	  	  
However,	   there	  are	  also	  companies	   that	  have	  a	  vested	   interest	   in	  a	  peaceful	  operating	  environment.	   Some	  of	   these	   companies	  will	   choose	   to	  withdraw	  when	   conflict	   erupts;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Christian	  Aid,	  “The	  Scorched	  Earth,”	  4,	  21.	  66	  Scott	  Pegg	  and	  Alissa	  Wilson,	  “Feature	  Review,”	  Third	  World	  Quarterly,	  vol.	  24,	  no.	  6	  (2003),	  DOI:	  10.1080/01436590310001630125.	  67	  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency.	  68	  Patey,	  A	  Complex	  Reality;	  Reno,	  “Foreign	  Firms	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  NPFL”;	  Reno,	  Warlord	  Politics	  and	  African	  States;	  Global	  Witness,	  “Logging	  Off”;	  Global	  Witness,	  “A	  Rough	  Trade”;	  	  Christian	  Aid,	  “The	  Scorched	  Earth.”	  69	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict”;	  Reno,	  Warlord	  Politics	  and	  African	  States;	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars.”	  70	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  38.	  71	  Ibid.,	  39.	  72	  Collier	  et	  al.,	  “On	  the	  Duration	  of	  Civil	  War.”	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however,	   others	   elect	   to	   keep	   operations	   running	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   instability.	   The	  literature	   points	   to	   a	   handful	   of	   factors	   that	   might	   influence	   which	   companies	   exit	   a	  conflict.	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  more	  generally	  that	  companies	  with	  relatively	  low	  capital	  investment	   and	   mobile	   assets	   often	   decide	   to	   cease	   operations	   and	   withdraw	   from	  conflict-­‐affected	   areas. 73 	  Other	   studies	   emphasise	   the	   industry	   within	   which	   the	  company	  operates	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  operations	  as	  significant	  determining	  factors.74	  Additionally,	  some	  assert	  that	  the	  historical	  experience	  of	  the	  company	  within	  the	  host	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  conflict	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.75	  However,	  there	   is	   a	   general	   lack	   of	   research	   into	   the	   factors	   that	   drive	  MNC	  decision-­‐making	   in	  conflict	  situations,	  which	  often	  leads	  to	  simplistic	  assumptions	  of	  profit-­‐maximisation	  as	  a	  motivating	  force	  in	  the	  literature.76	  This	  study	  seeks	  to	  address	  this	  issue	  by	  unpacking	  the	  possible	  motivations	  for	  Firestone’s	  decisions	  to	  cease	  or	  restart	  operations.	  	  
3.2.	  Rebel-­‐centric	  Approaches	  
Collier	  and	  Hoeffler’s	  seminal	  study,	  Greed	  and	  Grievance	  in	  Civil	  War,	  has	  had	  a	  notable	  influence	   on	   the	   way	   in	   which	   analyses	   of	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   contemporary	  conflicts	   are	   approached.	   Their	   study	   uses	   quantitative	   reasoning	   to	   show	   that	  contemporary	  civil	  conflict	  is	  primarily	  fuelled	  by	  greed	  and	  that	  natural	  resources	  can	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  the	  outbreak	  of	  rebellion	  and	  for	  rebel	  groups	  to	  finance	  their	  activities	  during	  conflict.	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  “greedy	  rebels”	  narrative	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  literature,	   which	   focuses	   on	   the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  rebels	   and	   business	   actors.77	  The	   policy	   implication	   of	   the	   “greedy	   rebel”	   narrative	   is	  that	   business	   actors	   are	   expected	   not	   to	   engage	   with	   rebels	   or,	   if	   not	   possible,	   to	  withdraw	   from	   the	   environment.	   Therefore,	   any	   engagement	   (perceived	   or	   real)	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Patey,	  A	  Complex	  Reality;	  	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict”;	  Jake	  Sherman,	  Private	  Sector	  Actors	  in	  Zones	  of	  Conflict:	  Research	  Challenges	  and	  Policy	  Responses	  (:	  New	  York:	  International	  Peace	  Academy,	  2001),	  5,	  https://www.ipinst.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/publications/pdf_report_private_sector.pdf.	  74	  Miller	  et	  al.,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Non-­‐State	  Actors”;	  	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace;	  	  Miller	  et	  al.,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Non-­‐State	  Actors”;	  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs.”	  75	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace;	  	  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs.”	  76	  Patey,	  A	  Complex	  Reality,	  6.	  77	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  War	  and	  Conflict	  Transformation,”	  4;	  Ballantine	  and	  Sherman,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Armed	  Conflict,	  10;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “The	  Charles	  Taylor	  Verdict:	  A	  Global	  Witness	  Briefing	  on	  a	  Dictator,	  Blood	  Diamonds	  and	  Timber,	  and	  Two	  Countries	  in	  Recovery,”	  April	  2012,	  accessed	  August	  8,	  2017,	  https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/charles-­‐taylor-­‐verdict-­‐global-­‐witness-­‐briefing-­‐dictator-­‐blood-­‐diamonds-­‐and-­‐timber-­‐and-­‐two/.	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rebel	   actors	   is	   received	   with	   reproach	   and	   negative	   attention.	   This	   is	   particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  natural	  resource-­‐reliant	  companies,	  which	  have	  faced	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  lawsuits	  compared	  to	  companies	  in	  other	  sectors.78	  	  
3.3.	  Focus	  on	  the	  Natural	  Resource	  Sector	  
There	  is	  general	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  MNCs	  that	  rely	  on	  natural	  resources	  are	  most	   likely	   to	   remain	   when	   conflict	   erupts.79	  According	   to	   Patey,	   resource-­‐extracting	  corporations	   represent	   the	   majority	   of	   what	   Ballantine	   and	   Nitzschke	   term	   the	  “legitimate”	  side	  of	  corporate	  activity	  in	  conflict	  zones.80	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  focus	  on	  large	  MNCs	  in	  the	  resource	  sector,	  as	  the	  substantial,	  immobile	  and	  capital-­‐intensive	  nature	  of	  their	  investments	  makes	  them	  more	  determined	  to	  continue	  operations	   when	   conflict	   erupts.81	  According	   to	   Bray,	   these	   substantial	   investments	  amount	  to	  a	  type	  of	  hostage	  situation,	  as	  once	  these	  MNCs	  pay	  for	  high-­‐cost	  fixed	  assets,	  they	  cannot	  easily	  withdraw	  from	  their	  host	  country.82	  Particular	  attention	  is	  afforded	  to	  case	   studies	   of	   Sierra	   Leone	   (diamonds),	   Sudan	   (oil)	   and	   Liberia	   (timber),	   as	   well	   as	  Angola	   and	   the	   DRC.83 	  A	   number	   of	   NGO	   and	   IO	   reports	   also	   single	   out	   certain	  prominent	  MNCs	  such	  as	  British	  Petroleum	  (BP),	  De	  Beers,	  ExxonMobil	  and	  Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	   for	   their	   activities	   in	   various	   conflict	   zones.84	  Their	   international	   visibility	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Michael	  Connor,	  “Business	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Interview	  with	  John	  Ruggie,”	  Business	  Ethics,	  October	  30,	  2011,	  accessed	  November	  12,	  2017,	  http://business-­‐ethics.com/2011/10/30/8127-­‐un-­‐principles-­‐on-­‐business-­‐and-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐interview-­‐with-­‐john-­‐ruggie/.	  79	  John	  Bray,	  “Attracting	  Reputable	  Companies	  to	  Risky	  Environments:	  Petroleum	  and	  Mining	  Companies,”	  in	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Violent	  Conflict:	  Options	  and	  Actions,	  ed.	  Ian	  Bannon	  and	  Paul	  Collier	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  2003).	  80	  Patey,	  A	  Complex	  Reality;	  	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict.”	  81	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict”;	  	  Bray,	  “Attracting	  Reputable	  Companies	  to	  Risky	  Environments”;	  	  Le	  Billon,	  “The	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  War.”	  82	  Bray,	  “Attracting	  Reputable	  Companies	  to	  Risky	  Environments,”	  292;	  	  Juliette	  Bennett,	  “Multinational	  Corporations,	  Social	  Responsibility	  and	  Conflict,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Affairs,	  vol.	  55,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  2002),	  5,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/24358177;	  	  OECD,	  OECD	  Guidelines	  for	  Multinational	  Enterprises.	  83	  Christian	  Aid,	  “The	  Scorched	  Earth”;	  Global	  Witness,	  “A	  Rough	  Trade”;	  Patey,	  A	  Complex	  Reality;	  Luke	  Anthony	  Patey,	  “State	  Rules:	  Oil	  Companies	  and	  Armed	  Conflict	  in	  Sudan,”	  Third	  World	  Quarterly,	  vol.	  28,	  no.	  5	  (2007),	  997-­‐1016,	  url:	  http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/stable/20454976;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “Logging	  Off”;	  Global	  Witness,	  “Taylor-­‐made”;	  Berdal	  and	  Malone,	  introduction	  to	  Gredd	  and	  Governance;	  De	  Soysa,	  “The	  Resource	  Curse”;	  Boge	  et	  al.,	  “Who’s	  Minding	  the	  Store?”	  84	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  37;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “A	  Rough	  Trade”;	  Berdal	  and	  Malone,	  introduction	  to	  Greed	  and	  Governmance;	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economic	   prowess,	   along	   with	   their	   significance	   to	   the	   economies	   of	   their	   host	  countries,	   make	   these	   companies	   particularly	   notable	   actors	   within	   contemporary	  conflict	  analysis.	  In	  addition,	  MNCs	  headquartered	  in	  the	  west	  are	  most	  commonly	  cited	  in	   the	   literature.	  While	   some	   studies	   refer	   broadly	   to	   natural	   resources,	   much	   of	   the	  academic	   literature	   emphasises	   those	  MNCs	   involved	   in	   the	   extraction	   of	   oil,	   gas	   and	  diamonds,85	  while	   the	   roles	   of	   MNCs	   whose	   operations	   rely	   on	   other	   resources	   are	  typically	  overlooked.	  	  
3.4.	  Recognition	  of	  the	  Risks	  of	  Operating	  in	  a	  Conflict	  
It	   is	  widely	  acknowledged	   in	   the	  academic	   literature	   that	   legitimate	  companies	  have	  a	  vested	   interest	   in	   a	   peaceful	   operating	   environment	   and	   that	   capital-­‐	   and	   trade-­‐intensive	   companies	   are	   the	  most	   vulnerable	   during	   conflict.86	  Studies	   emphasise	   that	  business	   actors	   can	   be	   affected	   in	   different	   ways	   and	   to	   differing	   degrees	   by	   the	  eruption	   of	   violent	   conflict	   in	   a	   host	   state.87	  The	   impact	   can	   be	   direct,	   such	   as	   the	  destruction	   of	   corporate	   infrastructure	   or	   the	   kidnapping	   or	   killing	   of	   employees,	   or	  indirect,	  felt	  through	  disruptions	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  the	  inability	  of	  employees	  to	  get	  to	  work,	  or	  even	  a	  drop	   in	   the	  demand	   for	  a	  company’s	  goods	  or	  services.88	  A	  number	  of	  authors	  also	  emphasise	  the	  reputational	  risks	  that	  companies	  might	  face	  if	  they	  remain	  in	  a	  conflict	  setting.89	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  al.,	  “Who’s	  Minding	  the	  Store?”	  85	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  86	  Ballantine	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  and	  Conflict”;	  Bray,	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  Companies	  to	  Risky	  Environments”;	  	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace:	  The	  Private	  Sector	  as	  a	  Partner	  in	  Conflict	  Prevention	  and	  Resolution;	  	  Kathleen	  A.	  Getz	  and	  Jennifer	  Oetzel,	  “MNE	  Strategic	  Intervention	  in	  Violent	  Conflict:	  Variations	  Based	  on	  Conflict	  Characteristics,”	  Journal	  of	  Business	  Ethics,	  vol.	  89,	  no.	  4	  (2009),	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3.5.	  Corporate	  Activities	  and	  their	  Impacts	  on	  the	  Conflict	  
There	  is	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  view	  the	  impacts	  that	  business	  actors	  may	  have	  as	   two	   diametrically	   opposed	   possibilities.	   That	   is,	   the	   relationship	   between	   business	  actors	   and	   conflict	   is	   perceived	   as	   being	   either	   “conflict-­‐reducing”	   or	   “conflict-­‐aggravating”.90	  	  
3.5.1.	  Conflict-­‐reducing	  Behaviour	  
Literature	   on	   the	   positive	   impact	   of	   business	   actors	   is	   thin;	   however,	   there	   are	   a	   few	  studies	   that	   argue	   that	   when	   their	   profits	   are	   at	   risk,	   MNCs	   might	   act	   in	   ways	   that	  alleviate	  violence	  and	  contribute	   to	   the	  resolution	  of	   the	  conflict.91	  For	  example,	  MNCs	  with	  large	  operation	  sites	  at	  times	  offer	  spaces	  for	  employees	  and	  their	  families	  to	  seek	  refuge	  when	   the	   threat	   of	   danger	   is	   high.92	  Some	   studies	   point	   out	   that	   private	   actors	  sometimes	   engage	   in	   a	   form	   of	   “state-­‐building”	   in	   their	   host	   countries	   through,	   for	  example,	   sponsoring	   workshops	   on	   community	   cohesion	   and	   peaceful	   coexistence	   or	  even	  putting	  pressure	  on	  government	  to	  commit	  to	  particular	  reforms.93	  However,	  there	  is	  a	   lack	  of	   research	   into	   the	   factors	   that	  might	  cause	  some	  companies	   to	  adopt	  active	  strategies	  to	  alleviate	  conflict,	  while	  others	  do	  not.	  
3.5.2.	  Conflict-­‐aggravating	  Behaviour	  
In	   the	   literature,	   the	   activities	   believed	   to	   aggravate	   conflict	   dynamics	   are	   typically	  regarded	  as	  resulting	  from	  either	  financial	  transactions	  or	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  operations.94	  	  
3.5.2.1.	  Financial	  Transactions	  
Many	   scholars	   note	   that	   companies	   may	   exacerbate	   conflict	   through	   contractual	   and	  extracontractual	   payments	   made	   to	   allow	   for	   operations	   to	   continue.95	  The	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  and	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  90	  Sherman,	  Private	  Sector	  Actors	  in	  Zones	  of	  Conflict.	  91	  OECD,	  “Multinational	  Enterprises	  in	  Situations	  of	  Violent	  Conflict	  and	  Widespread	  Human	  Rights	  Abuses,”	  
OECD	  Working	  Papers	  on	  International	  Investment,	  no.	  01	  (May	  2002):	  7,	  https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-­‐policy/WP-­‐2002_1.pdf.	  92	  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency.	  93	  Ibid.,	  4.	  94	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict.”	  95	  Sherman,	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  Sector	  Actors	  in	  Zones	  of	  Conflict,	  4.	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shows	  that	  resource-­‐seeking	  MNCs	  will	  pay	  “whoever	  is	  in	  power”	  to	  ensure	  continued	  access	   to	  critical	   resources	  within	  a	  conflict	  zone.96	  These	   transactions	  can	  range	   from	  petty	   cash	   paid	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   transit	   of	   goods	   past	   a	   checkpoint,	   to	   the	   payment	   of	  huge	   concessions	   that	   include	   signature	   bonuses	   or	   resource-­‐collateralised	   loans	  rewarded	   to	   combatants	   in	   advance	   of	   commercial	   operations.97	  A	   few	   studies	   also	  recognise	   that	   payments	   can	   be	   in	   forms	   other	   than	  money,	   such	   as	   the	   provision	   of	  vehicles	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  humanitarian	  aid.98	  According	  to	  Le	  Billon,	  companies	  that	  seek	  to	  maintain	  access	  to	  critical	  resources	  often:	  
invest	  in	  rebel	  factions	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  accessing	  resource	  areas	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  while	  paying	  the	  government	  to	  keep	  longer-­‐term	  options	  open,	  or	  vice	  versa.99	  	  
Some	  studies	  point	  out	  that	  MNC	  support	  for	  a	  faction	  (whether	  indirect	  or	  direct)	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  military	  impasse	  by	  reinforcing	  the	  dominance	  of	  certain	  actors	  and	  changing	  the	   balance	   of	   power	   in	   the	   conflict	   theatre.100	  Richani	   points	   out	   that	   during	   the	  Colombian	   conflict,	   resource-­‐reliant	  MNCs	   aided	   the	   formation	   and	   financing	   of	   right-­‐wing	  paramilitary	  groups	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  satisfying	  social	   investment	  demands	  in	   guerrilla-­‐controlled	   areas.101	  In	   addition,	   these	   MNCs	   provided	   the	   state	   with	   vital	  resources	  to	  fund	  their	  military	  campaign	  against	  the	  insurgency.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  these	  MNCs	  played	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  establishing	  a	  military	  impasse,	  which	  could	  explain	   the	  protraction	  of	   the	  violence.102	  Thus,	  while	   the	   literature	  disproportionately	  focuses	   on	   MNC	   relations	   with	   rebels,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   business	   actors	   tend	   to	  “play	  all	  sides”	  in	  a	  conflict,	  which	  can	  frustrate	  peace	  efforts.103	  	  
A	   number	   of	   studies	   point	   to	   the	   damaging	   effects	   of	   a	   company’s	   procurement	   of	  protection	  and	  security	  measures.104	  MNCs	  are	  often	  required	  by	  national	  legislation	  to	  acquire	   security	   services	   from	   governments	   in	   their	   host	   countries.	   Through	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Philippe	  Le	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  War:	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  Resources	  and	  Armed	  Conflicts	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  Routledge,	  2005),	  31.	  97	  Ibid.	  98	  Reno,	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  4	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  Power	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  The	  Journal	  of	  Complex	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  (May	  2016),	  http://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780165/chapter-­‐4-­‐liberia-­‐durable-­‐illicit-­‐power-­‐structures/;	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  “Foreign	  Firms	  and	  the	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  of	  Charles	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  NPFL.”	  	  99	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  Billon,	  Fuelling	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  71.	  100	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  et	  al.,	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  Counterinsurgency,	  34.	  101	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provision	   of	   supplies	   to	   government	   security	   forces,	   MNCs	   might	   indirectly	   support	  repressive	   regimes.105	  However,	   much	   of	   the	   existing	   literature	   examines	   the	   impact	  that	  the	  procurement	  of	  protection	  from	  rebel	  forces	  can	  have	  on	  conflict	  dynamics.	  The	  literature	   also	   addresses	   the	   issues	   related	   to	   MNCs	   indirectly	   financing	   combatants	  through	   the	   payment	   of	   ransom	   fees	   for	   kidnapped	   employees.106	  Bannon	   and	   Collier	  point	   to	   the	   Colombian	   conflict	   in	   the	   1990s	   to	   illustrate	   this,	   as	   revenue	   from	  kidnapping	  was	   the	   third-­‐largest	   source	   of	   revenue	   for	   the	   National	   Liberation	   Army	  and	  the	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Colombia.107	  
3.5.2.2.	  On-­‐the-­‐ground	  Operational	  Support	  
While	  most	   of	   the	   literature	   focuses	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   financial	   and	  other	   transactions	  (such	  as	  provision	  of	  aid),	  the	  role	  that	  the	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  operations	  of	  a	  company	  can	  play	  is	  also	  recognised.	  Belligerents	  can	  accrue	  wealth	  and	  organise	  militarily	  by	  taking	  control	   of	   or	   gaining	   access	   to	   the	   sites	  of	  MNC	  operations.108	  Often,	   these	   sites	   are	   in	  militarily	   strategic	   locations	   near	   essential	   transportation	   such	   as	   airports,	   roads,	  railways	  and	  ports	  that	  are	  required	  for	  commercial	  operations.	  The	  infrastructure	  and	  technology	   available	   at	  most	   of	   the	   sites	   of	  MNC	   operations	   are	   often	   also	   invaluable	  resources	  for	  facilitating	  military	  campaigns.109	  Beyond	  strategic	  military	  benefits,	  there	  is	   a	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   the	   impact	   that	   rebel	   control	   of	   a	   company’s	   operations	   and	  networks	   can	   have	   on	   conflict	   dynamics.110	  For	   an	   armed	   faction,	   this	   control	   could	  provide	   access	   to	   potential	   revenue	   by	   turning	   expropriated	   assets	   into	   tradable	  commodities.	   For	   example,	  William	  Rosenau,	   Peter	   Chalk,	   Renny	  McPherson,	  Michelle	  Parker	   and	   Austin	   Long	   contend	   that	   rebel	   control	   over	   the	   sites	   of	   MNC	   operations	  provides	  opportunities	  for	  them	  to	  simultaneously	  finance	  their	  military	  pursuits	  while	  depriving	   the	   state	   of	   an	   important	   source	   of	   revenue.111 	  The	   literature	   typically	  assumes	  that	  the	  state’s	  accumulation	  of	  revenue	  from	  MNC	  activities	  is	  the	  status	  quo	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Banfield,	  et	  al.,	  “Transnational	  Corporations	  in	  Conflict-­‐prone	  Zones,”	  137.	  106	  Wennmann,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Conflict	  Financing,”	  435;	  	  Bannon	  and	  Collier,	  “Natural	  Resources	  and	  Conflict.”	  106	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  41.	  107	  Bannon	  and	  Collier,	  “Natural	  Resources	  and	  Conflict,”	  6;	  	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  41.	  108	  Boge	  et	  al.,	  “Who’s	  Minding	  the	  Store?:	  The	  Business	  of	  Private,	  Public,	  and	  Civil	  Actors	  in	  Zones	  of	  Conflict.”	  Bonn	  International	  Centre	  for	  Conversion	  Brief,	  vol.	  32	  (2005),	  https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/brief32.pdf.	  109	  Boge	  et	  al.,	  “Who’s	  Minding	  the	  Store?”	  16.	  110	  Le	  Billon,	  “The	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  War”;	  	  Banfield	  et	  al.,	  “Transnational	  Corporations	  in	  Conflict-­‐prone	  Zones.”	  111	  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency.	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and	  thus	  is	  not	  really	  an	  issue	  to	  be	  investigated.	  This	  draws	  back	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  “greedy	  rebels”	  narrative	  in	  the	  literature.	  
3.6.	  Business	  Actors	  as	  Peace	  Actors	  
Jane	  Nelson	  wrote	  one	  of	  the	  formative	  studies	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  participate	   in	   conflict	   prevention	   and	   resolution.112	  In	   a	   2000	   report	  written	  with	   the	  assistance	  of	   three	  prominent	  NGOs	   (International	  Alert,	   the	  Prince	  of	  Wales	  Business	  Leaders	   Forum	   and	   the	   Council	   on	   Economic	   Priorities),	   Nelson	   put	   forward	   the	  proposition	  that	  business	  has	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  promoting	  peace	  in	  conflict	  situations	  and	   can	  play	  a	  positive	   role	   in	  both	   conflict	  prevention	  and	   resolution.	  This	   agenda	   is	  supported	   by	   NGOs,	   in	   particular	   peace-­‐building	   NGOs	   like	   International	   Alert	   and	  Search	   for	   Common	  Ground.113	  Studies	   such	   as	   those	   by	   Banfield,	   Haufler	   and	   Lilly,114	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,115	  and	  Kanagaretnam	  and	  Brown116	  explore	   the	  possibility	  of	  engaging	   private	   actors	   in	   conflict	   prevention,	   conflict	   resolution	   and	   post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction.117	  Much	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  relies	  on	  the	  standards	  and	  principles	  developed	   by	   IOs	   as	   guides	   for	   “ethical”	   business	   behaviour	   in	   conflict.118	  However,	  these	  guidelines	  are	  underdeveloped	  and	  lack	  structural	  standardisation.	  
3.7.	  Section	  Summary	  	  
On	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  MNCs	  on	   conflict	   dynamics,	  Berman	  provides	   a	   succinct	  assessment	  of	  the	  current	  literature.	  He	  contends	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace.	  113	  van	  Dorp,	  Multinational	  Corporations	  and	  Conflict.	  114	  Banfield	  et	  al.,	  “Transnational	  Corporations	  in	  Conflict-­‐prone	  Zones.”	  115	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	  Armed	  Conflict.”	  116	  Kanagaretnam	  and	  Brown,	  Business,	  Conflict,	  and	  Peacebuilding.	  117	  Banfield	  et	  al.,	  “Transnational	  Corporations	  in	  Conflict-­‐prone	  Zones”,	  133;	  	  van	  Dorp,	  Multinational	  Corporations	  and	  Conflict.	  118	  Banfield	  et	  al,	  “Transnational	  Corporations	  in	  Conflict-­‐prone	  Zones”;	  	  Virginia	  Haufler,	  “Foreign	  Investors	  in	  Conflict	  Zones:	  New	  Expectations,”	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
International	  Security.	  Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2005;	  David	  Shearer,	  “Aiding	  or	  Abetting?	  Humanitarian	  Aid	  and	  Its	  Economic	  Role	  in	  Civil	  War,”	  in	  Greed	  and	  
Grievance:	  Economic	  Agendas	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  ed.	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2000);	  Kanagaretnam	  and	  Brown,	  Business,	  Conflict,	  and	  Peacebuilding;	  	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace.	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MNCs	  are	  at	  once	  being	  called	  to	  task	  for	  exacerbating	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  being	  called	  upon	  to	  participate	  in	  their	  prevention	  and	  resolution.119	  	  
The	  first	  issue	  with	  this	  is	  that	  it	  assumes	  that	  all	  corporate	  activities	  in	  a	  conflict	  zone	  will	   necessarily	   have	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	   the	   conflict.	   Research	   shows	   that	   this	   is	   not	  always	   the	   case	   as	   corporate	   activities	   can	   have	   conflict-­‐reducing	   effects.	   Moreover,	  conflict	   is	  dynamic	  and	  corporate	  activities	  are	  not	  monolithic.	  Along	   the	   trajectory	  of	  violence,	   corporate	   activities	   will	   affect	   conflict	   dynamics	   just	   as	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	  conflict	   will	   affect	   the	   company	   in	   return.	   To	   say	   that	   MNCs	   exacerbate	   conflict	   is	   to	  oversimplify	  the	  complex	  and	  fluid	  relationships	  that	   form	  between	  private	  actors	  and	  various	   factions.	   Integral	   to	   this	   is	   a	   more	   holistic	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  MNC	  and	  the	  state	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  other	   local	  actors	  on	   the	  other.	  This	  study	   contends	   that	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   motivations	   behind	   corporate	  behaviour	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  conflict	  dynamics	  is	  needed	  first	  in	  order	  to	  conceptualise	  an	  operational	  framework	  for	  proactive	  corporate	  engagement	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  	  
Section	  4	  |	  The	  Literature	  on	  the	  Firestone	  Liberia	  Case	  Study	  
4.1.	  The	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  Economy	  
There	  is	  widespread	  recognition	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  role	  that	  economic	  motives	  and	  agendas	   played	   in	   the	   Liberian	   civil	   conflict.120	  A	   number	   of	   scholarly	   studies	   that	  address	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   civil	   wars	   more	   generally	   make	   use	   of	  Liberia	   to	   emphasise	   certain	   points,	   as	   seen	   in	   papers	   written	   by	   Ballantine	   and	  Nitzschke,121	  Bannon	  and	  Collier,122	  and	  Berdal	  and	  Malone.123	  Other	  studies	  concentrate	  more	  specifically	  on	  the	  scale	  and	  legalities	  of	  certain	  economic	  activities	  of	  the	  Liberian	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  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs.”	  120	  Karen	  Ballantine	  and	  Heiko	  Nitzschke,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  War	  and	  Conflict	  Transformation”;	  Reno,	  “Foreign	  Firms	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Charles	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  NPFL”;	  	  Atkinson,	  “The	  War	  Economy	  in	  Liberia”;	  	  Berdal	  and	  Malone,	  Greed	  and	  Grievance;	  	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994”;	  	  Felix	  Gerdes,	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Liberian	  State:	  A	  Study	  in	  Neo-­‐patrimonial	  State	  Formation	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  Arbeitspapier,	  no.	  1	  (2013),	  http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5813/pdf/AP_Evolution_State_Gerdes_2013_1.pdf;	  	  Michael	  Ross,	  “The	  Natural	  Resource	  Curse”;	  	  Whetho,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Profit	  and	  Peace.”	  	  121	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Beyond	  Greed	  and	  Grievance”;	  	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  “Business	  and	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  Conflict.”	  122	  Bannon	  and	  Collier,	  “Natural	  Resources	  and	  Conflict.”	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  Berdal	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  Malone,	  Greed	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  Grievance.	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war	  economy,	  with	  a	   focus	  on	   the	   role	  of	  natural	   resources.124	  Due	   to	   the	  centrality	  of	  natural	  resources	  to	  the	  Liberian	  war	  economy,	  there	   is	  widespread	  recognition	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  resource-­‐reliant	  MNCs	  in	  the	  conflict.125	  
Numerous	   companies	   have	   been	   accused	   of	   “aiding	   and	   abetting”	   the	   actions	   of	  economic	   criminals	   (rebels),	   of	   bribery,	   and	   of	   illegally	   extracting	   and	   selling	   natural	  resources	   in	   a	  way	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   Liberian	  war	   economy.	  The	   role	   played	  by	  Guus	  Kouwenhoven	  of	  the	  Oriental	  Timber	  Corporation	  is	  often	  referred	  to,	  to	  illustrate	  the	  impact	  that	  private	  actors	  had	  on	  facilitating	  war	  crimes	  committed	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  Liberia.126	  Other	  notable	  companies	  include	  the	  Danzer	  Group,	  the	  Nimba	  Mining	  Company	   (NIMCO)	   and	   Dalhoff	   Larsen	   &	   Horneman	   (DLH).127	  In	   addition,	   the	   role	   of	  foreign	  mining	  and	  logging	  firms	  is	  emphasised,128	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  comparatively	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  Network:	  Exploiting	  Diamonds	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  research,	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  Crime	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  “The	  War	  Economy	  in	  Liberia”;	  	  Felix	  Gerdes,	  Civil	  War	  and	  State	  Formation:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  War	  and	  Peace	  in	  Liberia	  (Frankfurt:	  Campus	  Verlag,	  2013);	  Nelson,	  The	  Business	  of	  Peace;	  	  Ross,	  “The	  Natural	  Resource	  Curse”;	  Whetho,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Profit	  and	  Peace.”	  125	  Whetho,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Profit	  and	  Peace”;	  	  Kanagaretnam	  and	  Brown,	  Business,	  Conflict,	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  Peacebuilding;	  Bannon	  and	  Collier,	  “Natural	  Resources	  and	  Conflict”;	  	  Philip	  Swanson,	  Mai	  Oldgard	  and	  Leiv	  Lunde,	  “Who	  Gets	  the	  Money?	  Reporting	  Resource	  Revenues,”	  in	  
Natural	  Resources	  and	  Violent	  Conflict:	  Options	  and	  Actions,	  ed.	  Ian	  Bannon	  and	  Paul	  Collier	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  2003);	  	  Stephen	  Ellis,	  The	  Mask	  of	  Anarchy:	  The	  Destruction	  of	  Liberia	  and	  the	  Religious	  Dimension	  of	  an	  African	  Civil	  
War,	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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  Truth	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  Reconciliation	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  (TRC),	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  http://www.pul.org.lr/doc/trc-­‐of-­‐liberia-­‐final-­‐report-­‐volume-­‐ii.pdf;	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  “The	  Complicity	  of	  Multinational	  Corporations	  in	  International	  Crimes”;	  	  Global	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  “Logging	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  127	  United	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  Report”;	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  “Foreign	  Firms	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  NPFL”;	  	  Reno,	  Warlord	  Politics	  and	  African	  States;	  	  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “Logging	  Off”;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “The	  Charles	  Taylor	  Verdict”;	  Stichting	  Onderzoek	  Multinationale	  Ondernemingen	  (SOMO).	  “Multinational	  corporations	  in	  conflict-­‐affected	  areas:	  Risks	  and	  challenges	  around	  human	  rights	  and	  conflict,”	  December	  2015.	  https://www.somo.nl/wp-­‐content/uploads/2016/01/Risks-­‐and-­‐challenges-­‐around-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐and-­‐conflict.pdf;	  Atkinson,	  “The	  War	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  in	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  128	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given	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  rubber	  plantations.129	  	  
While	   numerous	   actors	   contributed	   towards	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Liberian	   civil	   war	  economy,	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  involvement	  has	  received	  the	  most	  attention.	  From	  the	  1989	  insurgency,	  Taylor	  began	  to	  build	  a	  “multi-­‐state	   territory	   in	  West	  Africa”130	  that	  would	  eventually	   include	   the	  majority	  of	  Liberia	  as	  well	  as	  parts	  of	  Guinea	  and	  Sierra	  Leone.	  Through	  this	  territory	  –	  popularly	  known	  as	  “Taylorland”	  or	  “Greater	  Liberia”	  –	  Taylor	  had	   access	   to	   significant	   resources.	   In	   order	   to	   extract	   wealth	   from	   these	   resources,	  Taylor	  entered	  into	  commercial	  relationships	  with	  numerous	  foreign	  firms.	  As	  William	  Reno	  observes:	  
Taylor	  stands	  as	  one	  of	   the	  most	  recent	  and	  extreme	  examples	  of	  rule	   through	  personal	  control	  over	  resources	  in	  Africa,	  surviving	  significant	  challenges	  to	  his	  position	  and	  confounding	  predictions	  of	  an	  early	  demise.131	  
The	   approach	   of	   many	   of	   the	   existing	   analyses	   is	   thus	   rebel-­‐centric,	   with	   particular	  attention	   paid	   to	   Charles	   Taylor’s	   economic	   activities	   and	   the	   impact	   that	   his	  commercial	   alliances	   had	   on	   conflict	   dynamics.132	  By	   1992,	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   a	  significant	  portion	  of	  Taylor’s	   tax	  revenue	  was	  coming	   from	  foreign	   firms	  operating	   in	  Liberia	  and	  “Firestone	  was	  the	  largest	  foreign	  corporation	  to	  fall	  squarely	  in	  his	  camp”.	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  Crimes”;	  Global	  Witness,	  “Taylor-­‐made”;	  	  Ballantine	  and	  Nitzschke,	  "The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  War”;	  Duffield,	  “Globalization,	  Transborder	  Trade,	  and	  War	  Economies”;	  Colin	  M.	  Waugh,	  Charles	  Taylor	  and	  Liberia:	  Ambition	  and	  Atrocity	  in	  Africa's	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  Star	  State	  (Zed	  Books:	  London,	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  Conflict,	  and	  Peacebuilding;	  	  Jonathon	  M.	  Winer	  and	  Trifin	  J.	  Roule,	  “Follow	  the	  Money:	  The	  Finance	  of	  Illicit	  Resource	  Extraction,”	  in	  
Natural	  Resources	  and	  Violent	  Conflict:	  Options	  and	  Actions,	  ed.	  Ian	  Bannon	  and	  Paul	  Collier	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Washington,	  2003);	  	  David	  Shearer,	  “Aiding	  or	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  Global	  Witness,	  “Logging	  Off”;	  	  Global	  Witness,	  “Taylor-­‐made.”	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4.2.	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  
The	  release	  of	  the	  PBS	  documentary,	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord,	  in	  2014	  generated	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	   interest	   in	   the	  media	  and	   from	  NGOs	   in	   the	  Firestone	  Liberia	  case	  study.133	  The	  academic	  literature	  is	  very	  thin	  in	  comparison	  and	  research	  revealed	  no	  systematic	  analysis	  of	   the	  case	  study.	  The	  rebel-­‐centric	  approach	   in	   the	   literature	  on	   the	  Liberian	  war	  economy	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  ongoing	  discussion	  about	  Firestone’s	  behaviour	  during	  the	  conflict.	  Attention	  is	  particularly	  focused	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  Firestone	  and	  Charles	  Taylor,	   or	  more	  broadly	  his	  NPFL	  and	  NPRAG.134	  This	   is	  despite	   evidence	   that	  Firestone	  at	   first	  hedged	   its	  bets	  by	  engaging	  with	  all	  prominent	  actors	   in	   the	   conflict	  before	  entering	  into	  an	  agreement	  with	  Taylor’s	  NPRAG.	  Emphasis	  is	  mostly	  on	  the	  way	  in	   which	   the	   company’s	   financial	   transactions	   with	   the	   rebels	   and	   its	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	  operations	  and	  logistical	  support	  aided	  Taylor	  in	  his	  military	  campaigns.135	  	  
The	   United	   Steelworkers	   of	   America	   compiled	   a	   report	   that	   addresses	   the	   agreement	  between	   Firestone	   and	   Taylor.	   The	   report	   asserts	   that	   the	   agreement	   to	   do	   business	  with	   the	   warlord	   “indirectly	   and	   perhaps	   directly	   contributed	   to	   mass	   death	   and	  destruction	   in	   Liberia,	   and	  prolonged	   the	   civil	  war”.136	  The	   report	  was	  written	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  swaying	  BFS	  during	  the	  union’s	  negotiations	  in	  1996	  and	  thus	  likely	  adopted	  a	   rebel-­‐centric	   approach	   in	   order	   to	   frame	   the	   company	   in	   a	   negative	   light.	   As	   such,	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  University	  Press,	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caution	  was	  taken	  in	  using	  this	  report	  as	  reliable	  knowledge.	   In	  a	  study	  commissioned	  by	  the	  RAND	  Corporation,	  Rosenau	  et	  al.	  also	  investigate	  the	  role	  played	  by	  Firestone	  in	  the	  Liberian	  conflict.	  The	  authors	  quote	  Haufler’s	  statement	  that	  even	  the	  unintentional	  actions	  of	  MNCs	  “can	  reinforce	  the	  dominance	  of	  particular	  elites	  or	  ethnic	  groups	  [and]	  change	   the	   local	   balance	   of	   power”.	   They	   argue	   that	   the	   company	   impacted	   conflict	  dynamics	   “through	   alleged	   protection	   payments	   to	   government	   officials	   and	   armed	  groups	  and	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  sanctuary	  to	  threatened	  civilian	  populations”.137	  	  
Reno	   investigates	   more	   closely	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Firestone	   might	   have	   facilitated	  Taylor’s	  military	   campaigns.	  He	   observes	   that	   Firestone’s	   rubber	   operations	   provided	  Taylor	  with	  millions	  in	  “tax”	  payments,	  while	  allowing	  (or	  being	  forced	  to	  allow)	  NPFL	  access	   to	   the	   plantation	   provided	   them	   with	   necessary	   war	   materiel	   and	   other	  resources..138	  In	   addition,	   he	   points	   out	   that	   Firestone,	   under	   the	   cover	   of	   foreign	   aid,	  brought	  rice	  in	  to	  Liberia	  that	  was	  subsequently	  given	  to	  feed	  Taylor’s	  troops	  as	  a	  “cost	  of	   doing	   business”. 139 	  Reno	   argues	   that	   Firestone	   likely	   calculated	   (or	   rather	  miscalculated)	  that	  the	  insurgency	  would	  quickly	  “assume	  the	  mantle	  of	  sovereignty”	  in	  Liberia,	   explaining	   the	   company’s	   decision	   to	   collaborate	  with	   Taylor.140	  In	   her	   study,	  Atkinson	   points	   out	   that	   Firestone	   management	   made	   arrangements	   with	   various	  factional	   leaders	   to	   secure	   protection	   during	   the	   Liberian	   Civil	   War.	   Specifically,	   she	  mentions	  the	  allegation	  that	  the	  company	  paid	  Taylor’s	  NPFL	  in	  excess	  of	  US$2	  million	  just	  for	  protection.	  	  
Section	  5	  |	  Chapter	  Summary	  
The	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   of	   MNCs	   in	   conflict	   is	   situated	   within	   the	   broader	  debate	  about	   the	  political	  economy	  of	  civil	  war	  and	  the	  role	  of	  resources	   in	  sustaining	  conflict,	  more	   specifically.	   However,	  many	   of	   these	   studies	   are	   very	   general	   in	   nature	  and	   focus	   predominantly	   on	   the	   link	   between	   diamonds	   and	   oil,	   and	   the	   big-­‐name	  companies	   in	   the	   conflicts	   in	   Sierra	   Leone,	  Angola	   and	  DRC.	  There	   is	   also	  widespread	  appeal	   for	  MNCs	  to	  act	   “responsibly”	   in	  conflict	  situations,	  which	  ranges	   from	  calls	   for	  companies	   to	   “do	   no	   harm”,	   to	   those	   that	   envisage	   a	   role	   for	   private	   actors	   in	  peacekeeping	   and	   post-­‐conflict	   reconstruction	   activities.	   However,	   there	   remains	   a	  significant	  gap	  between	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  responsible	  business	  practices	  in	  conflict	  and	  the	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reality	  on	  the	  ground.	  There	  is	  a	  noted	  tendency	  in	  both	  the	  academic	  studies	  and	  NGO	  reports	  to	  emphasise	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  MNC	  activities	  on	  conflict	  dynamics.	  Inherent	   in	   this	   is	   the	  presumption	   that	   a	   clear	   distinction	   exists	   between	   the	   “good”,	  “bad”	  and	  “worst”	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict.	  However,	  in	  reality,	  this	  is	  often	  not	  the	  case	  and	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  highlight	  this	  through	  the	  Firestone	  Liberia	  case	  study.	  
Moreover,	   insufficient	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   “dynamic	   constellation	   of	  independent	  variables”141	  that	  affects	  corporate	  strategies	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  In	  addition,	  more	  focus	  needs	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  geo-­‐economic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  significance	  of	  the	  operations	   of	   MNCs	   in	   conflict	   situations.	   This	   is	   surprising	   given	   the	   fairly	   broad	  recognition	   that	  many	   resource-­‐reliant	  MNCs	   choose	   to	   continue	   operating	   in	   conflict	  zones.	   Some	   scholars,	   such	   as	   Patey	   and	   Nelson,	   do	   recognise	   that	   foreign	   business	  actors	   can	   find	   themselves	   drawn	   into	   conflict	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   resources	   and	  infrastructure	   offered	   at	   the	   sites’	   operations.142	  However,	   little	   strategic	   analysis	   has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  influence	  that	  this	  geo-­‐economic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  significance	  has	  on	  the	  agency	  and	  choices	  available	  to	  foreign	  business	  actors.	  	  
With	   regards	   to	   the	   case	   study	   specifically,	   insufficient	   attention	  has	   been	  paid	   to	   the	  influence	  of	   the	  conflict’s	  characteristics	  on	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  choices	  during	   the	   first	  civil	   war.	   While	   the	   evidence	   shows	   that	   the	   violence	   of	   the	   Liberian	   conflict	   was	  particularly	  brutal	  and	  shocking,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  this,	  as	  well	   as	   Liberia’s	   cultural	   structure,	   had	   on	   the	   company’s	   agency	   during	   the	   conflict.	  Moreover,	   since	   the	   release	   of	   the	   Firestone	   and	   the	   Warlord	   documentary	   in	   2014,	  Firestone	   has	   been	   publicly	   criticised	   for	   its	   actions	   during	   the	   Liberian	   Civil	   War.	  However,	   there	   is	   a	   considerable	   lack	   of	   academic	   research	   on	   the	   details	   of	   this	  relationship,	  despite	  the	  availability	  of	  key	  primary	  sources.	  What	  literature	  does	  exist	  is	  critical	   of	   Firestone’s	   strategy,	   and	   typically	   conflates	   cause	   and	   consequence	   by	  contending	   that	   this	   strategy	  was	   informed	  by	  profit-­‐seeking	  aspirations.	  As	  such,	   this	  study	  uses	  both	  primary	  and	  secondary	  resources	  to	  conduct	  an	  in-­‐depth	  investigation	  into	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  behaviour	  during	  the	  civil	  war.	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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
Section	  1	  |	  Factors	  to	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  
In	   order	   to	   analyse	   the	   decisions	   made	   by	   Firestone	   Liberia	   during	   the	   civil	   war,	   an	  investigation	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  outbreak	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  is	  necessary.	   An	   exploration	   of	   Liberia’s	   history	   reveals	   the	   development	   of	   a	   political	  culture	  of	  predation	  and	  selfishness,	  which	  both	  influenced	  and	  infiltrated	  the	  character	  of	   the	   conflict	   that	   began	   in	   1989.	   Moreover,	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   regional	   and	  international	  dynamics	  of	  the	  conflict	  gives	  context	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	   the	   complex	   of	   actors	   involved.	   These	   dimensions	   are	   vital	   components	   to	  understanding	   the	   development	   of	   Firestone’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   Liberian	   state	   as	  well	  as	  the	  context	  within	  which	  it	  operated	  during	  the	  conflict.	  	  
1.1.	  The	  Historical	  Context	  
1.1.1.	  The	  Arrival	  of	  the	  American	  Settlers	  
The	  modern	  Liberian	  state	  owes	  its	  origins	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  group	  of	  freed	  slaves	  who	  were	   repatriated	   following	   America’s	   transition	   from	   a	   slave-­‐based	   economy	   to	   a	  capitalist	   system. 143 	  The	   African-­‐American	   settlers	   who	   arrived	   on	   the	   shores	   of	  Monrovia	   in	   1822	   never	   constituted	  more	   than	   five	  per	  cent	   of	   the	   population	   of	   the	  small	   West	   African	   state.144	  From	   the	   beginning,	   the	   settlers’	   interactions	   with	   the	  indigenous	   population	   were	   guided	   by	   their	   belief	   in	   the	   religious	   superiority	   of	  Christianity	   and	   their	   self-­‐proclaimed	   duty	   to	   Christianise	   and	   civilise	   the	   locals	  according	   to	  Western	   standards.145	  In	   order	   to	   distinguish	   themselves	   from	   the	   locals,	  they	   wore	   Western	   clothing,	   built	   houses	   designed	   in	   the	   architectural	   style	   of	   the	  American	   south,	   and	   named	   places	   and	   streets	   after	   key	   American	   figures	   and	   places	  (Monrovia	  was	  named	  after	  US	  President	   John	  Monroe).146	  The	   attitude	  of	   the	   settlers	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and	  their	  visible	  contempt	  for	  local	  cultures,	  religions	  and	  ways	  of	  life	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  systematic	  exclusion	  of	  indigenous	  Liberians	  under	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  rule.147	  
1.1.2.	  The	  Implementation	  of	  Indirect	  Rule	  
At	  first,	  interactions	  between	  the	  settlers	  and	  the	  indigenous	  population	  were	  limited	  as	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberians	  built	   their	   lives	  along	   the	  Monrovian	  coast	   and	   rarely	  ventured	  into	   the	   indigenously	   populated	   interior.148	  However,	   formal	   government	   control	   over	  the	  interior	  was	  extended	  in	  1904	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  President	  Arthur	  Barclay.	  The	  Barclay	  Plan,	  as	  it	  was	  known,	  involved	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  colonial-­‐style	  policy	  of	  indirect	  rule	   to	   administer	   the	   hinterland.	   The	   interior	   was	   divided	   into	   districts	   using	   pre-­‐existing	   traditional	   power	   structures	   to	   establish	   a	   two-­‐tiered	   system	   of	   “paramount	  chiefs”	   and	   “town	   chiefs”	   in	   each. 149 	  The	   government	   also	   appointed	   district	  commissioners	  who	  were	  sent	   to	   the	  Liberian	   interior	   to	  command	  the	  chiefs,	   thereby	  establishing	   an	   administrative	   hierarchy	   with	   the	   state	   at	   the	   apex. 150 	  The	  implementation	   of	   indirect	   rule	   was	   accompanied	   by	   increased	   taxation	   of	   the	  indigenous	  population	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  government	  to	  accrue	  revenue.	  Citizens	  of	  the	  hinterland	  were	   forced	   to	   pay	   far	  more	   burdensome	   taxes	   than	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberian	  population.	  For	  example,	  through	  the	  levying	  of	  a	  hut	  tax	  on	  the	  indigenous	  population,	  the	   state	   accrued	   US$300	  000	   in	   1925,	   while	   the	   main	   tax	   levied	   on	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberians	  (the	  property	  tax)	  brought	  in	  under	  US$5	  000	  in	  the	  same	  year.151	  	  
While	  the	  Barclay	  Plan	  extended	  citizenship	  to	  include	  indigenous	  Liberians	  for	  the	  first	  time,	   political	   integration	   of	   the	   indigenous	   population	   was	   largely	   superficial.152	  The	  government	  was	  thus	  forced	  to	  rely	  on	  intimidation	  and	  violent	  repression,	  rather	  than	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  majority,	   to	  rule.153	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  control	  over	  the	  hinterland	  districts,	  the	  government	  formed	  a	  standing	  army	  known	  as	  the	  Liberian	  Frontier	  Force	  (LFF)	  that	  was	  deployed	  to	  the	  interior	  as	  a:	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way	  of	  flexing	  the	  military	  muscle	  of	  the	  republic,	  of	  intimidating	  the	  indigenous	  people,	   and	   of	   cutting	   them	  off	   from	   the	   sources	   of	   their	   revenue	   through	   the	  application	  of	  force	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  trade.154	  	  
Members	   of	   the	   LFF	   did	   not	   receive	   regular	   salaries	   from	   the	   government	   and	   soon	  adopted	   a	   marauding	   mentality.	   Recruits	   expropriated	   local	   resources,	   raped	   and	  sexually	   enslaved	   women,	   torched	   villages,	   and	   forcibly	   conscripted	   young	   men	   into	  their	   forces.155	  The	   LFF	  was	   routinely	   used	   an	   instrument	   of	   coercion	  by	   the	   chiefs	   to	  force	  local	  men	  to	  pay	  their	  annual	  hut	  tax	  and,	  in	  turn,	  district	  commissioners	  made	  use	  of	  the	  LFF	  to	  punish	  chiefs	  if	  they	  failed	  to	  meet	  their	  annual	  tax	  quota.156	  This	  led	  to	  the	  formation	   of	   a	   system	   of	   control	   that	   operated	   through	   the	   use	   of	   intimidation	   and	  violence	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   power	   and	   was	   based	   on	   a	   military	   culture	   of	   ruthless	  commandeering.157	  The	   LFF	  was	   renamed	   the	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   Liberia	   (AFL)	   in	   1962	  and	   its	   history	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	   state	   power	   abuse	  by	   the	   state	   continued	   into	   the	  post-­‐Americo-­‐Liberian	  era.158	  
1.1.3.	  The	  Impact	  of	  President	  Tubman	  
The	   policy	   of	   indirect	   rule	  was	   formally	   superseded	   in	   1944	  with	   the	   inauguration	   of	  President	   William	   Tubman’s	   unification	   policy,	   which	   developed	   into	   his	   policy	   of	  integration	   in	   1964.159	  These	   policies	   were	   supposedly	   driven	   by	   the	   government’s	  recognition	   of	   the	   need	   to	   integrate	   the	   indigenous	   population	   politically,	   socially,	  legally	   and	   economically.160	  However,	   the	   policies	   suffered	   from	   a	   lack	   of	   genuine	  commitment	  and	  Tubman	  instead	  carried	  on	  the	  tradition	  of	  his	  predecessors	  by	  filling	  state	   positions	  with	   his	   own	   cronies.	   Through	   his	   economic	   Open	   Door	   Policy,	   which	  offered	   incentives	   such	   as	   duty-­‐free	   privileges	   and	   tax	   holidays	   to	   foreign	   investors,	  Tubman	  was	  able	  to	  attract	  significant	  FDI	  to	  Liberia	  and	  generate	  substantial	  revenue	  to	  turn	  Liberia	  into	  a	  truly	  neopatrimonal	  one-­‐party	  state.161	  Tubman	  also	  amended	  the	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  James	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  155	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  45.	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  of	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  Journal	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  vol.	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  no.	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  360,	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constitution	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  president	  to	  be	  in	  power	  for	  one	  eight-­‐year	  term	  followed	  by	   successive	   four-­‐year	   terms.	  His	   violent	   repression	  of	  opposition	   to	   the	  amendment	  was	  argued	  to	  be	  the	  “the	  modern	  genesis	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  political	  intolerance	  and	  witch-­‐hunting	   in	  Liberia”.162	  In	  addition,	  his	   three	  decades	  as	  president	   solidified	   in	  Liberian	  politics	   the	  partisan	  use	   of	   democratic	   institutions,	   political	   control	   of	   security	   forces,	  and	   the	   libellous	   destruction	   of	   property	   and	   taking	   of	   lives.	   As	   a	   result,	   Tubman’s	  regime	   has	   been	   accused	   of	   birthing	   a	   “political	   culture	   that	   would	   nurture	   future	  wars”.163	  	  
Tubman’s	  successor,	  William	  Tolbert,	  pledged	  to	   liberalise	  Liberia’s	  political	  space	  and	  to	  find	  a	  balance	  between	  economic	  development	  and	  social	  equity.164	  However,	  Tolbert	  routinely	   failed	   to	   balance	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   growing	   political	   appetite	   of	   the	  indigenous	  population	  with	  the	  historical	  ideals	  of	  his	  conservative	  constituents.165	  Like	  his	  predecessors,	  Tolbert	  soon	  resorted	  to	  the	  use	  of	  violent	  repression	  to	  quell	  public	  dissent	  and	  political	  opposition.166	  Eventually,	  in	  1979,	  after	  130	  years	  of	  alienation	  and	  gross	  injustice	  suffered	  under	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  rule,	  the	  indigenous	  population	  pushed	  back.	  
1.1.4.	  Political	  Structure	  and	  Culture	  under	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  Rule	  
Liberia’s	   class	   structure	   under	   Americo-­‐Liberian	   rule	   was	   divided	   between	   a	   distinct	  and	   exclusive	  minority	   and	   the	   broader	   indigenous	   population.	   The	   Americo-­‐Liberian	  minority	   dominated	   the	   political	   arena	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   economic,	   cultural	   and	   social	  spheres)	  and	  established	  political	  structures	   influenced	  by	   the	  American	  model.	  These	  structures	  included	  a	  bicameral	  legislature	  and	  the	  division	  of	  state	  power	  between	  the	  legislative,	   executive	   and	   judiciary. 167 	  While	   the	   political	   structures	   that	   were	  established	   included	   democratic	   characteristics,	   these	   served	   merely	   as	   channels	  through	  which	  the	  elite	  organised	  its	  control	  over	  the	  Liberian	  state.	  In	  reality,	  politics	  was	  conducted	  outside	  of	  formal	  channels	  and	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  oligarchy,	   which	   collectively	   wielded	   significant	   power	   over	   all	   three	   branches	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kieh,	  “Neo-­‐Colonialism,”	  170.	  162	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  II:	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  Final	  Report,	  90.	  163	  Ibid.	  164	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  99.	  165	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  175.	  166	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  177.	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government.	  This	  group	  included	  the	  president	  and	  his	  presidential	  cabinet,	   influential	  members	  of	  the	  legislative,	  and	  other	  notable	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  individuals.168	  
Thus,	  while	  the	  political	  structure	  implemented	  by	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberians	  imitated	  that	  of	   the	   American	   system,	   political	   culture	   in	   Liberia	   lacked	   genuine	   democratic	   norms	  and	  principles.169	  The	  True	  Whig	  Party,	  which	  acted	  as	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  instrument	  of	   political	   control,	   held	   a	  monopoly	   of	   power	   from	   1847	   until	   the	   1980	   coup	   d’état.	  While	   elections	   were	   held	   periodically,	   electoral	   officials	   and	   registrars	   were	   either	  selected	   by	   the	   president	   or	   from	   within	   the	   ruling	   party.170	  Positions	   in	   office	   were	  appointed	  according	   to	  personal	   loyalties	  and	  social	  connections	  rather	   than	  expertise	  or	   suitability	   for	   the	   job	   in	   office.	   Once	   established,	   the	   political	   culture	   was	   one	   of	  abusing	   office	   for	   private	   gain,	   a	   culture	   pervasive	   in	   the	   military	   as	   well.171	  In	   fact,	  corruption	   under	   Americo-­‐Liberian	   rule	   became	   so	   endemic	   and	   permissive	   that	   it	  became	   a	   culturally	   accepted,	   even	   respected,	   practice	   to	   use	   one’s	   position	   in	  government	   to	   steal	   public	   resources	   for	   personal	   gain.172	  The	   system	  was	   developed	  over	   consecutive	   Americo-­‐Liberian-­‐led	   political	   regimes,	   each	   of	   which	   contributed	  towards	   the	  continued	  entrenchment	  of	  norms	  of	  corruption	  and	  misappropriation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  centralisation	  of	  wealth	  and	  power	  in	  the	  political	  sphere.	  
According	   to	   the	   report	  by	   the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	   (TRC)	  of	  Liberia,	  “these	   entrenched	   aspects	   of	   life	   in	   Liberia	   exacerbated	   behaviour	   during	   the	   civil	  conflict”.173	  In	  addition,	   the	  absence	  of	   a	  democratic	  political	   culture,	   coupled	  with	   the	  Americo-­‐Liberians’	   abuse	   of	   the	   political	   structure	   for	   self-­‐enrichment,	   established	   a	  societal	   belief	   that	   change	   could	   only	   occur	   in	   Liberia	   through	   the	   use	   of	   force.	   This	  became	   evident	   in	   the	   1980	   violent	   overthrow	   of	   government	   and	   the	   subsequent	  reprisal	   attacks	   committed	   by	   those	   who	   had	   been	   victims	   of	   the	   unjust	   and	  exclusionary	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  political	  system.174	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1.2.	  The	  Doe	  Dictatorship	  
A	  group	  of	   junior	  army	  officers	  of	   indigenous	  backgrounds	  eventually	  ended	  Americo-­‐Liberian	   rule	   in	   1980	   through	   a	   coup	   d’état.	   The	   small	   group	   of	   soldiers	   entered	   the	  Executive	  Mansion	  in	  Monrovia	  on	  12	  April,	  led	  by	  Samuel	  Doe,	  killing	  members	  of	  staff	  and	  eventually	  President	  Tolbert	  himself.	  By	  dawn,	  Doe	  had	  proclaimed	  that	  “133	  years	  of	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  rule	  were	  over”.175	  Tolbert’s	  mutilated	  body	  and	  those	  of	  his	  dead	  staff	  members	  were	  paraded	  through	  the	  capital’s	  streets	  in	  a	  brutal	  display	  of	  Americo-­‐Liberian	   defeat.	   A	   group	   of	   mostly	   cabinet	   ministers	   were	   displayed	   on	   the	   beach	   in	  chains	   and	   shot	   by	   firing	   squad,	   and	   the	   houses	   of	   the	   overthrown	   elite	   were	  destroyed.176	  At	   the	   time,	   the	   overthrow	  of	   power	  was	   typically	   achieved	  with	   limited	  violence,	  but	  Doe’s	  coup	  was	  particularly	  brutal	  and	  bloody.	  
In	   the	   ashes	   of	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberian	   system,	   the	   People’s	   Redemption	   Council	   (PRC)	  was	  established	  with	  Master	  Sergeant	  Samuel	  Doe	  as	  council	  chair.177	  Doe’s	  promise	  was	  to	  return	  Liberia	  to	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  he	  initially	  enjoyed	  widespread	  support.	  In	  keeping	  with	  his	  pledge	  to	  “liberate”	  Liberia’s	  indigenous	  population,	  Doe	  eliminated	  (by	  execution	  or	  enforced	  exile)	  all	  those	  identified	  as	  the	  elites	  of	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  regime.178	  However,	  Doe’s	  brutality	  soon	  extended	  to	  include	  any	  individuals	  or	  groups	  identified	  by	  him	  as	  being	  a	  threat	  to	  his	  hold	  on	  power.	  His	  targets	  ranged	  from	  those	  who	  held	  positions	  in	  office	  and	  the	  military,	  as	  well	  as	  students	  and	  journalists,	  among	  others.179	  In	   the	   places	   of	   those	   politicians	   and	   military	   men	   he	   forcibly	   removed	   or	  executed,	   Doe	   placed	   members	   of	   his	   own	   ethnicity,	   Krahn,	   who	   constituted	   roughly	  five	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  Liberian	  population.180	  	  
1.2.1.	  The	  Politicisation	  of	  Ethnicity	  
Historically,	  the	  Liberian	  state	  had	  been	  used	  by	  those	  in	  power	  as	  a	  source	  of	  personal	  enrichment	   and	   Doe’s	   administration	   continued	   in	   this	   vein.181	  As	   Jonny	   Steinberg	  asserts,	   “the	   president’s	   office	   was	   a	   trough	   at	   which	   various	   constituencies	   came	   to	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feed”.182	  In	  order	  to	  safeguard	  his	  power,	  Doe	  politicised	  ethnic	  relations	  by	  selectively	  rewarding	  the	  Krahn	  (and	  the	  Mandingo,	  although	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent)	  with	  political	  and	  military	   positions	   and	   with	   access	   to	   economic	   goods.	   Over	   his	   tenure,	   other	   ethnic	  groups	   became	   progressively	   marginalised	   as	   economic	   and	   political	   opportunities	  became	   tied	   to	   ethnic	   affiliations.	   However,	   this	   put	   a	   higher	   premium	   on	   staying	   in	  power	   as	   such	   exclusionary	   ethnonationalist	   policies	   often	   result	   in	   violent	   reprisals	  once	  power	   changes	   hands.183	  The	  more	  Doe	   ethnicised	   the	   political	   sphere,	   the	  more	  paranoid	  he	  became	  about	  losing	  power,	  leading	  him	  increasingly	  to	  deal	  “with	  real	  and	  imagined	   threats	   with	   seemingly	   whimsical	   violence”. 184 	  Doe’s	   exclusionary	  ethnonationalist	  policies	  gave	  rise	  to	  group	  grievances	  and	  created	  a	  large,	  multi-­‐ethnic	  group	  of	  dissidents.	  As	  a	  result,	  Charles	  Taylor	  –	  the	  son	  of	  an	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  father	  and	  an	   indigenous	  mother	  –	  was	  able	   to	  bring	  together	  the	  Mano	  and	  Gio	   from	  Nimba	  County,	   along	   with	   members	   of	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberians	   in	   the	   diaspora,	   to	   create	   a	  formidable	  enemy.185	  	  
While	  the	  politicisation	  of	  ethnicity	  did	  not	  affect	  Firestone’s	  strategy	  specifically,	  it	  did	  lead	   to	   a	   conflict	   fought	   along	   ethnic	   lines	   defined	   by	   a	   continuous	   pattern	   of	   ethnic	  reprisal.	  It	  also	  meant	  that	  peace	  negotiations	  were	  continuously	  hampered	  by	  a	  conflict	  whose	  outcome	  was	  zero-­‐sum.186	  
1.2.2.	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Thomas	  Quiwonkpa	  
In	   the	   first	   five	   years	   of	   his	   political	   tenure,	   Doe	   found	   his	   greatest	   rival	   in	   Thomas	  Quiwonkpa,	   a	   Gio	   originally	   from	   Nimba	   County.187	  Quiwonkpa	   had	   been	   involved	  alongside	   Doe	   in	   the	   1980	   overthrow	   of	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberian	   government	   and	   was	  appointed	   the	   position	   of	   commanding	   general	   of	   the	   AFL	   after	   the	   PRC’s	   victory.	  Quiwonkpa	   was	   an	   ethnic	   Gio	   originally	   from	   Nimba	   County	   and	   he	   contributed	  significantly	  towards	  the	  ethnicisation	  of	  the	  AFL	  by	  cultivating	  strong	  ties	  with	  Gio	  and	  Mano	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  soldiers.188	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Doe	  was	  replacing	  top-­‐ranking	  military	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men	   and	   political	   officials	   with	   members	   of	   his	   own	   ethnicity,	   the	   Krahn.189	  As	   the	  personal	   rivalry	   developed	   between	   the	   two	  men,	   Doe	   formed	   an	   allegiance	  with	   the	  Mandingo	  –	  an	  ethnic	  group	  of	  Muslim	   faith	   that	  had	  enjoyed	  certain	  privileges	  under	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  rule.190	  The	  antagonism	  between	  Doe	  and	  Quiwonkpa	  soon	  permeated	  the	  armed	   forces,	  pitting	   their	   respective	  ethnic	   constituencies	  against	  one	  another.191	  As	  tensions	  heightened	  in	  1983,	  Quiwonkpa	  and	  a	  number	  of	  his	  loyalists	  fled	  into	  exile	  and	  began	  planning	  a	  campaign	  to	  overthrow	  Doe.192	  
After	   taking	  his	  position	  as	  council	   chair	   in	  1980,	  Doe	  suspended	  Liberia’s	  democratic	  institutions	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   republic’s	   history.193	  However,	   as	   his	   legitimacy	  eroded,	   the	   need	   to	   lend	   credence	   to	   his	   authority	   grew	   increasingly	   pressing.	  Quiwonkpa’s	   exile	   gave	  Doe	   the	   opportunity	   to	   acquiesce	   to	  mounting	  US	  pressure	   to	  institute	  civilian	  rule	  in	  Liberia.	  He	  quickly	  constructed	  his	  own	  political	  party,	  using	  his	  control	  over	   state	   resources	   to	  buy	   support	   for	   the	  elections	  and	   to	   fund	  his	   electoral	  campaigns.194	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  Doe	  was	  unable	  to	  secure	  a	  victory	  and	  rigged	  the	  results	  to	   award	   himself	   a	   51	  per	  cent	   majority	   in	   the	   1985	   elections. 195 	  Following	   the	  fraudulent	  elections,	  Quiwonkpa	  returned	  to	  Liberia	  from	  Sierra	  Leone	  to	  stage	  a	  coup	  with	  a	  group	  of	  former	  AFL	  soldiers	  loyal	  to	  him.196	  On	  reaching	  Monrovia,	  Quiwonkpa	  used	   the	   national	   radio	   station	   to	   announce	   that	   he	   and	   what	   he	   called	   his	   National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (NPFL)	  had	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  capital	  city.	  	  
However,	   Doe	   had	   been	   warned	   of	   the	   impending	   insurgency	   by	   officials	   from	   the	  US	  Embassy	  in	  Monrovia,	  giving	  him	  sufficient	  time	  to	  summon	  military	  reinforcements	  to	   re-­‐establish	  his	   control	   over	   the	   capital.197	  Quiwonkpa	  was	   killed	   and	  his	  mutilated	  corpse	   was	   paraded	   through	   Monrovia	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   the	   public	   brutality	   that	   was	   to	  follow.	   Gio	   and	   Mano	   civilians,	   especially	   those	   in	   Nimba	   County,	   were	   subjected	   to	  exceptional	   savagery	  at	   the	  hands	  of	  Doe’s	  AFL	  as	  a	   form	  of	   collective	  punishment	   for	  Quiwonkpa’s	   actions.198	  While	   the	  1985	  coup	   failed	  and	   the	   consequences	  were	  brutal	  for	  select	  ethnic	  groups,	  Quiwonkpa	  left	  behind	  a	  significant	  legacy:	  the	  NPFL.	  While	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Gerdes,	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Liberian	  State,”	  41–44.	  190	  Gerdes,	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Liberian	  State,”	  43.	  191	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994”,	  178.	  192	  Steinberg,	  Little	  Liberia,	  65;	  Gerdes,	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Liberian	  State,”	  42.	  193	  Ellis,	  The	  Mask	  of	  Anarchy.	  194	  Ibid.,	  58.	  195	  Gerdes,	  “The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Liberian	  State,”	  42.	  196	  Ibid.,	  43.	  197	  Ellis,	  The	  Mask	  of	  Anarchy,	  60.	  198	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994”,	  178.	  
	   49	  
NPFL	  had	  little	  formal	  structure	  until	  1989,	  Quiwonkpa	  had	  formed	  the	  military	  faction	  that	  would	  oust	  Doe	  in	  1989	  and	  initiate	  14	  years	  of	  violent	  conflict.199	  
1.2.3.	  Political	  Structure	  and	  Culture	  under	  Doe’s	  Regime	  
Doe’s	   initial	   claim	   to	   power	   relied	   heavily	   on	   the	   ideological	   justification	   that	   he	   had	  liberated	  the	  Liberian	  people	  through	  the	  1980	  revolution.200	  However,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  this	   claim	   faded	   as	   Doe	   increasingly	   resorted	   to	   the	   brutal	   use	   of	   military	   force	   and	  ethnic	  patronage	   to	  defend	  his	  position	   in	  power.201202	  Essentially,	  Liberia	  experienced	  no	   radical	   political,	   economic	   or	   social	   restructuring	   under	   the	   Doe	   regime	   and	  widespread	  public	  opinion	  of	   the	  new	  government	  was	  “same	  taxi,	  different	  driver”.203	  However,	   his	   introduction	   of	   exclusionary	   ethnic	   policies	   deviated	   from	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberian	   regimes	  who	   had	   relied	  more	   on	   class	   structure	   as	   a	   strategy	   for	   rule.	   Doe’s	  time	  in	  power	  resulted	  in	  the	  politicisation	  and	  divisive	  clustering	  of	  Liberia’s	  different	  ethnic	  groups,	  which	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  conflict	  that	  broke	  out	  following	  the	  1989	  insurgency.	  	  
The	  historic	   absence	  of	   a	   genuine	  democratic	   political	   culture	   in	   Liberia	  was	  not	   only	  perpetuated	   but	   arguably	   aggravated	   during	   Doe’s	   decade	   of	   power.	   Doe	   was	   not	  interested	   in	   the	   technical	   issues	   of	   running	   a	   state;	   instead,	   he	   used	   the	   power	   that	  came	  with	  the	  presidency	  to	  build	  ethnic	  alliances	  which,	  in	  turn,	  he	  used	  to	  protect	  his	  power. 204 	  In	   addition,	   Doe	   accrued	   revenue	   by	   granting	   concessions	   to	   foreign	  businesses	   that	   relied	   on	   him	   for	   commercial	   opportunities.	   Through	   legal	   and	   illegal	  payments	  made	  by	  these	  companies,	  Doe	  was	  able	  to	  sustain	  his	  patronage	  network	  and	  buy	  local	  support.	  Doe	  also	  accrued	  revenue	  through	  the	  receipt	  of	  US	  aid	  in	  a	  manner	  not	   dissimilar	   from	   the	   income	   the	   previous	   government	   had	   earned	   through	   the	  economic	   Open	   Door	   Policy.205 	  As	   such,	   Doe	   did	   not	   have	   to	   rely	   on	   democratic	  measures	  to	  ensure	  the	  continuation	  of	  his	  political	  career.	  According	  to	  Amos	  Sawyer,	  Liberia	   under	   Doe	   was	   characterised	   by	   “six	   years	   of	   rape	   and	   plunder	   by	   armed	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marauders	  whose	  ideology	  [was]	  to	  search	  for	  cash	  and	  whose	  ambition	  [was]	  to	  retain	  power	  to	  accumulate	  and	  protect	  wealth”.206	  	  
1.2.4.	  The	  End	  of	  the	  Doe	  Dictatorship	  
Doe’s	   progressively	   exclusionary	   ethnonationalist	   policies	   greatly	   diminished	   his	  support	   base	   and	   created	   widespread	   societal	   grievances. 207 	  By	   1990,	   Doe	   had	  reportedly	   survived	   no	   fewer	   than	   38	   coup	   attempts	   against	   his	   government	   and	   his	  own	   life.208	  Attempts	   to	   usurp	   power	   through	   the	   violent	   defeat	   of	   authority	   spread	  beyond	  the	  political	  sphere	  and	   infiltrated	  almost	  all	  aspects	  of	  Liberian	  society.	  From	  universities	  to	  sports	  clubs,	  no	  structure	  was	  safe	  and	  governing	  bodies	  and	  committees	  were	   routinely	   overthrown.	   As	   Jonny	   Steinberg	   illustrates,	   “every	   sphere	   of	   life,	   no	  matter	  how	  petty,	  was	  organised	  around	  a	  centre	  of	  power,	  and	  centres	  of	  power	  could	  be	  stormed,	  their	  personnel	  driven	  into	  the	  wilderness”.209	  In	  the	  political	  sphere	  and	  in	  society	  more	  broadly,	  power	  went	   to	   the	  most	  ruthless	  and	  brutal,	   to	   those	  who	  were	  prepared	   to	   take	   with	   force.	   This	   was	   made	   evident	   by	   the	   particularly	   bloody	   and	  brutal	   1980	   coup	   and	   would	   once	   again	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   violence	   that	   erupted	   in	  December	  1989.	  
This	   pattern	   of	   political	   predation	   and	   selfishness	   was	   perpetuated	   and	   exacerbated	  during	   the	   civil	   war.	   Both	   Taylor’s	   de	   facto	   government	   and	   the	   interim	   government	  established	  by	  ECOMOG	  suffered	   from	  predatory	   tendencies	  and	  egocentric	  ambitions,	  meaning	   that	   whomever	   Firestone	   Liberia	   dealt	   with	   was	   likely	   to	   be	   corrupt	   and	  repressive.	  As	  such,	  Liberia’s	  cultural	  structure	  significantly	  limited	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  foreign	  business	  actors.	  	  
1.3.	  The	  Influence	  of	  International	  and	  Regional	  Factors	  
Although	   the	   First	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   has	   often	   been	   approached	   as	   an	   intrastate	  conflict,	  regional	  and	  international	  dimensions	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  the	  onset	  and	  character	  of	  the	  conflict.	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1.3.1.	  International	  Factors	  
While	  Samuel	  Doe	  lacked	  experience	  in	  the	  intricacies	  of	  politics,	  he	  soon	  learnt	  that	  he	  could	  protect	  his	  position	  in	  Liberia	  by	  adopting	  a	  pro-­‐American	  line	  in	  foreign	  affairs.210	  In	   spite	  of	  Doe’s	  blatant	   transgressions	  as	  president,	  Cold	  War	   tactics	  drove	   the	  US	   to	  maintain	  financial	  and	  military	  support	   for	   its	  West	  African	  stronghold	  throughout	  the	  1980s.211	  Doe	  was	   able	   to	   suppress	  US	   concerns	   about	   his	   handling	   of	   state	   affairs	   by	  simply	  making	  “vague	  promises	  of	  reform”,212	  evidenced	  by	  official	  US	  endorsement	  of	  the	  fraudulent	  1985	  elections.	  However,	  the	  danger	  of	  relying	  so	  heavily	  on	  America	  as	  a	  patron	   became	   apparent	   in	   1988	  when	   official	  US	   support	   for	  Doe	  was	  withdrawn.213	  The	  abrupt	  cutting	  off	  of	  crucial	  resources	  from	  the	  US	  severely	  weakened	  Doe’s	  regime	  by	  undercutting	  his	   ability	   to	   fulfil	   patronage	  obligations	   and	   counterbalance	  Liberian	  strongmen.214	  	  
American–Libyan	  tensions	  over	  Liberia	  also	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  impending	  1989	  insurgency.	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  US	  was	  concerned	  about	  Colonel	  Muammar	  Gaddafi’s	  aspiration	  to	  build	  a	  pan-­‐Islamic	  African	  federation	  in	  Africa,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  close	  ties	  to	  the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   his	   support	   for	   a	   number	   of	   groups	   identified	   by	   the	   US	   as	  terrorists.215	  To	  prevent	  an	  alliance	  forming	  between	  Liberia	  and	  Libya,	  the	  US	  Assistant	  Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   African	   Affairs	   flew	   to	   Liberia	   with	   US$10	  million	   to	   buy	   Doe’s	  support.216	  While	   Doe’s	   decision	   to	   adopt	   a	   pro-­‐American	   line	   in	   his	   foreign	   policy	  helped	   buoy	   his	   political	   career	   in	   the	   short	   term,	   it	   also	   impacted	   regional	   dynamics	  and	  ultimately	  contributed	  towards	  its	  demise.	  	  
1.3.2.	  Regional	  Factors	  
Gaddafi	  sought	  revenge	  against	  Doe	  for	  favouring	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  US	  over	  Libya.	  He	  recruited	   Liberian	   dissidents	   who	   had	   fled	   Liberia	   to	   neighbouring	   countries,	  particularly	  Burkina	  Faso,	  Guinea,	  Ghana	  and	  Sierra	  Leone,	  bringing	   them	  to	  Libya	   for	  military	  training.	  The	  most	  significant	  Liberian	  contingent	  that	  trained	  in	  Libya	  was	  the	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  The	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  Foundation,	  May	  3,	  2011,	  accessed	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  12,	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NPFL,	  led	  by	  Charles	  Taylor.217	  Taylor’s	  NPFL	  recruits	  received	  training	  in	  Libya	  and	  his	  forces	   were	   augmented	   by	   mercenaries	   from	   Burkina	   Faso	   and	   revolutionaries	   from	  Sierra	   Leone	   and	   the	  Gambia.218	  President	   Felix	  Houphouët-­‐Boigny	   of	   the	   Ivory	   Coast,	  who	   had	   been	   a	   close	   friend	   of	   Tolbert,	   also	   offered	   refuge	   to	   Liberian	   exiles	   and	  assisted	  in	  facilitating	  the	  1989	  Taylor	  insurgency.219	  The	  Liberian	  diaspora	  in	  the	  Ivory	  Coast	  was	  constituted	  predominantly	  by	  Americo-­‐Liberians	  who	  had	  formed	  allegiances	  with	   subsequent	  waves	   of	   Liberian	   refugees,	  mostly	   the	   Gio	   and	  Mano	   fleeing	   Nimba	  County.220	  
These	   regional	   alliances	   would	   eventually	   impact	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   West	   African	  peacekeeping	  force,	  ECOMOG.	  Then	  Nigerian	  president,	  Ibrahim	  Babangida,	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  Doe’s	  and	  he	  allegedly	  provided	  Doe	  with	  weapons	  and	  ammunition	  during	  the	  AFL’s	  campaign	  in	  Nimba	  County	  (which	  Babangida	  has	  denied).	  Additionally,	  the	  1990	  killing	   of	   1	  000	   Nigerians	   by	   Taylor’s	   NPFL	   likely	   triggered	   Babangida’s	   decision	   to	  intervene	   in	   the	   Liberian	   conflict.	   There	   was	   a	   fear	   that	   the	   Liberian	   conflict	   would	  create	   a	   “ripple	   of	   instability”	   in	   the	   region	   and	   that	   victory	   for	   Taylor	   might	   lead	  Nigeria’s	   regional	   opponents	   to	  use	  Liberia	   as	   a	   source	  of	   aid	   and	   support.221	  As	   such,	  Nigeria	  took	  charge	  of	  the	  assemblage	  of	  the	  peacekeeping	  force	  known	  as	  the	  Economic	  Community	   of	   West	   African	   States	   Monitoring	   Group	   (ECOMOG)	   that	   would	   be	  dispatched	  to	  Liberia	   in	  1990	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	   the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  (ECOWAS).222	  	  
1.4.	  Section	  Summary	  
By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1980s,	  Liberia’s	   living	  memory	  was	  dominated	  by	  mass	  killings	  and	  the	  flagrant	  use	  of	  terror	  to	  assert	  dominance.	  The	  levels	  of	  brutality	  and	  violence	  that	  characterised	   Liberia’s	   history	   led	   to	   the	   outbreak	   of	   a	   conflict	   in	   late	   1989	   that	  was	  “peculiarly	  horrible”.223	  According	  to	  a	  witness,	  the	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  exceeded	  all	  other	  wars	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  intensity,	  its	  savagery,	  in	  depravity	  and	  in	  horror.224	  The	  character	  of	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the	  conflict	   is	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  understanding	  the	  strategic	  behaviour	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia	   in	   the	  early	  1990s	  as	   it	  put	   the	  company	   in	  a	  position	  of	  extreme	  vulnerability	  and	  severely	  limited	  its	  agency	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  conflict.	  The	  historical	  context	  also	  reveals	   the	   entrenched	   culture	   of	   predation	   and	   selfishness	   in	   Liberian	   politics.	   The	  implication	   of	   this	   is	   that	   whomever	   Firestone	   Liberia	   decided	   to	   engage	   with,	   they	  would	   likely	   be	   feeding	   a	   regime	   that	  was	   immoral	   and	   despotic.	   Essentially,	   the	   line	  between	   “good”	   and	   “bad”	   political	   actors	   had	   never	   been	   distinct	   or	   separate	   in	  Liberia’s	  history,	  and	  this	  was	  continued	  and	  further	  complicated	  during	  the	  civil	  war.	  	  
In	  addition,	  external	   intervening	   factors	  are	   important	   in	  understanding	  the	   formation	  of	  ECOMOG	  and	  the	  role	  it	  played	  in	  complicating	  and	  aggravating	  the	  conflict.	  Instead	  of	  representing	   a	   neutral	   peacekeeping	   force,	   ECOMOG	   was	   corrupted	   by	   bias	   and	  distracted	  by	  the	  marauding	  tendencies	  of	  its	  soldiers.	  Liberians	  commonly	  referred	  to	  ECOMOG	   as	   “Every	   Car	   or	  Moveable	   Object	   Gone”	   as	   its	   soldiers	   routinely	   stole	   from	  Liberia	   and	   shipped	   the	   looted	   goods	   back	   home	   (mostly	   to	   Nigeria).225	  In	   addition,	  ECOMOG	  was	   repeatedly	   criticised	   for	   its	   disregard	   for	   civilian	   safety,	   as	   it	   regularly	  besieged	   suspected	   NPFL	   territories	   with	   little	   thought	   for	   whatever	   and	   whomever	  resided	   there.226	  Thus,	  while	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   Liberian	   Civil	  War	   tends	   to	   portray	  ECOMOG	   (and	   the	   interim	   government)	   as	   the	   “good”	   and	   Taylor	   as	   the	   “bad”,	   this	  distinction	  was	  not	  nearly	  so	  clear-­‐cut	   in	  reality.	  The	   implication	  of	   this	  narrative	  was	  that	  Firestone	  Liberia	  was	  damned	  for	  engaging	  with	  Taylor	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  no	  “good”	  alternative	  existed.	  However,	  this	  assumption	  negates	  the	  need	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	   motivations	   behind	   the	   company’s	   decisions	   during	   the	   conflict.	   As	   mentioned	  previously,	  this	  is	  a	  significant	  gap	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  that	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  fill.	  
Understanding	   the	   background	   to	   the	   First	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   and	   the	   factors	   that	  shaped	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  critically	  examining	  Firestone’s	  decision-­‐making	  and	  behaviour	  during	   this	   time.	   As	   important	   is	   an	   understanding	   of	   Firestone’s	   longstanding	  relationship	  with	  the	  Liberian	  state,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  corporate	  structure	  within	  which	  Firestone	  operates.	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Section	  2	  |	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Liberian	  State	  
2.1.	  The	  Historical	  Context	  
2.1.1.	  Liberia’s	  Economic	  History	  
In	  the	  two	  decades	  that	  followed	  independence,	  the	  Liberian	  economy	  grew	  as	  a	  result	  of	   high	   international	   demand	   for	   Liberian	   resources	   (such	   as	   rubber,	   coffee	   and	  palm	  oil)	  produced	  by	  indigenous	  labour	  and	  traded	  by	  wealthy	  Liberian	  merchants.	  Wealthy	  Liberians	  from	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  political	  sphere	  invested	  in	  shipping	  vessels	  to	  capitalise	   on	   this	  demand,	   leading	   to	   the	  development	  of	   a	   small	   shipping	   industry.227	  However,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   steamship	   changed	   the	   global	   trading	   game	   and	  Liberian	  merchants	  were	   soon	   squeezed	   out	   of	   international	   trade	   as	   they	   lacked	   the	  capital	   to	   keep	   up	   with	   industrial	   developments.	   By	   the	   early	   20th	   century,	   Liberia’s	  trading	  environment	  was	  dominated	  by	  highly	  capitalised	   foreigners	  and	  the	  economy	  was	  almost	  entirely	  owned	  and	  controlled	  by	  foreign	  commercial	  houses.228	  	  
When	  its	  position	  as	  a	  trading	  nation	  plummeted,	  the	  Liberian	  state	  turned	  to	  taxing	  the	  indigenous	   population	   as	   well	   as	   foreign	   merchants	   for	   commodities	   that	   passed	  through	   Liberian	   ports.229	  The	   government	   also	   accumulated	   revenue	   through	   signing	  concessions	   with	   foreign	   firms	   for	   the	   commercial	   use	   of	   Liberian	   land	   and	   charging	  companies	   for	   recruiting	   Liberian	   labour.230	  The	   concentration	   of	   state	   power	   in	   the	  hands	   of	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberians	   meant	   that	   the	   “business	   of	   governance	   served	   the	  interest	  of	  businesses	  controlled	  by	  those	  families	  and	  their	  networks”.231	  While	  special	  deals	  were	  made	  between	   the	  Americo-­‐Liberians	  and	  a	  multitude	  of	   foreign	   firms,	   the	  concession	   agreement	   signed	   with	   the	   American-­‐based	   Firestone	   Tire	   and	   Rubber	  Company	  (FSTR)	  in	  the	  1920s	  was	  the	  most	  significant.	  Understanding	  the	  historic	  role	  played	  by	  Firestone	  in	  Liberia	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  historical	  antecedent	  to	  the	  civil	  conflict.	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2.2.	  The	  Origins	  of	  Firestone’s	  Liberian	  Operations	  
For	   America,	   the	   early	   1900s	   were	   a	   time	   of	   rapid	   industrialisation	   and	   rubber	   had	  become	   increasingly	   important	   in	   accelerating	   the	   process.232	  Unlike	   the	   British,	   who	  had	  full	  control	  over	  plants	  in	  their	  Southeast	  Asian	  colonies,	  American	  companies	  had	  no	   control	   over	   the	   source	   and	   supply	   of	   the	   sought-­‐after	   industrial	   resource.233	  The	  Firestone	  Tire	  and	  Rubber	  Company	  sought	  to	  break	  the	  British	  monopoly	  by	  building	  up	  an	  American	  rubber	  industry.234	  In	  December	  1923,	  Firestone	  Sr	  sent	  rubber	  experts	  to	  Mexico,	  the	  Philippines	  and	  Liberia	  to	  investigate	  their	  suitability	  to	  “grow	  American	  rubber”.235	  Firestone	   Sr	   decided	   on	   Liberia,	   presenting	   to	   his	   board	   of	   directors	   that,	  “the	   indigenous	   labour	  supply	  of	  Liberia	  effects	  a	   large	  savings	  …	   In	  Liberia	   [the]	   land	  costs	  practically	  nothing”.236	  In	   addition,	   Liberia	   imposed	  no	   income	   tax	  on	  profits,	   no	  land	  tax	  and	  no	  import	  duties	  on	  the	  machinery	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  brought	  in.237	  	  
Although	  financially	  ailing,	  the	  Liberian	  government’s	  concession	  agreement	  with	  FSTR	  was	  more	  than	  just	  a	  desperate	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  bankruptcy.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  spread	  of	  colonisation	  through	  Africa	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  fear	  that	  the	  British	  and	  French	   would	   encroach	   on	   their	   Liberian	   territory. 238 	  A	   substantial	   American	  investment	   would	   not	   only	   provide	   the	   debt-­‐stricken	   government	   with	  much	   needed	  income,	  but	  would	  also	   likely	  deter	  European	   interference	   in	  Liberian	   territory.239	  The	  concession	  agreement	  signed	  between	  the	  Liberian	  government	  and	  the	  FSTR	  –	  and	  the	  subsequent	  royalties	  received	  therefrom	  –	  enhanced	  the	  executive’s	  power	  and	  helped	  preserve	  Americo-­‐Liberian	   control	  over	  Liberia’s	   territory	   in	   its	   entirety.240	  Successive	  Liberian	   regimes	   used	   the	   concession	   agreement	   as	   a	   model	   for	   further	   foreign	  investments	  and	  Liberia’s	  prosperity	   increasingly	  came	   to	  rely	  on	   the	  success	  of	   these	  investments.241	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2.3.	  The	  Concession	  Agreement	  
The	  concession	  agreement	  entailed	  a	  99-­‐year	  lease	  on	  up	  to	  1	  million	  acres	  of	  land	  at	  an	  annual	  rent	  of	   five	  cents	  per	  acre	  for	  the	  first	  six	  years	  of	  operations.242	  After	  these	  six	  years,	   rent	   would	   be	   charged	   at	   10	  cents	   per	   acre	   and	   a	   revenue	   tax	   of	   2.5	  per	  cent	  would	   be	   paid	   on	   the	   value	   of	   all	   products	   exported.	   As	   part	   of	   the	   agreement,	   the	  Liberian	  government	  accepted	  a	   loan	  of	  US$5	  million	   from	   the	  Finance	  Corporation	  of	  America	   (FCA),	   a	   wholly	   owned	   subsidiary	   of	   FSTR.243	  The	   loan	   entailed	   a	   significant	  loss	   of	   sovereignty	   for	   Liberia	   as	   its	   stringent	   conditions	   granted	   the	   FCA	   full	   control	  over	   Liberia’s	   finances	   until	   the	   repayment	  was	   settled.244	  Thus,	   to	   prevent	   European	  colonisation	   and	   address	   its	   financial	   troubles,	   the	   Liberian	   government	   chose	   “the	  lesser	   evil	   –	   that	   of	   veiled	   economic	   dominance	   by	   a	   company	   belonging	   to	   a	  traditionally	  friendly	  company”.245	  
The	  Firestone	  Natural	  Rubber	  Company	  (FSNR)	  was	  established	  in	  1926	  as	  a	  subsidiary	  of	   FSTR	   and	   was	   charged	   with	   controlling	   the	   plantation	   from	   its	   headquarters	   in	  North	  America,	  while	   its	  own	  subsidiary,	   the	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company	   (FPCO	  or	  “Firestone”),	   executed	   operations	   on	   the	   ground. 246 	  The	   FSNR	   maintained	   central	  command	   over	   decision-­‐making	   and	   operations	   on	   the	   plantations	   and	   kept	   in	   close	  communication	   via	   radio.247	  In	   order	   to	   establish	   a	   rubber	   production	   industry	   in	  Liberia,	  engineers	  were	  brought	  in	  by	  Firestone	  to	  build	  roads	  and	  bridges.	  In	  addition,	  the	   company	   contributed	   much-­‐needed	   social	   development	   by	   building	   a	   modern	  hospital,	   setting	   up	   a	   telephone	   system	  and	  providing	   sanitation	   to	   nearby	   villages.248	  Both	  estates	  produced	  their	  own	  timber,	   tiles,	  bricks,	  soap,	  stone	  and	   latex	  cups,	  all	  of	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which	  were	  supplied	  by	  stores	  established	   for	  plantation	  employees.	  Eventually,	   these	  stores	  were	  opened	  up	  to	  the	  broader	  Liberian	  public.249	  	  
2.3.1.	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Supply	  of	  Labour	  
The	   concession	   agreement	   also	   explicitly	   stated	   the	   government’s	   responsibility	   to	  “encourage,	   support,	   and	   assist	   the	   efforts	   of	   Firestone	   to	   secure	   and	   maintain	   an	  adequate	   labour	   supply”.250	  While	   Firestone	   Sr	   had	   stressed	   the	   advantage	   of	   cheap	  labour	  supply	  to	  his	  board	  of	  directors,	  no	  national	   labour	  market	  existed	  in	  Liberia	  at	  the	   time.251	  However,	   the	   government	   had	   enforced	   involuntary	   labour	   since	   the	   late	  19th	  century,	  and	  this	  practice	  continued	  into	  the	  1900s	  following	  the	   implementation	  of	   indirect	   rule.252	  Many	   government	   officials	   and	   politicians	  were	   involved	   in	   rubber	  production	  in	  Liberia	  and	  thus	  desired	  to	  keep	  wages	  in	  the	  sector	  low	  to	  ensure	  higher	  profits.	   While	   the	   financial	   burden	   inflicted	   on	   adult	   indigenous	   men	   by	   the	   hut	  tax	  forced	   many	   to	   engage	   in	   pecuniary	   economic	   activities,	   poor	   wages	   on	   the	   rubber	  plantations	  made	  the	  sector	  relatively	  unappealing	  to	  those	  seeking	  work.	  As	  such,	  the	  government	   relied	   on	   the	   recruitment	   of	   forced	   labour	   to	   supply	   the	  plantations	  with	  workers.253	  On	  numerous	  occasions,	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  government	  used	  the	  state	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  enforcing	  labour,	  suppressing	  strikes	  and	  keeping	  wages	  low	  to	  benefit	  the	  “external	   wing	   of	   the	   Liberian	   ruling	   class”,254	  which	   included	   the	   likes	   of	   Firestone’s	  owners.	  In	  return	  for	  the	  labour	  supplied,	  the	  company	  paid	  half	  a	  cent	  to	  the	  chiefs,	  half	  a	   cent	   to	   the	   district	   commissioner	   and	   one	  cent	   to	   the	   government	   for	   each	   day	   of	  work.255	  	  
In	   1930,	   this	   system	   of	   forced	   labour	   became	   the	   topic	   of	   a	   League	   of	   Nations	  investigation,	  which	   found	   the	   use	   of	   forced	   labour	   by	   the	   Liberian	   government	   to	   be	  analogous	   to	  slavery.256	  In	  response,	  Firestone	   Jr	   launched	  a	  public	  relations	  campaign	  to	   protect	   the	   company’s	   reputation	   as	   one	   that	   had	   “brought	   a	   new	  day	   of	   hope	   and	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advancement”257	  to	   Liberia,	   while	   also	   benefitting	   American	   customers.	   His	   campaign	  was	  delivered	  in	  five-­‐minute	  radio	  spots	  and	  depicted	  the	  company	  as	  one	  that	  provided	  employment	   and	   social	   welfare	   to	   the	   locals,	   built	   infrastructure	   for	   the	   nation	   and	  respected	   local	  customs.258	  However,	   forced	   labour	  continued	  and,	   in	  1954,	  Firestone’s	  labour	   force	   was	   constituted	   by	   16	  000	   forcibly	   recruited	   workers	   (approximately	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  company’s	  total	  labour	  supply).	  Despite	  its	  feudal	  nature,	  the	  system	  did	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  national	  labour	  market	  of	  wage-­‐earning	  workers	  in	  Liberia	  and,	  by	  the	  early	  1960s,	  only	  20	  000	  workers	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  80	  000	  on	  the	  plantation	   were	   forced	   recruits,	   while	   the	   rest	   were	   voluntary	   wage-­‐seekers. 259	  However,	  allegations	  of	  “slave-­‐like”	  working	  conditions	  and	  the	  use	  of	  child	  labour	  have	  continued	  to	  haunt	  Firestone.260	  
2.3.2.	  Firestone	  and	  Political	  Engagement	  
The	   rubber	   plantation	   economy	   in	   Liberia	   was	   soon	   thriving,	   but	   only	   the	   Americo-­‐Liberian	  elite	  reaped	  the	  benefits.	  By	  the	  1950s,	  Firestone	  was	  Liberia’s	  largest	  private	  employer	   and	   revenues	   from	   rubber	   concessions	   constituted	   almost	   half	   of	   the	  government’s	   annual	   revenue. 261 	  Firestone	   also	   encouraged	   the	   participation	   of	  Americo-­‐Liberian	   elites	   in	   rubber	   production	   and	   offered	   agricultural	   advice	   to	  prospective	   farmers.	  Liberia’s	   former	  presidents,	  Charles	  King,	  Edwin	  Barclay,	  William	  Tubman	   and	   William	   Tolbert,	   all	   owned	   private	   rubber	   plantations.262	  During	   the	  Tubman	  presidency,	  the	  merging	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  the	  control	  of	  property	  rights	  reinforced	   patrimonial	   relationships	   as	   the	   president	   controlled	   the	   right	   to	   enclose	  communal	  land	  and	  transfer	  title	  deeds.263	  According	  to	  George	  Klay	  Kieh,	  the	  Firestone	  project	  “occasioned	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  class	  system	  primarily	  wedded	  to	  the	  individual’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  major	  means	  of	  production”,	  which	  turned	  the	  neocolonial	  state	  into	  a	  vehicle	  for	  promoting	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Americo-­‐Liberian	  ruling	  class.264	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As	  Firestone’s	  importance	  in	  Liberia	  grew,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  “[w]hoever	  was	   going	   to	   run	   Liberia	   needed	   Firestone”.265 	  However,	   when	   President	   Tolbert	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  in	  1971,	  he	  renegotiated	  the	  concession	  agreement	  with	  FSTR	  to	  include	  higher	  taxes	  and	  the	  hiring	  of	  more	  Liberians	  in	  senior	  management	  positions	  in	  keeping	  with	  his	  efforts	   to	  “Liberianise”	   the	  economy.266	  While	   the	  top	   financial	  and	  managerial	   positions	   remained	   the	   domain	   of	   the	   American	   staff,	   the	   company	  complained	  that	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  concession	  negatively	  affected	  its	  profit.267	  However,	  Firestone’s	  situation	  was	  eased	  in	  1980	  when	  Samuel	  Doe	  suspended	  the	  renegotiation	  of	   the	   concession.	   Doe	   also	   offered	   Firestone	   generous	   tax	   exemptions	   to	   lessen	   the	  negative	   consequences	  of	   the	  drop	   in	   the	  global	  price	  of	   rubber	   in	  1982.268	  In	   spite	  of	  these	  actions,	  the	  company’s	  supply	  of	  rubber	  from	  private	  farms	  dropped	  dramatically	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  Firestone	  was	  forced	  to	  surrender	  its	  lease	  on	  its	  Cavalla	  plantation.269	  	  	  
However,	  Firestone	  was	  extended	  a	  lifeline	  with	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  HIV	  and	  Aids	  in	  the	  1980s,	   which	   increased	   demand	   for	   condoms	   and	   other	   latex-­‐based	   protective	   gear	  significantly.	   In	   response	   to	   increased	   global	   demand	   for	   latex,	   as	   well	   as	   remaining	  financial	  pressures,	  a	  new	  system	  was	  initiated	  at	  the	  Harbel	  plantation	  that	  allowed	  for	  latex	  to	  flow	  from	  the	  rubber	  tree	  for	  longer.270	  This	  system	  decreased	  the	  frequency	  of	  tapping,	   leading	   the	   company	   to	   dismiss	   5	  000	   of	   its	   workers	   to	   decrease	   costs	   and	  boost	   profitability.	   Firestone	  was	   still	   facing	   criticism	   for	   harsh	  working	   conditions	   at	  the	  plantation	  and	   the	  decision	   to	   reduce	   the	   labour	   force	  only	  exacerbated	  hostilities	  towards	  the	  company.271	  However,	  the	  increase	  in	  demand	  for	  latex	  helped	  to	  keep	  the	  company	  afloat	  and	  Firestone	  “ended	  the	  decade	  on	  a	  positive	  note”.272	  
2.4.	  Section	  Summary	  
To	  protect	   its	   plantation	   in	  Liberia,	   Firestone	   sought	   to	  maintain	   good	   relations	   “with	  whoever	  ran	  Liberia,	  no	  matter	  how	  they	  came	  to	  power	  or	  what	  they	  did	  to	  hold	  on	  to	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it”.273	  This	   included	   the	   30-­‐year	   quasi-­‐dictatorship	   of	   President	   Tubman,	   as	   well	   as	  President	  Doe.274	  Similarly,	  each	  new	  regime	  remained	  aware	  of	   the	  significance	  of	   the	  revenues	   that	   accrued	   to	  government	   through	   the	   company’s	  payment	  of	   its	   rent,	   and	  through	   taxation	   and	   royalty	   payments.275	  The	   significant	   investment	   made	   by	   the	  company	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   to	   consider	  when	   analysing	  BFS’s	  decision	   to	   support	  the	   collaboration	   between	   Firestone	   Liberia	   and	   Taylor’s	   government.	   Liberia’s	  historical	  economic	  context	  and	  Firestone’s	  position	  within	  it	  are	  thus	  important	  factors	  to	  understanding	  the	  company’s	  behaviour	  during	  the	  First	  Civil	  War.	  	  
Section	  3	  |	  Firestone	  and	  The	  Bridgestone	  Corporation	  
3.1.	  The	  Bridgestone	  Corporation	  Acquisition	  
The	   1970s	   had	   been	   a	   difficult	   decade	   for	   Firestone’s	   parent	   company,	   the	   Firestone	  Tire	   and	   Rubber	   Company.276	  In	   1979,	   FSTR	   appointed	   its	   first	   “outsider”	   CEO,	   John	  Nevin,	   who	   was	   tasked	   with	   reinvigorating	   the	   company’s	   financial	   situation	   and	  maximising	   shareholder	   value.277	  While	   Nevin	   executed	   his	   mandate	   successfully,	   the	  process	   involved	   closing	   several	   long-­‐standing	   Firestone	   plants,	   which	   made	   him	  unpopular	   in	   the	   company’s	   home	   city	   of	   Akron.278	  With	   the	   changes	  made	   by	   Nevin,	  what	  had	  begun	  as	  a	   family-­‐style	  business	   in	   the	  early	  1900s	  was	  much	   less	  so	  by	   the	  end	   of	   the	   1970s	   and,	   in	   1988,	   the	   decision	  was	  made	   to	   sell	   the	   Firestone	   Tire	   and	  Rubber	   Company	   to	   a	   Japanese	   conglomerate,	   the	   Bridgestone	   Corporation	  (“Bridgestone”).	  As	  part	  of	   its	  growth	  strategy,	  Bridgestone	  had	  already	  established	  its	  own	   North	   American	   manufacturing	   facility	   through	   the	   acquisition	   of	   one	   of	   FSTR’s	  tyre	   plants	   in	   Tennessee	   in	   1983.279	  However,	   America	   accounted	   for	   45	  per	  cent	   of	  global	  tyre	  sales	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  Bridgestone	  desired	  a	  larger	  stake	  in	  the	  US	  market.280	  The	  Bridgestone	  Corporation	  bid	  US$2.6	  billion	  for	  complete	  ownership	  of	  all	  of	  FSTR’s	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market	   share	   and	   assets. 281 	  Firestone’s	   board	   voted	   to	   advise	   the	   company’s	  shareholders	  to	  accept	  the	  deal,	  which	  they	  did	  in	  April	  1988.282	  	  
3.2.	  The	  Creation	  of	  Bridgestone/Firestone	  Incorporated	  	  
Bridgestone	   merged	   its	   US	   operations	   with	   FSTR	   to	   form	   the	   subsidiary,	  Bridgestone/Firestone	   Incorporated	   (BFS).	   FPCO	   changed	   to	   Firestone	   Liberia	   and	  remained	   under	   the	   control	   of	   its	   parent	   company,	   FSNR.283	  Between	   1989	   and	   1991,	  Bridgestone	  lost	  over	  US$1	  billion	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  FSTR	  acquisition.284	  The	  condition	  of	  Firestone’s	  plants	  and	  facilities	  was	  far	  worse	  than	  Bridgestone	  had	  anticipated	  and	  the	  parent	  company	  was	  forced	  to	  inject	  US$1.4	  billion	  into	  necessary	  upgrades.	  Moreover,	  the	  FSTR	  lost	  its	  contract	  to	  supply	  tyres	  to	  General	  Motors	  shortly	  after	  Bridgestone’s	  acquisition.285	  To	   deal	   with	   these	   losses,	   Bridgestone	   designed	   a	   new	   management	  structure	  for	  BFS	  that	  emphasised	  employee	  engagement.	  Part	  of	  this	  involved	  building	  a	  better	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  union,	  the	  United	  Rubber	  Workers	  (URW).286	  	  
3.2.1.	  The	  Influence	  of	  Yoichiro	  Kaizaki	  	  
While	   Bridgestone	  was	   advocating	   improved	   employee	   and	   union	   engagement	   on	   the	  ground,	   top	   management	   was	   undergoing	   other	   changes.	   Yoichiro	   Kaizaki	   was	  appointed	   as	   the	   first	   Japanese	   head	   of	   BFS	   in	   1991	   and	   was	   well-­‐known	   for	   his	  aggressive	   cost-­‐cutting	   strategies	   and	   his	   ruthless	   termination	   of	   ailing	   Bridgestone	  divisions.	  At	  corporate	  headquarters,	  he	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “ichiban”	  (number	  one)	  tough	  member	  of	  Bridgestone’s	  hierarchy287	  and	  his	  business	  tactics	  reflected	  the	  anti-­‐union	   sentiments	   of	   corporate	   America	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s.288	  Kaizaki’s	   assertive	  business	  approach	  paid	  off	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  subsidiary’s	  profitability	  and,	  in	  1992,	  the	  two	  companies	   were	   fully	   consolidated	   and	   headquarters	   were	   moved	   to	   Nashville,	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Tennessee.289	  Kaizaki	   returned	   to	   Japan	   in	   1993	   to	   take	   the	   position	   of	   CEO	   of	   the	  Bridgestone	  Corporation,	  while	  Masatoshi	  Ono	   took	  over	  his	  position	  as	   the	   chairman	  and	   CEO	   of	   BFS.290	  However,	   with	   BFS	   still	   US$2	  billion	   in	   debt,	   Kaizaki	  maintained	   a	  close	  watch	  over	  the	  company	  from	  Tokyo	  and	  soon	  instituted	  even	  harsher	  cost-­‐cutting	  strategies.	  	  
Kaizaki’s	   aggressive	  business	   tactics	   caused	   tension	  between	  BFS	  and	   the	  URW	  union.	  When	  he	  threatened	  to	  shut	  down	  one	  of	  Firestone’s	  plants	  in	  1993	  unless	  labour	  costs	  were	   significantly	   decreased,	   the	   local	   union	   went	   on	   strike	   for	   two	   weeks.	   BFS’s	  response,	   directed	   by	   Kaizaki	   from	   Japan,	   was	   aggressive.	   According	   to	   a	   former	  president	  of	  the	  URW:	  
They	  put	  up	  guns	  on	   top	  of	  buildings,	   sandbags	  around.	   I	  mean,	  here's	   a	  place	  where	  they're	  supposed	  to	  have	  this	  cooperative	  joint-­‐venture	  type	  of	  a	  location,	  and	  one	  of	   the	   first	   things	   is	   they	   [have]	   armed	  people	   roaming	  around	   in	   the	  plant.291	  
It	  soon	  became	  clear	  that	  BFS’s	  strategies	  on	  the	  ground	  were	  not	  only	  independent	  of	  its	   broader	   business	   objectives	   and	   practices,	   but	   often	   contradictory	   to	   them.292	  By	  mid-­‐1994,	  after	  months	  of	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  demands,	  the	  company	  and	  the	  union	  reached	  an	   impasse.293	  Approximately	   4	  000	   BFS	   employees	  went	   on	   strike,	   but	   Kaizaki	   stood	  firm,	  asserting	  after	  10	  months	  of	  striking	  that,	  “even	  if	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  people	  resist	  me,	  I	  don’t	   care”.294	  To	  deal	  with	   the	  break	   in	   its	   supply	   chain	  and	   the	  drop	   in	  productivity,	  BFS	   simply	   brought	   in	   replacement	   workers	   and	   imported	   stock	   from	   its	   Japanese	  operations	   to	   meet	   American	   demand.295	  Through	   implementing	   these	   and	   various	  other	  measures,	  BFS	  was	  able	  to	  counteract	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  the	  strike.	  By	  1996,	   the	  company	  was	   turning	  a	  profit	  of	  US$285	  million	  and	  accounted	   for	  almost	  a	  third	  of	  Bridgestone’s	  operating	  profits	  and	  43	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  consolidated	  sales.296	  	  
Bridgestone/Firestone	   finally	   conceded	   to	   employee	  demands	   in	   1996,	   after	   the	  URW	  merged	  with	  the	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America	  and	  its	  campaign	  against	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parent	  Bridgestone)	  went	  global.297	  The	  amplification	  of	  the	  visibility	  of	  the	  strike	  forced	  the	   company	   to	   act	   to	   protect	   its	   reputation	   and	   Bridgestone’s	   market	   value.	  Bridgestone	   was	   forced	   to	   adopt	   similar	   strategies	   in	   2000	   following	   the	   recall	   of	  millions	   of	   its	   Firestone	   tyres	   after	   a	   number	   of	   fatal	   car	   accidents	   occurred	   in	   Ford	  Rangers	   fitted	   with	   the	   tyres.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   significant	   decline	   in	   the	   value	   of	   the	  company’s	  shares	  and	  a	  US$10	  billion	  decrease	  in	  its	  cash	  reserves.298	  To	  deal	  with	  the	  controversy,	   BFS	   compensated	   affected	   customers	   and	   used	   the	   media	   to	   reassure	  consumers	   of	   its	   commitment	   to	   quality	   and	   safety	   control.	   At	   the	   corporate	   level,	  Bridgestone	  CEO	  tried	  to	  turn	  attention	  away	  from	  itself	  by	  blaming	  Ford	  Motors	  for	  the	  accidents.299	  	  
In	   these	   instances,	   the	   Bridgestone	   Corporation	   stepped	   in	   to	   mitigate	   the	   negative	  effects	  on	  the	  company’s	  market	  value	  and	  to	  reassure	   its	  shareholders.	  However,	   this	  only	   occurred	   once	   negative	   media	   coverage	   and	   public	   opinion	   threatened	   the	  corporation’s	  image	  and	  reputation.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  Firestone	  Liberia	  debacle	  received	  almost	  no	  media	  coverage	  at	   the	  time.	  This	  could	  explain	   the	  absence	  of	  Bridgestone’s	  influence	  on	  the	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  Firestone,	  which	  was	  driven	  predominantly	   from	  BFS	  with	  input	  from	  Firestone	  management.	  
3.3.	  Section	  Summary	  
The	  Firestone	  Liberia	  case	  only	  became	  controversial	   long	  after	  the	  conflict	  had	  ended	  due	   to	   the	   delayed	   emergence	   of	   certain	   primary	   resources.	   This,	   coupled	   with	   the	  complex	  organisational	   structure	  of	   the	  corporation,	  meant	   that	  much	  of	   the	  decision-­‐making	   took	   place	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   subsidiary,	   Firestone,	   and	   its	   immediate	   parent,	  BFS.	   Understanding	   the	   agency	   available	   to	   company	  management	   at	   each	   level	   is	   an	  integral	  piece	  of	  the	  puzzle.	  The	  Firestone	  management	  team	  on	  the	  plantation	  was	  able	  to	   take	   immediate	   action	  when	   the	   conflict	   affected	   themselves,	   their	   families	   and	   the	  Liberian	   employees	   by	   temporarily	   ceasing	   operations	   and	   avoiding	   the	   areas	   where	  violence	  was	  most	  concentrated.	  However,	  Firestone	  Liberia	  ultimately	  relied	  on	  BFS	  to	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decide	  whom	  to	  evacuate	  and	  when,	  as	  well	  as	  when	  to	  return	  to	  Liberia	  and	  on	  what	  terms.	   In	   turn,	  BFS	  was	  constrained	  by	   financial	   issues	  at	   the	   time	  and	  by	  pressure	   to	  ape	   the	   successes	   of	   its	   parent	   company,	   the	   Bridgestone	   Corporation,	   following	   the	  complicated	   merging	   of	   North	   American	   operations.	   Thus,	   understanding	   Firestone’s	  history	   in	   Liberia,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   broader	   corporate	   structure	  within	  which	  it	  sits,	  provides	  crucial	  context	  for	  analysis.	  
Section	  4	  |	  Chapter	  Summary	  
The	   First	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   had	   its	   origins	   in	   the	   founding	   of	   Liberia	   by	   a	   foreign-­‐minority	   elite	  who	   turned	   the	   state	   into	   an	   enterprise	   from	  which	   they	   could	   benefit	  while	  excluding	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   the	  population	   from	  access	   to	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  opportunities.	   From	  early	   on	   in	   its	   formation	   as	   a	   state,	   Liberian	  politicians	  and	  civilians	  alike	  engaged	  in	  predatory	  and	  selfish	  behaviour.	  Moreover,	  the	  pervasive	  reliance	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  govern	  also	  created	  the	  widespread	  belief	  that	  the	  way	  to	  access	  power	  in	  Liberia	  was	  through	  violent	  usurpation	  followed	  by	  retributive	  acts	  of	  brutality.	   As	   mentioned,	   the	   violence	   that	   characterised	   the	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   was	  particularly	   brutal	   and	   horrifying,	   and	   atrocities	   were	   committed	   by	   all	   actors	  involved.300	  When	   fighting	   reached	   the	   plantation	   in	   June	   1990,	   Firestone	   Liberia’s	  employees	   found	   themselves	   engulfed	   in	   a	   conflict	   where	   acts	   of	   violence	   were	  pervasive	   and	   carried	   out	   by	   unpredictable	   recruits,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	   young	  boys	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  drugs	  and	  alcohol.301	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   emphasise	   here	   that	   any	   foreign	   company	   operating	   in	   this	  environment	   faced	   the	   problem	   that	   all	   choices	   that	   involved	   remaining	   in	   Liberia	  would	  mean	  engaging	  with	  actors	  (be	   they	  politicians,	  civilians,	   foreigners,	   rebels,	  and	  so	   on)	   who	   were	   predominantly	   self-­‐interested	   and	   morally	   corrupt.	   The	   decisions	  made	  by	  the	  company	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  within	  this	  context.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
The	   First	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   began	   in	   1989	   with	   a	   rebel	   insurgency	   launched	   from	  neighbouring	  Ivory	  Coast	  and	  ended	  in	  1997	  with	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  election	  as	  president.	  The	  conflict	  was	  characterised	  by	  extreme	  brutality	  and	  violence	   inflicted	  on	  and	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  actors,	   including	  rebels,	  government	  officials,	   foreign	  forces	  and	  civilians.	  By	  the	  time	  war	  broke	  out,	  Firestone	  Liberia	  had	  been	  operating	  its	  plantation	  in	  Harbel	  for	  almost	   65	  years.	   The	   company	   had	   become	   accustomed	   to	   navigating	   the	   country’s	  often-­‐tumultuous	  political	  terrain	  and	  had	  built	  successful	  relationships	  with	  successive	  Liberian	   presidents.	   The	   newly	   amalgamated	   Bridgestone/Firestone	   (BFS),	   located	   in	  faraway	  Ohio,	  was	  thus	  faced	  with	  the	  task	  of	  deciding	  the	  future	  of	  one	  of	  its	  overseas	  subsidiaries.	  BFS	  has	   received	  extensive	   criticism	   for	   the	  decisions	   it	  made	  during	   the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  and,	  yet,	  no	  comprehensive	  analysis	  has	  been	  conducted	  on	  the	  events	  that	  unfolded	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  This	  chapter	  makes	  use	  of	  primary	  resources	  to	  conduct	  an	  in-­‐depth	  investigation	  into	  Firestone’s	  actions	  and	  decisions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	   Liberian	   civil	   conflict.	   The	   company’s	   actions	   are	   contextualised	   according	   to	   the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  conflict,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  relations	  with	  its	  parent	  company,	  BFS.	  While	  the	  chapter	   addresses	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   company’s	   actions,	   it	   also	   aims	   to	   provide	  insight	   into	   the	  possible	  reasons	  behind	  the	  decisions	   that	  were	  made.	  Essentially,	   the	  objective	  is	  to	  reveal	  the	  complexities	  inherent	  in	  the	  corporate–conflict	  nexus.	  	  
Section	  1	  |	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Conflict	  Trajectory	  
1.1.	  December	  1989	  –	  May	  1990	  
1.1.1.	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Early	  Days	  of	  the	  Insurgency	  
On	   Christmas	   Eve	   in	   1989,	   Charles	   Taylor	   led	   approximately	   150	   men	   into	   Liberia’s	  northeast	   region.	   The	   insurgents	   launched	   their	   first	   attack	   in	   Nimba	   County	   in	  retaliation	  for	  President	  Doe’s	  brutal	  attack	  on	  the	  county’s	  Gio	  and	  Mano	  population.302	  In	  response,	  Doe	  sent	  troops	  from	  his	  Krahn-­‐dominated	  AFL	  to	  Butuo,	  where	  they	  once	  again	   singled	   out	  Mano	   and	   Gio	   –	   this	   time	   for	   their	   perceived	   support	   of	   the	   Taylor	  invasion.303	  The	  earliest	   incarnation	  of	   the	   conflict	   set	   the	  NPFL,	  predominantly	  of	  Gio	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  Stephen	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994:	  A	  Study	  of	  Ethnic	  and	  Spiritual	  Violence,”	  166.	  303	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994,”	  167.	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and	  Mano	  ethnicity,	  against	  the	  government’s	  AFL,	  constituted	  primarily	  by	  Krahn.304	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  NPFL	  insurgency,	  Doe	  appeared	  confident	  that	  his	  soldiers	  could	  contain	  the	   threat.	   However,	   Taylor’s	   fast-­‐expanding	   NPFL	  made	   swift	   progress,	   entering	   the	  Krahn	   ethnic	   group’s	   heartland,	   Grand	   Gedeh	   County,	   in	   early	   1990	   and	   reaching	   the	  outskirts	  of	  Monrovia	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  year.305	  Doe	  responded	  to	  the	  growing	  threat	  by	   arming	  Krahn	   and	  Mandingo	   civilians	   to	   assist	   his	  military	   in	   attacking	   and	   killing	  hundreds	   of	   Gio	   and	   Mano	   living	   in	   Monrovia.	   As	   such,	   the	   conflict	   soon	   expanded	  beyond	  the	  military	  and	  political	  spheres	  to	  infiltrate	  broader	  Liberian	  society.306	  	  
As	   evidenced	   by	   Figure	   2	   below,	   the	   insurgency	   started	   some	   distance	   from	   the	  Firestone	  plantation,	  which	  is	  situated	  in	  Liberia’s	  Margibi	  County.	  	  
Figure	  2:	  Political	  map	  of	  Liberia,	  showing	  the	  location	  of	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  
Source:	  Source:	  http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/liberia-­‐map.htm	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In	  an	  interview	  for	  the	  documentary	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord,	  Elizabeth	  Blunt	  –	  then	  a	  reporter	  for	  BBC	  West	  Africa	  –	  recounted	  her	  visit	  to	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  just	  after	  the	  1989	  insurgency.	  Of	  the	  plantation,	  Blunt	  notes,	  “[i]t	  was	  beautiful.	   It	  was	  green.	   It	  was	   peaceful”.307	  While	   the	   hope	   was	   that	   the	   brewing	   conflict	   would	   not	   affect	   the	  plantation’s	   operations,	   workers	   or	   assets,	   Firestone	   plantation	   manager,	   Donald	  Ensminger,	   became	   increasingly	   aware	   that	   the	   future	   safety	   of	   the	   plantation	   and	   its	  employees	   could	   not	   be	   guaranteed.308	  The	   company	   could	   not	   risk	   being	   unprepared	  for	  the	  potential	  damage	  that	  a	  violent	  conflict	  posed	  and,	  on	  6	  April	  1990,	  Ensminger	  issued	   a	   notice	   to	   Firestone’s	   expatriate	   staff.	   In	   the	   note,	   he	   wrote	   that,	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	  the	  prevailing	  political	  instability	  and	  uncertainty,	  a	  plan	  was	  needed	  to	  prepare	   for	   a	   “worst-­‐case	   scenario”.309	  While	   it	   is	   unclear	   exactly	   what	   this	   scenario	  entailed,	   Ensminger’s	   letter	   contained	   instructions	   for	   Firestone’s	   40	   or	   so	   American	  and	   foreign	   employees	   to	   pack	   emergency	   bags	   and	   to	   put	   gas	   in	   their	   cars	   in	  preparation.	   It	   also	   identified	   an	   emergency	   assembly	   point.	   Ensminger	   specified	   that	  the	   existence	   of	   the	   note,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   information	   conveyed	   therein,	   was	   not	   be	  disclosed	   to	   anyone	   who	   had	   not	   personally	   received	   the	   note	   themselves.310	  In	   May	  1990,	  as	  the	  conflict	  drew	  nearer	  to	  the	  plantation,	  the	  family	  members	  of	  the	  expatriate	  employees	  were	   sent	   home.311	  However,	   the	   expatriate	   staff	   remained	   and	   operations	  on	  the	  plantation	  continued.	  
Firestone’s	   Liberian	  workers	  were	   not	   included	   in	   and,	   consequently,	   not	   covered	   by	  management’s	  emergency	  plan	  of	  action.	  However,	  Ensminger	  did	  meet	  with	  a	  group	  of	  the	  company’s	  Liberian	  employees	  to	  inform	  them	  that	  the	  company	  was	  not	  equipped	  to	  protect	  them	  should	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  plantation	  deteriorate.	  While	  he	  assured	  the	  frightened	  staffers	  of	  his	  belief	  (whether	  portrayed	  or	  real)	  that	  the	  rebels	  would	  likely	  only	   use	   the	   plantation	   as	   a	   path	   towards	   the	   capital,	   he	   also	   warned	   them	   that	  Firestone	   was	   a	   foreign	   company	   and	   thus	   responsible	   primarily	   to	   its	   expatriate	  staff.312	  By	   the	   middle	   of	   1990,	   the	   NPFL	   rebels	   had	   advanced	   through	   much	   of	   the	  Liberian	   countryside	   using	   terror	   tactics	   to	   incite	   fear	   in	   those	   they	   encountered.	  Journalists	   present	   at	   the	   time	   speak	   of	   rebels	   “advancing	  with	   their	   AKs	   held	   above	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  Gaviria,	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord.	  308	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994”;	  	  Ensminger,	  diary	  entries.	  309	  T.	  Christian	  Miller	  and	  Jonathan	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  One:	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  the	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  in	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord,	  November	  18,	  2014,	  accessed	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  16,	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their	  heads,	   just	   firing	  randomly	  down	  the	  road”	  while	  “wearing	  fright	  wigs,	  …	  shower	  caps	  and	  women’s	  dresses	  and	  bathrobes”.313	  The	  rebels	  were	  headed	  for	  the	  capital	  city	  and	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  was	  on	  their	  path.	  
1.1.2.	   The	   Geo-­‐political	   and	   Geo-­‐economic	   Significance	   of	   the	   Firestone	  Plantation	  
From	  the	  sources	  available,	  the	  Firestone	  management	  team	  did	  seem	  to	  believe	  –	  or	  at	  least	   portray	   to	   believe	   –	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   insurgency	   that	   the	   rebels	   would	  simply	   “go	   around	   the	   plantation”. 314 	  However,	   as	   Figure	   3	   shows,	   the	   Firestone	  plantation’s	  proximity	  to	  the	  capital	  city,	  Monrovia,	  put	  it	  right	  on	  the	  NPFL’s	  warpath.	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Firestone’s	  Harbel	  plantation	  
Source:	  https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-­‐and-­‐the-­‐warlord-­‐chapter-­‐6	  
In	   addition	   to	   its	   geo-­‐political	   significance,	   the	   plantation	   held	   geo-­‐economic	  significance	   to	   the	   rebels.	   The	   Harbel	   plantation	   had	   the	   makings	   of	   a	   military	   base,	  firstly	  due	  to	  its	  expansive	  size	  and	  the	  cover	  provided	  by	  its	  trees.	  It	  was	  also	  located	  in	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  Scott	  Stearns	  (Freelance	  Reporter,	  Liberia,	  1990–92)	  and	  John	  lee	  Anderson,	  interview	  for	  Gaviria,	  
Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord.	  314	  Steve	  Raimo	  interview	  for	  Gaviria,	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord.	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close	  proximity	  to	  the	  Port	  of	  Buchanan	  and	  to	  Roberts	  International	  Airport	  (informally	  known	  as	  Roberts	  Field	  or	  abbreviated	  to	  RIA).315	  The	  plantation	  also	  had	  good	  facilities	  and	  communications	  technology;	  it	  offered	  housing	  and	  clinics,	  and	  had	  supplies	  of	  food	  and	   fuel,	   which	   were	   scarce	   during	   the	   conflict.	   It	   also	   offered	   certain	   recreational	  luxuries,	  such	  as	  a	  nine-­‐hole	  golf	  course	  and	  a	  clubhouse.	  These	  attributes	  would	  have	  made	  the	  plantation	  a	  tempting	  target	  for	  any	  armed	  faction.316	  
1.2.	  The	  Events	  of	  June	  1990	  	  
1.2.1.	  The	  AFL	  and	  NPFL	  Battle	  at	  the	  Firestone	  Plantation	  
Despite	  hopes	  that	  the	  plantation	  would	  be	  circumvented,	  the	  NPFL	  rebels	  arrived	  at	  the	  Harbel	   plantation	   on	   5	   June	   1990.317	  The	   rebels	   first	   arrived	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	   the	  Firestone	  factory	  compound	  (illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3).	  That	  night,	  management	  sent	  most	  of	   the	   workers	   home	   and	   retained	   only	   a	   skeleton	   crew	   to	   work	   the	   nightshift.	   The	  following	   day	   workers	   were	   also	   sent	   home	   from	   the	   central	   office,	   located	  1.6	  kilometres	  (three	  miles)	  down	  from	  the	  factory.318	  By	  midday,	  Ensminger	  noted	  that	  the	  rebels	  had	  taken	  control	  of	  Area	  45	  (see	  Figure	  3)	  –	  a	  zone	  critical	  to	  the	  plantation’s	  operations	   –	   and	   had	   begun	   to	   demand	   cars,	   petrol	   and	  money	   from	  management.319	  Around	  two	  o’clock	  that	  afternoon,	  Ensminger	  observed	  that	  the	  rebels	  had	  entered	  the	  plantation’s	   golf	   clubhouse	   (located	   in	   Area	  44),	   demanding	   vehicles	   and	   taking	   with	  them	   handheld	   radios,	   bags	   of	   rice	   and	   petty	   cash.	   With	   the	   rebels	   moving	   swiftly	  through	   the	   plantation,	   management	   imposed	   a	   six	   o’clock	   curfew	   and	   informed	   all	  employees	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  work	  on	  6	  June.320	  	  
It	   at	   first	   appeared	   that	   the	   rebels	   did	   not	   intend	   to	   harm	   anyone	   present	   on	   the	  plantation.	   In	   fact,	   many	   of	   the	   Liberian	   workers	   celebrated	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   NPFL	  troops,	  referring	  to	  them	  as	  freedom	  fighters	  and	  cheering	  them	  on.321	  Doe	  had	  become	  widely	  unpopular	  and	  many	  Liberians	  believed	  that	  Taylor’s	  rebellion	  signalled	  the	  end	  of	   a	   repressive	   and	   corrupt	   regime.	  However,	   the	   rebels’	   behaviour	   on	   the	   plantation	  and	  their	  ruthless	  victimisation	  of	  Liberian	  workers	  quickly	  quelled	  such	  hopes.	  After	  a	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day	  on	   the	  plantation,	  NPFL	   troops	   initiated	   a	   campaign	  of	   violence;	   beating,	   robbing,	  shooting,	   detaining	   and	   publicly	   executing	   those	   Liberians	   they	   identified	   as	   being	  supporters	   of	   the	  Doe	   regime.322	  Four	  days	   after	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   rebels,	   troops	   from	  Doe’s	   AFL	   recaptured	   the	   plantation	   from	   the	   NPFL	   and	   pushed	   the	   rebels	   into	   the	  surrounding	   bushes.	   Once	   they	   had	   assumed	   control	   over	   the	   plantation,	   the	  government	   forces	   launched	   their	  own	  campaign	  of	  violence	  against	   those	  believed	   to	  be	  supporters	  or	  facilitators	  of	  the	  Taylor-­‐led	  rebellion.323	  
The	   battle	   that	   continued	   between	   the	   AFL	   and	   the	   NPFL	  was	   particularly	   intense	   in	  Area	  45	   (see	   Figure	  3),	   and	  many	   civilians	  were	   caught	   in	   the	   crossfire.	   By	   this	   stage,	  operations	   on	   the	   plantation	   had	   come	   to	   a	   standstill	   and	   Firestone’s	   expatriate	   staff	  decided	   to	   seek	   refuge	   at	   Ensminger’s	   home,	   House	  53,	   in	   Area	  42	   (see	   Figure	  3).324	  Thousands	   of	   Firestone	   employees	   had	   already	   begun	   evacuating	   their	   homes	   and	  heading	  towards	  the	  Harbel	  Hills	  (shown	  in	  Figure	  3)	  to	  escape	  the	  violence	  in	  Area	  45.	  On	   the	   third	   day,	   approximately	   2	  000	   workers	   arrived	   at	   House	  53	   in	   the	   hopes	   of	  finding	  refuge	  from	  the	  violence.	  However,	  they	  were	  given	  rice	  and	  told	  by	  Ensminger	  that	  management	   could	  not	  offer	   them	  protection	   from	  either	   the	  AFL	  or	   the	  NPFL.325	  The	  management	   team	   had	   reached	   out	   to	   the	   heads	   of	   the	   factions	   on	   a	   number	   of	  occasions;	   however,	   these	   attempts	   had	   proven	   futile.	   On	   13	   June,	   Ensminger’s	   diary	  entry	   speaks	   to	   the	   precarious	   situation	   that	   Firestone	  was	   in	   at	   the	   time.	   The	   entry	  reflects	   his	   concerns	   for	   his	   and	   the	   other	   expatriate	   staff’s	   safety,	   the	   safety	   of	   their	  Liberian	   employees,	   the	   safety	   of	   their	   assets	   and	   the	   need	   to	   assess	   company	   risks	  versus	  losses	  in	  an	  increasingly	  unstable	  environment.326	  	  
After	   seven	   days	   of	   fighting,	   it	   remained	   unclear	   which	   force	   had	   control	   over	   the	  plantation.	  In	  his	  diary,	  Ensminger	  noted:	  
Very	   awkward	   and	   potentially	   dangerous	   for	   us,	   our	   people	   and	   our	   assets	  …	  Will	   there	   be	   confrontations?	   Who	   will	   control?	   How	   to	   deal	   with	   changing	  hands/demands?327	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According	   to	   Ensminger’s	   diary	   and	   other	   witness	   accounts,	   these	   demands	   were	  typically	  made	   by	   drunken,	   armed	   and	   angry	   fighters.328	  As	   such,	  many	   of	   them	  were	  acquiesced	  to	  through	  payments	  in	  cash	  or	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  food	  and	  equipment	  to	   ensure	   the	   safety	   of	   Firestone	   employees.329	  With	   a	   violent	   battle	   being	   waged	  between	  AFL	  and	  NPFL,	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  plantation	  became	  increasingly	  precarious.	  However,	   the	   management	   team	   on	   the	   ground	   had	   received	   little	   in	   the	   form	   of	  guidance	   or	   communication	   from	   Bridgestone’s	   regional	   corporate	   offices	   in	   Akron.	  Ensminger	  noted	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  communications	  between	  Firestone	  and	  its	  corporate	  offices	  had	  been	  unsatisfactory,	  given	  the	  circumstances.330	  As	   far	  as	  public	  statements	  on	  the	  matter	  were	  concerned,	  BFS	  spokesman,	  Trevor	  Hoskins,	  had	  announced	  to	  the	  press	   in	   Akron	   that	   the	   intention	   was	   to	   keep	   operations	   running	   even	   with	   the	  presence	   of	   the	   rebels,	   whom	   he	   referred	   to	   as	   freedom	   fighters.331	  However,	   in	   the	  afternoon	  on	  13	  June,	  six	  NPFL	  fighters	  armed	  with	  a	  rocket-­‐propelled	  grenade	  launcher	  confronted	   Ensminger	   to	   demand	   money.	   Years	   later,	   Ensminger	   maintained	   that,	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  incident,	  he	  continued	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  conflict	  was	  a	  “short-­‐term	  event”	  and	   that	   it	   did	   not	   change	   his	   conviction	   that	   the	   NPFL	   had	   not	   arrived	   with	   the	  intention	   to	   destroy	   company	   property	   or	   harm	   employees.	   Regardless	   of	   the	  contentions	   of	   the	   Firestone	   management	   staff,	   the	   incident	   led	   BFS	   headquarters	   to	  recognise	  that	  the	  situation	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  case	  of	  protecting	  corporate	  interests,	  but	  a	  question	  of	  life	  itself.	  BFS	  management	  decided,	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  US	  Embassy	  in	  Monrovia,	  to	  evacuate	  its	  expatriate	  employees	  from	  Liberia	  on	  14	  June	  1990.332	  BFS	  Chairman,	   George	   Aucott,	   asked	   that	   that	   the	   company’s	   employees	   keep	   their	  colleagues	  left	  in	  Liberia	  in	  their	  prayers.333	  
1.3.	  July	  1990	  –	  December	  1991	  
1.3.1.	  The	  Increasing	  Complexities	  of	  the	  Conflict	  Theatre	  
By	   the	  middle	   of	   1990,	   the	  NPFL	  had	   reached	   the	   outskirts	   of	  Monrovia	   and	   a	  Taylor	  victory	   appeared	   plausible.	   However,	   in	   July	   1990,	   several	   hundred	   members	   of	   the	  NPFL	  broke	  away	   to	   form	  the	   Independent	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	   (INPFL)	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with	   Taylor’s	   former	   NPFL	   training	   officer,	   Prince	   Yormie	   Johnson,	   at	   its	   helm.334	  Johnson	  took	  with	  him	  many	  of	  the	  NPFL’s	  most	  experienced	  fighters,	  including	  many	  of	  his	   Libyan-­‐trained	   special	   commandos,	   leaving	  Taylor	  with	   a	   few	   trained	   fighters	   and	  thousands	   of	   civilians	  who	   had	   taken	   up	   arms	  with	   the	   NPFL	   as	   it	   travelled	   south.335	  Although	   fewer	   in	   numbers,	   the	   soldiers	   in	   Johnson’s	   INPFL	   were	   well-­‐trained	   and	  better	  disciplined,	  and	  the	  split	  significantly	  weakened	  the	  NPFL	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  The	  emergence	  of	   two	  mutually	   antagonistic	  belligerents,	   the	  NPFL	  and	   the	   INPFL,	  diluted	  the	   immediate	   threat	   to	   the	  Liberian	  government	   and	  allowed	   it	   to	   stave	  off	   defeat	   in	  mid-­‐1990.336	  However,	   neighbouring	   states	   in	   the	   West	   African	   region	   had	   become	  increasingly	  concerned	  with	  the	  instability	  in	  Liberia.337	  As	  such,	  ECOWAS	  dispatched	  a	  multilateral	   armed	   force	   known	   as	   the	   Economic	   Community	   of	   West	   African	   States	  Monitoring	   Group	   (ECOMOG)	   to	   Monrovia	   in	   August	   1990.338	  The	   arrival	   of	   ECOMOG	  introduced	   a	   further	   obstacle	   to	   Taylor’s	   political	   aspirations	   and	   split	   the	   balance	   of	  power	  in	  the	  conflict	  between	  three	  competing	  factions,	  namely	  the	  INPFL,	  the	  NPFL	  and	  ECOMOG.	  
Despite	  the	  arrival	  of	  ECOMOG’s	  12	  000-­‐strong	  intervention	  force,	  the	  INPFL	  succeeded	  in	  capturing	  and	  killing	  Samuel	  Doe	  in	  September	  1990.339	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  1990,	  the	  INPFL	  held	  a	  small	  area	  of	  Monrovia	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  capital	  remained	  largely	  under	  ECOMOG	  control.340	  Most	  of	  Liberia,	  with	  the	  significant	  exception	  of	  the	  capital	  city,	  fell	  under	  Taylor’s	  control.341	  The	  situation	  stabilised	  and	  ECOWAS	  established	  the	  Interim	  Government	   of	   National	   Unity	   (IGNU)	   in	   November	   1990	   with	   Amos	   Sawyer	   as	  Interim	  President. 342 	  While	   Taylor	   participated	   in	   three	   successive	   rounds	   of	  negotiations	   orchestrated	   by	   ECOMOG	   (November	   1990,	   February	   1991	   and	   April	  1991),	  these	  talks	  were	  unsuccessful	  as	  Taylor	  refused	  to	  recognise	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  IGNU.343	  Instead,	   he	   established	   his	   own	   administrative	   headquarters	   in	   Gbarnga,	   in	  Bong	   County,	   with	   all	   the	   characteristics	   of	   a	   sovereign	   state.344	  His	   government,	   the	  National	  Patriotic	  Reconstruction	  Assembly	  Government	   (NPRAG),	  organised	  elections	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and	   formed	   its	   own	   parliament.345	  Taylor	   also	   set	   up	   ministries,	   introduced	   his	   own	  currency,	   opened	   a	   bank	   in	   Gbarnga	   headed	   by	   his	   brother,	   Gbatu	   Taylor,	   and	  encouraged	   foreign	   companies	   to	   continue	   with	   “business	   as	   usual”	   in	   his	   “Greater	  Liberia”.346	  This	  effectively	  created	  a	  military	  stalemate	  in	  Liberia.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  Taylor’s	  refusal	  to	  recognise	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  IGNU,	  peace	  talks	  were	  complicated	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  another	  military	  faction	  from	  Sierra	  Leone.	  The	  United	  Liberation	  Movement	  of	  Liberia	  for	  Democracy	  (ULIMO)	  included	  a	  number	  of	   former-­‐AFL	  soldiers,	  as	  well	  as	  militarised	  civilians	  of	  mostly	  Krahn	  and	  Mandingo	  ethnicity.	  In	  early	  1991,	  Taylor	  had	   initiated	  a	  campaign	   to	  destabilise	  Sierra	  Leone	   in	  punishment	  for	   its	   support	   of	   ECOMOG.	   In	   retaliation,	   the	   government	   of	   Sierra	   Leone	   sought	   the	  support	   of	   Liberian	   exiles	   to	   push	   back	   against	   the	   NPFL.347	  With	   the	   backing	   of	   the	  Sierra	   Leonean	   government,	   ULIMO	   began	   partaking	   in	   anti-­‐NPFL	   attacks,	  predominantly	   along	   the	   Liberia–Sierra	   Leone	   border	   as	   well	   as	   within	   Sierra	   Leone	  itself,	  against	  the	  pro-­‐Taylor	  Revolutionary	  United	  Front	  (RUF).348	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  further	  complication,	   ECOWAS	   continued	   to	   attempt	   to	   end	   the	   conflict	   through	   a	   negotiated	  settlement	  throughout	  1991.349	  
1.3.2.	  Firestone	  Hedges	  its	  Bets	  
With	   conflict	   dynamics	   so	   complex,	   Firestone	   hired	   Gerald	   Padmore,	   a	   US-­‐based	  Liberian-­‐born	   attorney,	   to	   advise	   on	   and	   assist	   in	   the	   company’s	   return.	   As	   Padmore	  explained,	  Liberia	  at	  the	  time	  was	  divided	  between	  two	  competing	  centres	  of	  power,	  and	  “Firestone’s	   operations	   straddled	   the	   lines	   of	   control”. 350 	  Before	   the	   civil	   war,	  Firestone’s	  rubber	  would	  be	  processed	  at	  the	  Harbel	  plantation	  and	  then	  transported	  to	  Monrovia’s	  Freeport	  for	  export.	  However,	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  IGNU	  (protected	  by	  ECOMOG	  forces)	  controlled	  the	  small	  district	  around	  Monrovia,	  including	  Freeport,	  while	  Taylor’s	  NPFL	  occupied	  most	  of	   the	  countryside,	   including	  Harbel	  and	   the	  Port	  of	  Buchanan.351	  Thus,	   at	   this	   stage	   in	   the	   conflict,	   Firestone	   hedged	   its	   bets	   by	   engaging	   (or	   at	   least	  trying	   to	   engage)	   with	   all	   relevant	   actors	   to	   the	   conflict.	   Following	   the	   June	   1990	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evacuation	  of	  its	  expatriate	  staff,	  the	  company	  settled	  any	  outstanding	  payments	  to	  the	  state	   as	   required	   by	   its	   concession	   agreement	   and	   made	   advance	   payments	   for	  withholding	  taxes	  and	  income	  taxes.352	  Ensminger	  also	  reached	  out	  to	  Taylor	  in	  October	  1990	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  arranging	  a	  meeting	  between	  NPRAG,	  Firestone	  and	  BFS	  to	  discuss	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  plantation	  to	  assess	  the	  status	  of	  its	  assets	  and	  infrastructure.353	  Ensminger	  emphasised	   that	   Firestone	   could	   not	   return	   and	   restart	   operations	   until	   he	   had	  “assurance	   that	   order	   would	   be	   restored	   to	   Liberia	   and	   that	   all	   employees	   and	   their	  dependents	  would	  be	  safe	  from	  physical	  harm”.354	  In	  addition,	  Firestone	  stated	  it	  would	  not	  recognise	  the	   legitimacy	  of	  any	  authority	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  “interfering	   in	  the	   internal	  affairs	  of	  Liberia”.355	  	  
Despite	   receiving	   no	   correspondence	   back	   from	   Taylor,	   BFS	   remained	   intent	   on	  restarting	  operations	  and	  sent	  a	  small	  team	  of	  Firestone	  managers,	  including	  Ensminger	  and	  Ken	  Gerhart,	  to	  Monrovia	  in	  early	  1991.356	  At	  this	  stage,	  the	  company	  continued	  to	  engage	   with	   all	   relevant	   actors	   in	   the	   conflict	   theatre,	   which	   included	   numerous	  correspondences	   with	   Taylor	   and	   a	   meeting	   with	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   INPFL,	   Prince	  Johnson.357	  In	  addition,	  Firestone	  sent	  shipments	  of	  rice	  to	  both	  Taylor’s	  NPRAG	  and	  the	  IGNU	  between	   June	  1990	  and	   June	  1993	  to	   the	  sum	  of	  US$1.2	  million.358	  The	  company	  thus	   continued	   to	   “pick	   all	   sides”	   at	   a	   time	  when	   it	   was	   not	   certain	   to	  whom	   victory	  would	  go,	  but	  perhaps	  focused	  disproportionately	  on	  connecting	  with	  Taylor,	  given	  the	  plantation’s	  location	  within	  NPFL	  territory.	  In	  April	  1991,	  US	  Ambassador	  Peter	  Jon	  de	  Vos	  finally	  succeeded	  in	  securing	  Firestone	  a	  meeting	  with	  Taylor.	  De	  Vos	  –	  an	  apparent	  “proponent	   of	   Firestone	   and	  Taylor	   reaching	   an	   accommodation”359	  –	   took	   Ensminger	  with	   him	   to	   the	  meeting.	   However,	   Ensminger	   remained	   determined	   not	   to	   recognise	  Taylor’s	  NPRAG,	   insisting	   that	   the	  company	  would	  only	  work	  with	  NPRAG	  once	   it	  had	  received	   “all	   the	   dues	   that	   a	   government	   should	   receive”.360	  The	   meeting	   was	   thus	  unsuccessful	   for	   both	   parties.	   According	   to	   Ken	   Gerhart,	   the	   underlying	   problem	  was	  that	   Taylor	   wanted	   everything	   to	   be	   done	   his	   way,	   while	   Ensminger	   wanted	   it	   done	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“Firestone’s	  way”.361	  Historically,	   the	   Firestone	  Tire	   and	  Rubber	  Company	   (Firestone’s	  parent	  company	  before	   the	  Bridgestone	  acquisition)	  had	  negotiated	   from	  a	  position	  of	  power	   relative	   to	   the	   Liberian	   state.	   At	   this	   stage	   in	   the	   conflict,	   Taylor’s	   power	  was	  expanding	  as	  he	  consolidated	  his	  control	  over	  most	  of	  the	  Liberian	  territory,	  and	  he	  was	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  wait	  until	  Firestone	  was	  prepared	  to	  operate	  on	  his	  terms.362	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  1991,	  Ensminger	  and	  Taylor	  had	  reached	  an	  impasse.	  
Despite	  the	  April	  1991	  meeting,	  Firestone	  was	  facing	  increasing	  difficulties	  in	  trying	  to	  deal	   with	   both	   the	   IGNU	   and	   the	   NPFL.	   The	   US	   Embassy	   in	   Monrovia	   continued	   to	  encourage	  Firestone	  and	  the	  NPRAG	  to	  reach	  an	  accommodation	  to	  allow	  for	  operations	  on	   the	   plantation	   to	   restart,	   as	   continued	   inactivity	   at	   the	   plantation	   was	   benefitting	  no	  one.363	  In	   response,	   BFS	   sent	   two	   of	   its	   corporate	   executives,	   John	   Schremp	   and	  Richard	  Stupp,	  to	  Liberia	  to	  meet	  with	  Taylor	  in	  July	  1991	  to	  broker	  a	  deal	  that	  would	  allow	  operations	   to	  restart.	  From	  its	   investigation,	  ProPublica	  claims	  that	   this	  meeting	  resulted	   in	   BFS	   committing	   to	   conduct	   its	   business	   only	   through	   NPFL	   territory	   and	  agreeing	   to	   recognise	  NPRAG	  as	   the	   legitimate	  government	   in	  Liberia.364	  This	   is	  based	  on	   a	   letter	   sent	   by	   Schremp	   to	   the	   NPRAG	  Minister	   of	   Labour,	   in	  which	   he	  mentions	  “President	  Taylor”.	  However,	   the	   letter	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  ceding	  to	  these	  demands,	  but	   rather	   focuses	  on	  NPRAG’s	   consent	   to	   allow	  Firestone	  management	  back	  onto	   the	  plantation	  and	  to	  assist	  in	  restarting	  operations.365	  	  
In	   spite	   of	   the	   agreement	   reached	   at	   the	   meeting,	   the	   company	   continued	   to	   face	  difficulties	   in	   restarting	   operations	   on	   the	   plantation	   due	   to	   renewed	   fighting	   and	  incidents	  of	   looting.	  A	  cable	  between	   the	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	   the	  US	  Embassy	   in	  Monrovia	   in	   August	   1991	   reported	   that	   Firestone	   was	   “reluctant	   to	   write	   off	   huge	  investments	  in	  Liberia	  but	  [was	  showing]	  increasing	  frustration	  over	  efforts	  to	  conduct	  business	   ‘by	   the	   book’ ”.366	  Taylor’s	   influence	   reached	   its	   zenith	   in	   mid-­‐1991	   as	   he	  effectively	   controlled	   over	   95	   per	   cent	   of	   Liberia.367	  This,	   along	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  plantation	  falling	  within	  this	  territory,	  arguably	  made	  Taylor	  the	  most	  critical	  factor	  in	  deciding	  Firestone’s	  future	  in	  Liberia.	  While	  Schremp	  did	  meet	  with	  the	  IGNU	  following	  the	   July	   1991	   meeting,	   Amos	   Sawyer	   reportedly	   found	   Schremp	   to	   be	   elusive	   when	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questioned	   about	   Taylor.	   In	   a	   recent	   interview,	   Sawyer	   stated	   that	   “[the	   IGNU]	   knew	  that	   Firestone	   support	   could	   fuel	   the	   war”.368	  Ensminger	   also	   found	   issue	   with	   the	  company’s	   decision	   to	  work	  with	  NPRAG	  and	   returned	   to	  Akron	   to	  meet	  with	   several	  senior	  BFS	  executives.	  He	  failed	  to	  impact	  the	  executives’	  decision	  and,	  in	  October	  1991,	  Ensminger	   accepted	   a	   buyout	   package	   in	   exchange	   for	   not	   publicising	   the	   company’s	  actions.	  He	  was	  later	  replaced	  by	  Don	  Weihe,	  a	  retired	  Firestone	  plantation	  boss	  and	  old	  acquaintance	  of	  Taylor’s	  from	  his	  years	  working	  alongside	  the	  AFL.369	  	  
Eventually,	  the	  BFS	  Board	  of	  Directors	  met	  on	  17	  December	  1991	  in	  Akron	  to	  discuss	  its	  options	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  Firestone	  plantation.370	  Schremp	  presented	  the	  details	  of	  the	  July	   meeting	   and	   the	   subsequent	   difficulties	   to	   the	   company’s	   top	   executives	   and	  advised	  them	  that	  an	  accord	  had	  been	  reached	  between	  the	  different	  political	  factions	  in	  Liberia	   committing	   them	   to	   down	   their	   arms,	   open	   up	   roads	   and	   partake	   in	   the	  upcoming	  election	  process.	  He	  continued	   that,	  while	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  accord	  had	   suffered	   some	   delays,	   its	   conditions	   were	   devised	   to	   create	   an	   “atmosphere	  conducive	  to	  the	  holding	  of	  free,	  fair,	  and	  democratic	  elections”371	  scheduled	  for	  October	  1992.372	  As	  such,	  Schremp	  asserted	  that	  there	  was	  hope	  that	  the	  accord’s	  success	  would	  bring	  much	  needed	  stability	  and	  economic	  growth	  to	  the	  country.373	  	  
1.3.3.	  The	  Yamoussoukro	  IV	  Accord	  
The	  agreement	  to	  which	  Schremp	  referred	  in	  his	  presentation	  was	  the	  Yamoussoukro	  IV	  Accord.	   The	   accord	   had	   been	   approved	   by	   ECOWAS	   states	   in	   September	   1991	   and	  signed	   by	   the	   warring	   factions	   in	   October	   1991.374	  Several	   factors	   shed	   light	   on	   why	  Taylor	   agreed	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   negotiations	   that	   culminated	   in	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  Yamoussoukro	  IV	  Accord.	  Firstly,	  the	  arrival	  of	  ULIMO	  added	  another	  anti-­‐NPFL	  faction	  to	  the	  conflict,	  exposing	  the	  NPFL	  to	  a	  second	  front	  and	  diminishing	  Taylor’s	  territorial	  control.375	  In	  addition,	  following	  increasing	  international	  pressure,	  a	  number	  of	  Taylor’s	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  Taylor.	  374	  René	  Valéry	  Monge,	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  17	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  Permanent	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  of	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  to	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  to	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  Peacemaker.	  https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LR_911030_FinalCommuniqueFourthMeetingECOWAS.pdf.	  375	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francophone	   regional	   allies	   had	   agreed	   to	   partake	   in	   the	   peace	   process,	   while	  anglophone	   states	   took	   charge	   of	   peacekeeping	   duties.376	  While	   the	   arrival	   of	   ULIMO	  negatively	   affected	  Taylor’s	   position	   of	   power,	   the	   accord	   offered	   him	   the	   recognition	  that	   NPRAG	   was	   a	   government	   of	   a	   “sovereign”	   territory.	   For	   the	   IGNU,	   the	   accord	  offered	   the	   disarmament	   of	   warring	   factions	   and	   the	   deployment	   of	   ECOMOG	   forces	  throughout	  Liberia.377	  In	  this	  context,	   the	  NPFL	  and	  the	  IGNU	  signed	  Yamoussoukro	  IV	  on	  30	  October	  1991	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  ECOMOG.378	  	  
Three	  days	  after	  the	  December	  1991	  board	  meeting,	  Schremp	  delivered	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  meeting	   to	  Taylor,	   noting	   the	  board’s	   confirmation	   for	  Firestone	   to	   go	   ahead	  with	  the	   programme	   to	   restart	   operations	   at	   Harbel. 379 	  The	   letter	   was	   addressed	   to	  “President	  Taylor”	  and	  confirmed	  BFS’s	  commitment	  to	  exporting	  its	  product	  out	  of	  the	  NPFL-­‐controlled	   Buchanan	   port.	   While	   the	   letter	   does	   not	   indicate	   the	   company’s	  recognition	  of	  NPRAG	  as	   the	  sole	  authority	   in	  Liberia,	   the	  conditions	  of	   the	  agreement	  lent	   credence	   to	   his	   legitimacy.	   However,	   according	   to	   the	   Yamoussoukro	   IV	   Accord,	  Greater	  Liberia	  was	  recognised	  as	  a	  sovereign	  territory	  and	  his	  NPRAG	  as	  a	   legitimate	  government.	  	  
1.4.	  January	  1992	  –	  November	  1992	  
1.4.1.	  Firestone’s	  Agreement	  with	  NPRAG	  
Firestone	   Liberia	   signed	   a	   memorandum	   of	   understanding	   (MOU)380 	  with	   Charles	  Taylor’s	  NPRAG	   in	  Gbarnga,	   Liberia	   in	   January	  1992.381	  In	  May	  1992,	   Yoichiro	  Kaizaki	  and	   other	   members	   of	   the	   BFS	   executive	   team	   met	   with	   NPRAG’s	   acting	   Minister	   of	  Finance	  and	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  confirm	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  agreement.382	  In	  the	  meeting’s	  memorandum	  of	  discussion	  (MOD),	  Kaizaki	  conveyed	  his	  perception	  that	  the	   political	   situation	   in	   Liberia	   had	   stabilised	   and	   the	   company’s	   belief	   that	   NPRAG	  would	   emerge	   victorious	   in	   the	   coming	   October	   elections.383 	  However,	   the	   fragile	  stability	   established	   by	   Yamoussoukro	   IV	  was	   not	   long-­‐lived.	   Following	   the	   arrival	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  376	  Julius	  Mutwol,	  Peace	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  and	  Civil	  Wars	  in	  Africa:	  Insurgent	  Motivations,	  State	  Responses,	  and	  
Third-­‐Party	  Peacemaking	  in	  Liberia,	  Rwanda,	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  (New	  York:	  Cambria	  Press,	  2009),	  76.	  377	  Waugh,	  Charles	  Taylor	  and	  Liberia.	  378	  Monge,	  “Letter	  Dated	  17	  November	  1992.”	  379	  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Charles	  Taylor,	  1.	  380	  Memorandum	  of	  understanding.	  381	  Memorandum	  of	  understanding.	  382Memorandum	  of	  discussion,	  1.	  383	  Ibid.,	  11.	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ULIMO	   in	   September	   1991,	   ECOMOG	   erected	   a	   buffer	   zone	   along	   Liberia’s	   western	  border	  with	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  purportedly	  demilitarised	   the	  ULIMO	  enclave.	  However,	  ECOMOG	  allowed	  the	  faction	  to	  move	  freely	  into	  Liberia,	  thereby	  facilitating	  its	  surprise	  attacks	  on	  Taylor’s	  NPFL.384	  ULIMO	  soon	  gained	  control	  over	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  Bomi	  and	  Grand	  Cape	  Mount	  counties,	  which	  provided	  the	  faction	  with	  significant	  resources	  to	   finance	   their	  military	   campaigns.385	  The	   growing	  presence	   of	  ULIMO	  and	   continued	  mistrust	   of	  ECOMOG	   led	  Taylor	   to	  push	  back	  against	   the	  deployment	  of	  peacekeeping	  troops	   in	   NPFL-­‐controlled	   territory.386	  ECOWAS	   responded	   to	   Taylor’s	   violations	   by	  imposing	  comprehensive	  economic	  sanctions	  on	  NPFL-­‐controlled	  territory	  in	  July	  1992,	  a	   move	   that	   was	   endorsed	   five	   months	   later	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	  (UNSC).387	  
In	   spite	   of	   these	   events,	   Firestone	   upheld	   its	   contract	   with	   the	   NPFL,	   a	   decision	   for	  which	   it	  has	   faced	  much	  criticism.	   In	  the	   literature,	   the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  MNC	  activities	   in	   conflict	   zones	   are	   typically	   addressed	   under	   two	   headings:	   financial	  payments	  and	  logistical	  support.	  
1.4.1.1.	  Financial	  Transactions	  
1.4.1.1.1.	  Payments	  in	  Cash	  and	  Kind	  	  
One	   of	   the	   conditions	   stipulated	   in	   the	   Firestone-­‐NPRAG	   agreement	   was	   that	   the	  company	  would:	  
within	   thirty	   days,	   make	   all	   necessary	   arrangements	   with	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Finance	  for	  settlement	  of	  present	  and	  future	  financial	  obligations.388	  	  
Firestone	   began	   making	   payments	   to	   Taylor’s	   NPRAG	   in	   January	   1992,	   as	   shown	   in	  internal	  corporate	  records.389	  Between	  January	  1992	  and	  January	  1993,	  Firestone	  made	  tax	   payments	   to	   NPRAG	   that	   totalled	   US$2.35	  million	   for	   line	   items	   including	   income	  and	   reconstruction	   taxes	   (US$1	  272	  000),	   a	   social	   security	   pension	   scheme	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  384	  Kofi	  Oteng	  Kufuor,	  “Developments	  in	  the	  Resolution	  of	  the	  Liberian	  Conflict,”	  American	  University	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  10,	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  1	  (1996),	  382,	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  385	  Waugh,	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  and	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  386	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America.	  “Preliminary,”	  24.	  387	  Ibid.,	  25.	  388	  Memorandum	  of	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  2.	  389	  Firestone	  Plantations	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  of	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(US$469	  000),	   social	   security	   income	   schemes	   (US$89	  000),	   and	   land	   and	   rent	   duties	  (US$535	  000).390	  Cash	   payments	   totalled	   US$1	  366	  000,	   while	   payments	   in	   kind	   for	  items	   listed	   as	   “rice	   or	   equipment”	   total	   US$998	  000.391	  A	   Firestone	   1992	   production	  and	  shipping	  document	  also	   records	   that	   the	  company	  spent	  a	   total	  of	  US$35	  300	  000	  between	   June	   1990	   and	   February	   1993	   on	   rebuilding	   the	   plantation.392	  It	   is	   unclear	  whether	   this	   amount	   included	   the	   US$2.35	  million	   in	   tax	   payments,	   as	   the	   document	  attributes	  US$23	  million	   to	   “plantation	   rehabilitation,	   pensions	   and	   labour	   settlement,	  and	   humanitarian	   aid”393	  and	   the	   remaining	   US$12	  300	  000	   to	   “misc	   [sic]	   obligations	  and	  expenses	  while	  awaiting	  return	  to	  operation”.394	  
Between	   1990	   and	   1993,	   Firestone’s	   parent	   company,	   Bridgestone/Firestone,	   also	  reported	   spending	   over	   US$1	  million	   on	   “humanitarian	   rice”	   for	   which	   the	   company	  later	   submitted	  an	   insurance	  claim	   for	   reimbursement.	  According	   to	   the	  company,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   food	   was	   given	   to	   company	   employees	   in	   connection	   with	   restarting	  business	   operations	   in	   Harbel. 395 	  However,	   there	   were	   numerous	   reports	   that	  humanitarian	  aid	  was	  redirected	  to	  feed	  Taylor’s	  NPFL.	  Several	  months	  before	  the	  MOU	  was	   signed,	   a	   large	   ocean	   freighter	   leased	   by	   Firestone	   called	   the	   Harbel	   Tapper	   had	  arrived	   in	   Monrovia	   at	   the	   NPFL-­‐controlled	   Buchanan	   port.396	  The	   Harbel	   Tapper	  brought	  relief	  cargo	  from	  the	  US-­‐based	  Liberian	  Committee	  for	  Relief,	  Resettlement	  and	  Reconstruction,	   as	   well	   as	   supplies	   needed	   to	   restart	   operations	   at	   the	   Harbel	  plantation.397	  However,	   in	   order	   to	   secure	   the	   aid	   on	   delivery,	   the	   cargo’s	   arrival	  was	  coordinated	  with	  Isaac	  Mussah,	  the	  NPFL	  Chief	  of	  Staff.	  While	  the	  rice	  was	  intended	  for	  the	   employees	   on	   the	   Firestone	   plantation,	   the	   communication	   from	   the	   US	   Embassy	  notes	   that	   it	  was	   instead	   “donated”	   to	   the	  NPFL	  as	   “the	  price	  Firestone	  had	   to	  pay	   for	  Mussah’s	  cooperation”.398	  	  
Despite	   sanctions	   imposed	   against	   Taylor’s	   territory	   in	   July	   1992,	   Firestone’s	   rubber	  exports	  were	  directed	  through	  NPFL-­‐controlled	  Buchanan	  port.399	  Weihe	  created	  a	  new	  system	   to	   ship	   Firestone’s	   latex	   from	   Buchanan	   allegedly	   to	   “avoid	   the	   interim	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	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  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company,	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  and	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  United	  Steelworkers	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  Cable,	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  United	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  of	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government’s	  25	  per	  cent	  export	  earnings	  surrender	  requirement”.400	  The	  NPFL	  charged	  Firestone	  port	   fees	  of	  only	  10	  per	  cent,	  which	  not	  only	  saved	  the	  company	  money,	  but	  also	   “put	   cash	   into	   Taylor’s	   hands”.401	  In	   addition,	   in	   keeping	   with	   a	   decree	   made	   by	  Taylor	  on	   the	  pay	   structure	  of	   resource-­‐extracting	   companies,	   Firestone	  paid	  workers	  half	   in	   US	  dollars	   and	   half	   in	   Liberian	  dollars	   according	   to	   an	   embassy	   cable	   in	   July	  1992.402	  According	   to	   ProPublica,	   “as	   the	   U.S.	   dollars	   circulated,	   they	   helped	   provide	  Taylor’s	  government	  with	  much	  needed	  liquid	  currency”.403	  
1.4.1.1.2.	  The	  Procurement	  of	  Protection	  
Another	   significant	   condition	   of	   the	   MOU	   involved	   Firestone’s	   procurement	   of	  protection	  from	  the	  NPFL	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  “plant	  protection	  force”,	  for	  which	  the	  company	  reportedly	  paid	  US$2	  million	  annually.	  Taylor	  put	  Brigadier	  General	  Domingo	  Ramos	  in	  charge	  of	  protecting	  the	  plantation	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  about	  300	  NPFL	   soldiers.	   In	   addition,	   he	   commanded	   Ramos	   to	   recover	   Firestone’s	   looted	  machinery,	  equipment	  and	  vehicles.404	  According	  to	  the	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America,	  this	  (along	  with	  other	  payments)	  provided	  Taylor	  with	  both	  the	  means	  and	  the	  motive	  to	  keep	  fighting	  in	  1992.405	  However,	  the	  situation	  to	  which	  Firestone	  management	  had	  been	  exposed	  was	  characterised	  by	  widespread	  violence	  committed	  by	  multiple,	  active	  warring	   factions.406	  In	   addition,	   the	   use	   of	   drugs	   and	   alcohol	   by	   combatants	   of	   all	  factions	  was	  pervasive,	  which	  made	  their	  actions	  even	  more	  violent	  and	  unpredictable.	  While	   these	   payments	  might	  well	   have	   provided	   Taylor	  with	   the	   financial	  means	   and	  motive	  to	  avoid	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  to	  the	  conflict,	  they	  were	  also	  likely	  necessary	  to	  ensure	   the	   protection	   of	   company	   employees	   and	   assets	   in	   a	   context	   of	   extreme	  volatility	  and	  violence.	  Firestone	  had	  already	  in	  mid-­‐1990	  complained	  that	  the	  Liberian	  government	   had	   failed	   to	   supply	   it	   with	   the	   security	   measures	   provided	   for	   in	   its	  concession	  agreement.407	  It	   is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  that	  Firestone	  may	  have	  turned	  to	  the	   NPFL	   for	   protection,	   primarily	   because	   the	   plantation	   was	   located	   within	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Taylorland,	   and	   secondly,	   because	   the	   government	   had	   failed	   to	   provide	   the	   level	   of	  protection	  required.	  
1.4.1.2.	  On-­‐the-­‐ground	  Operations	  
In	   October	   1992,	   Weihe	   took	   the	   new	   US	   Ambassador	   to	   Liberia	   on	   a	   tour	   of	   the	  plantation.	   In	   a	   cable	   to	   the	   US	   State	   Department,	   the	   Ambassador	   noted	   that	   the	  plantation	  was	  at	  this	  stage	  “back	  in	  operation	  in	  a	  major	  way	  if	  not	  yet	  at	  full	  capacity”	  and	   employees	   appeared	   “well-­‐fed	   and	   generally	   content”.408	  In	   addition,	   he	   reported	  that	   the	   Firestone	   Hospital	   was	   operational	   again	   and	   that,	   although	   severely	  understaffed,	  it	  was	  providing	  necessary	  medical	  attention	  to	  Firestone	  employees	  and	  their	   dependents,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Liberian	   population.409	  According	   to	   the	   report,	   the	  NPFL	   had	   put	   up	  military	   barriers	   and	   checkpoints	   in	   the	   area,	   although	   intimidation	  tactics	  seemed	  to	  be	  “somewhat	  less	  extensive	  or	  intensive”	  under	  Domingo’s	  control.410	  	  
However,	   another	   tour	   given	   by	  Weihe	   previously	   in	   June	   provided	   a	   less	   optimistic	  account	  of	  the	  goings-­‐on	  on	  the	  plantation.	  The	  details	  of	  the	  visit	  were	  recounted	  in	  a	  cable	  and	  included	  concerns	  that:	  
[w]ithout	  elaborating,	  but	  giving	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  may	  be	  some	  military	  significance,	   [Weihe]	   mentioned	   that	   certain	   parts	   of	   the	   plantation	   were	   off-­‐limits	  to	  non-­‐NPFL.411	  	  
Taylor	   and	   his	   NPFL	   used	   these	   areas	   for	   private	   matters	   purportedly	   unknown	   to	  Firestone	  staff	  and	  employees.	  NPFL	  soldiers	  were	  also	  quartered	  on	  the	  plantation	  and	  given	  access	  to	  company	  vehicles.	  According	  to	  Taylor’s	  Minister	  of	  Defence,	  Jucontee	  T.	  Woewiyu,	  the	  General	  Manager’s	  house	  –	  known	  as	  Building	  54	  –	  was	  made	  available	  to	  Taylor	   to	   use	   as	   his	   “executive	   mansion”.412 	  Another	   facility	   –	   Building	  53	   –	   was	  converted	  by	  the	  NPFL	  into	  its	  radio	  station.	  According	  to	  Woewiyu,	  Firestone	  allowed	  the	  radio	  station	  because	  “it	  was	  information	  useful	  to	  everybody”.413	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Firestone	   was	   accused	   of	   facilitating	   the	   offensive	   launched	   by	   the	   NPFL	   in	   October	  1992	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  decision	  to	  allow	  the	  NPFL	  onto	  the	  plantation	  and	  giving	  it	  access	  to	   crucial	   supplies.	   The	   offensive	   was	   named	   Operation	   Octopus,	   for	   Taylor’s	   plan	   to	  attack	   the	   capital	   city	   from	   multiple	   directions,	   “enveloping	   it	   like	   the	   arms	   of	   an	  octopus”.414.	  
According	   to	   the	   USWA,	   violent	   atrocities	   reached	   new	   heights	   during	   Operation	  Octopus	   and	  Firestone	   received	   serious	   criticism	   for	   supposedly	   “allowing”	   for	   this	   to	  happen.415	  
1.4.1.2.1.	  Operation	  Octopus	  
The	  NPFL	  launched	  its	  surprise	  attack	  against	  ECOMOG	  forces	  in	  Monrovia	  in	  the	  early	  hours	  of	  15	  October	  1992.	  Two	  attacks	  were	   launched	  from	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  –	  one	   from	   the	   north	   and	   one	   from	   the	   east	   –	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   taking	   control	   of	  Monrovia’s	   suburbs	   and	   the	   IGNU’s	   last	   remaining	   airport.416	  In	   retaliation,	   ECOMOG	  launched	   a	   counterattack	   with	   the	   support	   of	   anti-­‐Taylor	   factions	   and	   former	   AFL	  troops	   who	   knew	   the	   terrain	   well.417	  In	   November,	   ECOMOG	   went	   on	   the	   offensive,	  bombing	   known	   NPFL	   territories.	   The	   Firestone	   plantation	   was	   hit	   six	   times	   by	  ECOMOG	  Alpha	  jets	  on	  2	  November	  1992,	  exacting	  a	  significant	  human	  cost.418	  The	  first	  bomb	   hit	   near	   the	   rubber	   processing	   plant,	   destroying	   houses	   and	   a	   soccer	   field,	   and	  killing	  42	   civilians.419	  Over	   the	  next	   few	  days,	   ECOMOG	   jets	  hit	   two	  Firestone	   garages,	  two	  crossroads	  on	  the	  plantation,	  the	  Duside	  Hospital	  and	  adjacent	  staff	  residences,	  and	  the	   rubber	   processing	   plant	   (directly	   this	   time	   –	   destroying	  parts	   of	   the	   block	   rubber	  and	   liquid	   rubber	   areas).420	  Firestone	  management	   reported	   that	   no	   combatants	  were	  killed	   in	   the	   bombings,	   and	   that	   the	   victims	   of	   the	   ECOMOG	   attack	   were	   Firestone	  dependents	  and	  those	  seeking	  refuge	  from	  the	  attacks	  in	  Monrovia.421	  	  
Following	  the	  carnage	  created	  by	  Operation	  Octopus,	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  went	  into	  “stand-­‐by	  mode”	  and	  the	  expatriate	  employees	  were	  evacuated	  for	  the	  second	  time	  on	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18	  November	  1992	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  Kaizaki.422	  On	  leaving,	  Weihe	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  Taylor	  wherein	  he	  noted	  Kaizaki’s	  recognition	  of	  NPRAG’s	  cooperation	  and	  assistance,	  and	  his	  desire	  that	  operations	  be	  restarted	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.423	  The	  letter	  contained	  details	  of	  Firestone’s	   plans	   for	   the	   plantation	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   management	   team.	   This	  included	  Weihe’s	  appointment	  of	  a	  stand-­‐in	  CEO	  and	  Operations	  Manager,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  selection	   of	   managers	   to	   oversee	   personnel	   and	   protect	   assets	   in	   the	   various	  departments.	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  he	  had	  left	  instructions	  for	  ensuring	  the	  continuation	  of	  essential	   operations	   (including	   the	   hospital,	   the	   hydroelectric	   plant	   and	   the	  waterworks).	   In	   addition,	   he	   indicated	   that	   the	   plantation	   had	   sufficient	   rice	   to	   feed	  employees	   for	   the	   foreseeable	   future	   and	   that,	   once	   this	   had	   run	   out,	   employees	  stationed	   in	   Ivory	   Coast	   would	   take	   charge	   of	   restocking	   supplies.424 	  Weihe	   also	  requested	   that,	   “Brig.	   Gen.	   Domingo	  Ramos	  …	   continue	   his	   outstanding	  work	   keeping	  the	   peace	   and	   protecting	   the	   assets	   of	   the	   plantation”	   and	   that	   NPRAG	   continue	   to	  provide	  security	  measures	  needed	  once	  operations	  had	  restarted.425	  	  
1.5.	  December	  1992	  –	  July	  1997	  
1.5.1.	  ECOMOG	  Takes	  Control	  of	  the	  Plantation	  
In	   December	   1992,	   while	   the	   plantation	   was	   in	   stand-­‐by	   mode,	   BFS	   held	   a	   board	  meeting	  at	  which	  a	  “forward	  plan”	  for	  Firestone	  was	  discussed.	  The	  plan	  involved:	  
A	   continued	   presence	   on	   the	   Plantation	   using	   Liberian	   employees,	   continued	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  costs,	  and	  a	  return	  to	  operations	  as	  soon	  as	  safe.426	  	  
At	   the	   meeting,	   Schremp	   reportedly	   suggested	   selling	   the	   plantation,	   but	   Kaizaki	  remained	   intent	   on	   holding	   on	   to	   it	   in	   the	   hopes	   that	   operations	   would	   soon	   be	  restarted.	  However,	  the	  changing	  political	  and	  military	  situation	  in	  Liberia	  affected	  this	  “forward	  plan”.	  In	  late	  February	  1993,	  troops	  loyal	  to	  the	  IGNU	  recaptured	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  from	  the	  NPFL	  and	  turned	  it	  over	  to	  ECOMOG.427	  Once	  the	  NPFL	  lost	  control	  of	   the	   plantation,	   ECOMOG	   benefitted	   from	   tax	   payments	   for	   rubber	   exported	   from	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Buchanan,	   while	   the	   Liberian	   government	   benefitted	   from	   taxes	   accrued	   through	  Freeport.428	  
In	  July	  1993,	  the	  warring	  factions	  finally	  gave	  in	  to	  the	  increasing	  international	  pressure	  to	  cease	  hostilities	  while	  maintaining	  their	  occupied	  positions.	  A	  ceasefire	  was	  signed	  in	  Cotonou,	   Benin	   and	   provision	   was	   made	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   provisional	  government.	   A	   timeline	   was	   also	   established	   for	   elections	   to	   be	   held	   and	   ECOMOG	  remained	   in	   place	   as	   a	   monitoring	   force	   to	   oversee	   the	   process.	   However,	   following	  complaints	   over	   the	   impartiality	   of	   ECOMOG,	   the	   UN	   established	   the	   United	   Nations	  Observer	  Mission	  in	  Liberia	  (UNOMIL),	  which	  was	  tasked	  with	  reporting	  progress	  to	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General.429	  
Amos	   Sawyer	   toured	   the	   Firestone	   plantation	   in	   March	   1993	   following	   the	   ECOMOG	  takeover	  and	  reported	  on	  his	  visit	  at	  a	  press	  conference	  in	  Monrovia.	  In	  the	  recording	  of	  the	  conference,	  Sawyer	  remarked	  that:	  
Firestone	   facilities	   had	   been	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   Mr.	   Taylor’s	   war	   machine	   …	  Firestone’s	  communication	  system	  was	  at	  his	  disposal	  …	  [t]hey	  were	  operating,	  if	  not	  in	  cooperation,	  surely	  side	  by	  side	  –	  reinforcing	  each	  other.430	  
Sawyer	  argued	  that	   the	  Firestone	  plantation	  had	  served	  as	   the	  NPFL’s	   “command	  post	  and	   nerve	   centre”431	  for	   Operation	   Octopus	   and	   threatened	   the	   company	   with	   legal	  action	   for	   its	   alleged	   support	   of	   Taylor’s	   NPRAG.	   The	   IGNU	   also	   sought	   financial	  restitution	  from	  Firestone	  as	  per	  its	  general	  policy	  for	  dealing	  with	  companies	  accused	  of	  engaging	  with	  Taylor.432	  However,	  in	  March	  1994,	  a	  new	  transitional	  government	  was	  instated	  that	  contained	  representatives	  from	  all	  the	  warring	  factions,	  including	  NPRAG.	  As	  such,	  nothing	  came	  of	  Sawyer’s	  legal	  threats	  to	  Firestone.433	  	  
1.5.2.	  The	  End	  of	  the	  First	  Civil	  War	  and	  Firestone’s	  Return	  
The	   company	   reportedly	   kept	   a	   low	   profile	   over	   the	   next	   two	   years,	   maintaining	   a	  skeleton	   crew	   on	   the	   plantation	   to	   ensure	   the	   maintenance	   of	   its	   assets	   and	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  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency,	  23.	  429	  Ellis,	  “Liberia	  1989–1994,”	  172.	  430	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America,	  “Preliminary	  Report,”	  34–36.	  431	  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Six:	  Raining	  Hell.”	  432	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	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infrastructure.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  plantation	  continued	  to	  act	  as	  a	  battleground	  for	  the	  various	  factions	  as	  well	  as	  a	  place	  of	  refuge	  for	  many	  civilians.434	  Between	  1994	  and	  1996,	   several	   attempts	   to	   institute	   a	   peace	   agreement	   failed,	   largely	   due	   to	   Nigeria’s	  refusal	   to	   agree	   to	   a	   deal	   that	   included	   Taylor.435	  However,	   in	   1996,	   the	   Nigerian	  President,	   Sani	   Abacha,	   and	   Charles	   Taylor	   suddenly	   reached	   an	   agreement.	   This	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  military	  weakening	  of	  the	  NPFL	  as	  well	  as	  Abacha’s	  desire	  for	  Nigeria	  to	   appear	   as	   a	   peacemaker	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Ogoni	   activist	   Ken	   Saro-­‐Wiwa’s	   1995	  execution.436	  On	   19	   July	   1997,	   special	   elections	   were	   held	   with	   Taylor	   and	   his	   NPFL	  emerging	   victorious	   by	   a	   large	   majority,	   with	   speculation	   that	   this	   was	   because	  Liberians	  feared	  further	  violence	  if	  he	  lost.437	  Firestone	  returned	  to	  Liberia	  in	  1996	  and	  invested	   approximately	   US$146	  million	   in	   repairing	   the	   damage	   done	   to	   its	   Harbel	  plantation.	  According	  to	  the	  company,	  production	  only	  returned	  to	  capacity	  in	  2000.438	  
Section	  2	  |	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Case	  Study	  
2.1.	  The	  Consequences	  of	  Firestone’s	  Actions	  
The	  primary	  accusations	  laid	  against	  Firestone	  include	  its	  financial	  payments	  to	  NPRAG,	  its	   decision	   to	   allow	   the	   NPFL	   to	   use	   the	   plantation	   and,	   more	   generally,	   that	   the	  company	   earned	   revenue	   in	   the	  midst	   of	  mass	   atrocities.	   The	   IGNU,	  ECOMOG	  and	   the	  United	   Steelworkers	   union	   all	   accused	   Firestone	   of	   being	   complicit	   in	   NPFL	   military	  affairs,	   asserting	   that	   the	   company	   had	   helped	   the	   NPFL	   build	   explosives	   and	   had	  provided	  them	  with	  ammunition	  for	  combat.439	  Firestone	  firmly	  denied	  involvement	   in	  such	   activities.	   ECOMOG	   also	   reported	   unearthing	   mass	   graves	   on	   the	   plantation	   in	  1993,	   which	   they	   believed	   to	   hold	   the	   victims	   of	   NPFL	   attacks.440	  According	   to	   the	  ECOMOG	  commanders	  who	  made	  the	  discovery,	   the	  gravesite	  was	   located	  close	   to	   the	  Firestone	   factory,	   which	   would	   have	  made	   it	   hard	   to	   hide	   from	   company	   employees.	  However,	  with	   the	   periods	   of	   chaos	   that	   occurred	   at	   the	   plantation	   and	   the	   atrocities	  committed	  by	  various	  factions,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	  either	  to	  identify	  the	  victims	  found	   in	   the	  graves	  or	   to	  discern	  whether	   the	  graves	  were	  made	  when	   the	  plantation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  434	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  Liberian	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  War:	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  Global	  Society,	  vol.	  19,	  no.	  1	  (2005),	  82,	  DOI:	  10.1080/1360082042000316059.	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  Ibid.,	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  437	  Lee	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  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	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  Firestone	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  accessed	  January	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was	   operational	   or	   on	   stand-­‐by.	   Moreover,	   civilians	   and	   combatants	   alike	   often	  struggled	  to	  identify	  the	  factions	  to	  which	  fighters	  belonged	  and	  so	  it	  was	  often	  unclear	  who	   had	   committed	   which	   act	   of	   violence.441	  As	   with	   any	   conflict,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  ascertain	  the	  motives	  of	  any	  of	  the	  factions	  involved	  and	  thus	  it	   is	  not	  certain	  whether	  such	  allegations	  were	  factual,	  bombastic	  or	  untrue.	  	  
It	  is,	  however,	  difficult	  to	  ignore	  the	  key	  role	  that	  the	  plantation	  played	  in	  facilitating	  the	  NPFL’s	   Operation	   Octopus.	   Additionally,	   the	   plantation	   did	   provide	   the	   NPFL	   with	   a	  well-­‐functioning	   military	   base	   complete	   with	   housing,	   vehicles,	   food	   and	  communications	   technology.	  Once	  operations	  were	   restarted,	   the	  plantation	   itself	   also	  became	   a	   source	   of	   income	   for	   NPRAG.	   Taylor	   testified	   at	   his	   International	   Criminal	  Court	   (ICC)	   trial	   that	   once	   the	   plantation	   fell	   into	   NPFL	   control,	   “it	   became	   at	   that	  particular	   time	   [the	   NPFL’s]	  most	   significant	   principal	   source	   of	   foreign	   exchange”.442	  Taylor	  revealed	  that	  the	  NPFL	  could	  make	  between	  US$1	  million	  and	  US$2	  million	  every	  two	   quarters,	   depending	   on	   rubber	   sales	   from	   the	   plantation. 443 	  While	   he	   was	  reportedly	   earning	   as	  much	   as	   US$75	  million	   per	   annum	   by	   1996	   (on	   top	   of	   support	  received	  from	  sympathetic	  states	  such	  as	  Burkina	  Faso	  and	  Libya),	  this	  was	  a	  significant	  sum	  for	  Taylor	   in	  the	  early	  days	  of	   the	  conflict.444	  While	  on	  trial	   for	  war	  crimes	  at	  The	  Hague,	  Taylor	  explained	  the	  particular	  significance	  of	  his	  collaboration	  with	  Firestone	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
DEFENCE	  ATTORNEY:	  Now,	  Harbel	  is	  the	  location	  for	  what	  economic	  activity?	  	  
CHARLES	  TAYLOR:	  Harbel	  is	  the	  location	  of	  the	  Firestone	  rubber	  plantation.	  	  
DEFENCE	  ATTORNEY:	  And	  what	  was	  the	  significance	  of	  capturing	  that?	  	  
CHARLES	   TAYLOR:	  Oh,	   you	  had	   immediately	   a	  means	   that	  would	  provide	   the	  financial	  assistance	  that	  we	  needed	  for	  the	  revolution.445	  
In	   addition	   to	   offering	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   support,	   Firestone	   was	   accused	   of	   helping	   to	  finance	  Taylor’s	  military	  campaigns	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  The	  payments	  made	  by	  Firestone	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  of	  the	  ICC	  trial	  of	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  the	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in	  cash	  and	  in	  kind	  undeniably	  contributed	  towards	  the	  NPFL’s	  military	  capabilities	  and	  Taylor’s	  ability	  to	  withstand	  pressure	  from	  the	  IGNU	  and	  ECOWAS	  states.446	  The	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America	  was	  particularly	  critical	  of	  Firestone’s	  actions	  during	  the	  first	  civil	  war.	  The	  union’s	  1996	  report	  argued	  that:	  	  
Bridgestone/Firestone’s	   agreement	   to	   do	   business	   with	   …	   Charles	   Taylor	  indirectly	   and	   perhaps	   directly	   contributed	   to	   mass	   death	   and	   destruction	   in	  Liberia,	   and	   prolonged	   the	   civil	   war	   by	   providing	   Taylor	   with	   badly	   needed	  revenue	  and	  a	  base	  of	  operations.447	  
However,	  the	  union	  was	  engaged	  in	  an	  intense	  contractual	  dispute	  with	  BFS	  in	  the	  US	  at	  the	   time.	   As	   such,	   the	   United	   Steelworkers	   of	   America	   investigated	   the	   situation	   in	  Liberia	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   using	   what	   it	   uncovered	   as	   leverage	   in	   its	   contract	  negotiations	  with	  Firestone.448	  When	  BFS	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  union’s	  demands,	  the	  report	  was	   hidden	   and	   only	   became	   public	   two	   decades	   later.449	  While	   this	   does	   not	   absolve	  Firestone,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  allegations	  against	  the	  company	  were	  made.	  	  
Finally,	   Firestone	   was	   also	   accused	   of	   simply	   continuing	   operations	   while	   bearing	  witness	   to	   the	   atrocities	   being	   committed	   around	   them.	   During	   Operation	   Octopus,	  production	  on	   the	  plantation	   reached	   its	  1992	   record	   (a	   total	  of	  4.7	  million	  pounds	  of	  rubber),	  earning	  Firestone	  further	  criticism.450	  Members	  of	  Firestone	  staff	  did	  admit	  that	  they	  noticed	  something	  unusual	   taking	  place	  at	   the	  time;	  however,	  many	  qualified	  this	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  tall	  trees	  on	  the	  plantation	  mostly	  restricted	  their	  vision.451	  Weihe	  also	   insisted	   he	   did	   not	   know	  Taylor	  was	   planning	   an	   attack;	   however,	   his	   statement	  that	   “[the	   NPFL]	   used	   the	   plantation	   to,	   more	   or	   less,	   regroup,	   and	   go	   down	   to	  Schieffelin”452 	  suggest	   otherwise. 453 	  Moreover,	   his	   close	   personal	   relationship	   with	  Taylor	   might	   have	   made	   him	   more	   likely	   to	   turn	   a	   blind	   eye	   to	   happenings	   on	   the	  plantation.	  While	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  accept	   that	  management	  was	  completely	  oblivious	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  446	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  “Preliminary	  Report,”	  30.	  447	  Ibid.,	  3.	  448	  Ibid.	  449	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  “Union	  Buried	  Evidence	  of	  Firestone	  Support	  of	  Warlord	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  Labor	  Deal,”	  
ProPublica,	  March	  12,	  2015,	  accessed	  September	  2,	  2018,	  https://www.propublica.org/article/union-­‐buried-­‐evidence-­‐of-­‐firestone-­‐support-­‐of-­‐warlord-­‐after-­‐labor-­‐deal;	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all	   the	  goings-­‐on,	   it	   is	   impossible	  to	  know	  for	  certain	  which	  Firestone	  employees	  were	  privy	  to	  Taylor’s	  plans,	  if	  any	  at	  all.	  This	  said,	  even	  if	  management	  had	  their	  suspicions	  or	  prior	  knowledge,	   the	   company	  was	  bargaining	   from	  a	  position	  of	  weakness	   and	   its	  options	  were	  limited.	  Without	  support	  from	  its	  home	  government	  in	  the	  US	  and	  unable	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  IGNU,	  what	  Firestone	  management	  could	  actually	  have	  done	  at	  the	  time	  is	  questionable.	  
Essentially,	  Firestone’s	  agreement	  with	  NPRAG	  did	  provide	  Taylor	  with	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  financial	  and	  logistical	  support	  he	  needed	  to	  continue	  in	  his	  campaign	  to	  capture	  the	  capital	  and	   the	  presidency.	  While	  many	  of	   the	  accusations	  made	  are	  well-­‐founded,	   the	  consequences	  of	  Firestone’s	  decisions	  cannot	  be	  analysed	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  array	  of	  options	  available	  to	  the	  company.	  The	  following	  section	  uses	  a	  letter	  written	  by	  Schremp	  to	   unpack	   the	   possible	   motivations	   behind	   the	   1992	   agreement.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   try	   to	  understand	   the	   degree	   of	   agency	   available	   to	   the	   company	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	  conflict	  and	  to	  assess	  the	  choices	  it	  made	  against	  any	  realistic	  alternatives.	  
2.2.	  The	  Possible	  Motivation	  for	  Firestone’s	  Actions	  
2.1.1.	  “Profit,	  Profit,	  Profit”454	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1993,	  the	  IGNU	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  and	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  sent	  a	  joint	  letter	   to	   Schremp	   questioning	   Firestone’s	   actions	   in	   Liberia	   from	   1991	   and	   its	  relationship	   with	   NPRAG/NPFL,	   in	   particular. 455 	  The	   next	   month,	   BFS	   executive	  Schremp	   responded	   to	   Sawyer’s	   accusations	   in	   a	   letter	   sent	   to	   the	   IGNU	   Finance	  Minister.456	  Schremp	  gave	  three	  primary	  justifications	  for	  Firestone’s	  return	  to	  Liberia:	  concern	   for	   the	   company’s	   Liberian	   workers,	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   its	   assets	   and	   the	  promise	   of	   stability	   offered	   by	   the	   Yamoussoukro	   IV	   Accord. 457 	  A	   number	   of	  contributions	   to	   the	   debate	   argue	   or	   insinuate	   that	   the	   overwhelming	  motivation	   for	  returning	   to	   Liberia	   and	   restarting	   operations	   was	   to	   do	   with	   profit.458	  However,	  Firestone	  reported	  profits	  of	  approximately	  US$16	  million	  in	  1989,	  the	  year	  before	  the	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  Edwin	  Cisco	  (Firestone	  Workers	  Union)	  interview	  for	  Gaviria,	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord.	  455	  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Francis	  T.	  Karpe,	  1.	  456	  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Six:	  Raining	  Hell.”	  457	  United	  Steelworkers	  of	  America,	  “Preliminary	  Report,”	  38–40.	  458	  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Four:	  Deal	  with	  the	  Devil”;	  	  Doyle,	  “What	  Firestone	  did	  in	  Liberia	  for	  ‘Profit,	  Profit,	  Profit,’ ”;	  DeFotis,	  “Investing	  in	  Africa”;	  	  Genzlinger,	  “Bodies	  Pile	  Up,	  but	  Business	  Goes	  On.”	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conflict	   started.459	  In	   comparison,	   Schremp’s	   letter	   noted	   that	   the	   company’s	   profits	  between	   1991	   and	   the	   end	   of	   1992	   amounted	   to	   just	   US$1.1	  million.460	  The	   debt	  increase	   for	   the	   company	   over	   the	   period	   June	   1990	   to	   February	   1993	   was	   over	  US$35	  million,	   with	   US$12	  million	   of	   this	   spent	   on	   “miscellaneous	   obligations	   and	  expenses	   while	   awaiting	   return	   to	   operation”	   and	   US$23	  million	   for	   “plant	  rehabilitation,	  pensions	  and	  labour	  settlement,	  and	  humanitarian	  aid”.461	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	   US$16	  500	  000	   was	   attributed	   to	   the	   damage	   to	   and	   loss	   of	   property,	   which	  brought	  the	  amount	  to	  a	  total	  exceeding	  US$50	  million.462	  Thus,	   it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  conflict	  offered	  Firestone	  a	  more	  lucrative	  opportunity	  to	  generate	  profit	  than	  in	  times	  of	  peace.	  	  
2.1.2.	  Protecting	  the	  Future	  of	  its	  Investment	  	  
A	   more	   likely	   explanation	   for	   BFS’s	   decision	   was	   its	   concern	   for	   the	   state	   of	   its	  investment	   and	   the	   fragility	   of	   its	   assets	   located	   in	   Liberia.	   The	   plantation	   itself	  (including	  the	  rubber	  trees,	  the	  buildings	  and	  factories,	  and	  the	  vehicles	  and	  equipment)	  was	  only	  estimated	  to	  be	  worth	  around	  US$200	  million	  at	  the	  time.	  For	  the	  Bridgestone	  Corporation,	  a	  loss	  of	  US$	  200	  million	  would	  not	  have	  had	  any	  serious	  implications	  for	  the	  parent	  company’s	  long-­‐term	  financial	  health.	  Moreover,	  its	  shareholders	  would	  have	  not	   have	   suffered	   losses	   beyond	   the	   amount	   of	   their	   original	   investment	   due	   to	   the	  protection	  of	  limited	  liability.	  However,	  the	  plantation	  brought	  in	  decent	  revenue	  for	  the	  FSTR	  and	  BFS	  surely	  hoped	  it	  would	  continue	  in	  this	  stream.	  In	  the	  late	  1980s,	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Bridgestone	  Corporation’s	  acquisition	  of	  FSTR,	   the	  Liberian	  plantation	  was	  supplying	  around	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  latex	  consumed	  in	  the	  US.463	  	  
In	  addition,	   its	  primary	  assets	  –	   the	  rubber	   trees	  –	  were	   fragile	  and	  required	  constant	  attention.	  A	  single	  rubber	  tree	  takes	  approximately	  six	  years	  to	  reach	  maturity,	  at	  which	  time	   it	   is	   carefully	   drained	   and	   then	   left	   to	   renew	   its	   supply	   before	   being	   tapped	  again.464	  A	   group	   of	   Liberian	   managers	   had	   remained	   behind	   to	   keep	   the	   plantation	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  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Three:	  Tough	  Talk	  in	  the	  Jungle”;	  	  Michael	  Kourabas,	  “How	  Firestone	  Buoyed	  the	  Rise	  of	  Convicted	  War	  Criminal	  Charles	  Taylor,”	  Triple	  
Pundit,	  November	  21,	  2014,	  accessed	  November	  2,	  2018,	  https://www.triplepundit.com/2014/11/firestone-­‐buoyed-­‐rise-­‐convicted-­‐war-­‐criminal-­‐charles-­‐taylor/.	  460	  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Francis	  T.	  Karpeh.	  461	  Firestone	  Plantations	  Company,	  “1992	  Production	  and	  Shipments,”	  3.	  462	  Ibid.	  463	  Gaviria,	  Firestone	  and	  the	  Warlord.	  464	  Patricia	  Levy	  and	  Michael	  Spilling,	  Cultures	  of	  the	  World:	  Liberia	  (New	  York:	  Marshall	  Cavendish,	  2008),	  17.	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operational;	   however,	   the	   small	   team	   had	   been	   unable	   to	   properly	   maintain	   all	   the	  rubber	  trees	  that	  covered	  the	   large	  200	  square	  mile	  (518	  square	  kilometre)	  area.465	  In	  addition,	   Schremp’s	   letter	   noted	   that	   Firestone	   had	   received	   reports	   of	   rebels	   and	  civilians	   “slaughter-­‐tapping”466	  the	   plantation	   trees	   to	   illegally	   harvest	   its	   latex	   for	  profit. 467 	  Like	   many	   other	   resource-­‐reliant	   MNCs,	   Firestone	   Liberia’s	   assets	   were	  immobile.	  On	  this	  issue,	  then	  US	  Ambassador	  Herman	  J.	  Cohen	  argued:	  
You	   can’t	   close	   down	   a	   plantation.	   You	   can’t	   wrap	   up,	   you	   know,	   five	   million	  trees	   and	   take	   them	  away.	   So	   you	  want	   to	  preserve	  what	   you	   can,	   and	   so	   you	  have	  to	  make	  deals.468	  
2.1.3.	  Protecting	  its	  Liberian	  Employees	  
While	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  BFS	  was	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  protect	   its	  investment	   and	   perhaps	   to	   generate	   some	   revenue	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   a	   dire	   financial	  period,	  other	  motivations	  also	  warrant	  consideration.	  In	  his	  letter	  to	  the	  IGNU,	  Schremp	  asserted	  that	  Firestone	  “received	  regular	  entreaties	   from	  employees	  and	  their	   families	  and	  dependents	  asking	  [Firestone]	  to	  return	  in	  order	  to	  alleviate	  their	  hardship”.469	  BFS	  attorney,	  Gerald	  Padmore,	  argued	  that	  the	  company’s	  desire	  to	  return	  to	  the	  plantation	  was	   driven	   primarily	   by	   a	   concern	   for	   its	   employees	   and	   that	   the	   “easy	   answer”	   for	  Firestone	   would	   have	   been	   to	   abandon	   the	   plantation.470	  Moreover,	   the	   management	  team	  of	  Firestone	  had	  been	  working	  with	  their	  Liberian	  colleagues	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	   for	  years	  and	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  assume	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  concern	  for	  their	  wellbeing.	  The	  Firestone	  management	  team	  on	  the	  ground	  had	  witnessed	  an	  episode	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  June	  1990	  and	  were	  aware,	  at	  least	  to	  an	  extent,	  of	  the	  levels	  of	  brutality	  and	  violence	  occurring.	   Moreover,	   Schremp’s	   letter	   argued	   that	   the	   plantation	   needed	   income	   to	  cover	   expenditures	   such	   as	   rice	   and	   medicine	   for	   those	   in	   need,	   which	   meant	   that	  operations	  would	  have	  to	  restart.471	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  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency,	  19.	  466	  This	  is	  “an	  industry	  term	  for	  extracting	  so	  much	  sap	  that	  the	  tree	  dies”.	  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Three:	  Tough	  Talk	  in	  the	  Jungle.”	  467	  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Three:	  Tough	  Talk	  in	  the	  Jungle.”	  468	  Herman	  Cohen	  (US	  Assistant	  Secretary	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  State	  for	  African	  Affairs	  in	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  early	  years	  of	  the	  civil	  war)	  interview	  for	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  Firestone	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  469	  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Francis	  T.	  Karpeh,	  2.	  470	  Miller	  and	  Jones,	  “Chapter	  Three:	  Tough	  Talk	  in	  the	  Jungle.”	  471	  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Francis	  T.	  Karpeh.	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2.1.4.	  The	  Assurance	  of	  Yamoussoukro	  IV	  
Schremp’s	  letter	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  Yamoussoukro	  IV	  Accord	  recognised	  that	  “both	  the	  Interim	  Government	  and	  the	  NPRAG	  would	  continue	  to	  administer	  territory	  under	  their	  respective	  control	  pending	  elections	  later	  in	  1992”.472	  According	  to	  Schremp,	  this	  was	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  conflict	  was	  drawing	  to	  a	  close.	  Moreover,	  he	  argued	  that,	  in	  entering	  into	   its	   MOU	   with	   the	   NPFL,	   “Firestone	   did	   not	   escape	   its	   obligations	   but,	   under	   a	  situation	   of	   force	  majeur,	   had	   to	   accept	  more	   onerous	   ones”.473	  This	   likely	   referred	   to	  both	  the	  heavy	  financial	  burden	  of	  the	  agreement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  restrictive	  environment	  created	  by	  NPFL	  control	  of	   the	  plantation.	  According	  to	  Schremp,	   the	  company	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  supporting	  the	  NPFL	  or	  any	  other	  military	  or	  political	  entity	  and	  had	  no	  prior	  knowledge	  of	   the	  NPFL’s	   (or	  any	  other	   faction’s)	  plans.	  The	   letter	  specified	   that	  peace	  was	  always	  preferable	   for	  the	  company	  and	  that	  Firestone’s	  “own	  economic	  objectives	  in	   Liberia	   [could]	   only	   be	   advanced	   under	   these	   [peaceful]	   conditions”.474	  The	   letter	  concluded	   with	   the	   conviction	   that	   Firestone	   should	   not	   be	   punished	   for	   events	   that	  were	   beyond	   its	   control	   and	   that	   the	   company	   had	   acted	   reasonably	   given	   the	  circumstances	  to	  protect	  its	  assets	  and	  employees.475	  
Section	  3	  |	  Chapter	  Summary	  
When	  assessing	  the	  evidence,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  conclude	  that	  the	  agreement	  with	  Taylor	  arose	  of	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  deal	  would	  be	  financially	  lucrative.	  Rather,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	   underlying	   motives	   were	   protecting	   the	   plantation’s	   assets	   and	   its	   Liberian	  employees	   (even	   if	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent).	  By	   the	  end	  of	  1991,	   the	  plantation	  was	   located	  squarely	  within	  NPFL	   territory	  and	  Taylor	  was	   in	  a	  powerful	  bargaining	  position.	  BFS	  found	  itself	  negotiating	  with	  Taylor’s	  NPRAG	  from	  a	  position	  of	  weakness	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  dangers	  facing	  its	  Liberian	  employees	  as	  well	  as	  its	  not	  easily	  replaceable	  assets.	  The	  levels	  of	  brutality	  and	  the	  shocking	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  made	  Firestone	  employees	  and	  assets	   extremely	   vulnerable	   and	   constrained	   the	   company’s	   agency	   to	   withstand	   the	  NPFL.	  Moreover,	   the	   inability	  of	   the	  state	   to	  provide	  security	  and	   the	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  US	  government	  to	  offer	  protection	  limited	  the	  company’s	  choices	  significantly;	  this,	  coupled	  with	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  armed	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict	  (and	  child	  soldiers	  particularly),	  made	   procuring	   protection	   all	   the	  more	   necessary.	   As	   Firestone	   had	   no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  472	  Ibid.,	  2–3.	  473	  Ibid.,	  3.	  474	  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	  Francis	  T.	  Karpeh,	  3.	  475	  Ibid.,	  5.	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means	  to	  protect	  itself	  in	  such	  an	  environment,	  the	  NPFL	  was	  perhaps	  its	  best	  option	  for	  ensuring	   that	   operations	   could	   continue	   in	   a	   relatively	   safe	   environment.	   Over	   and	  above	   these	   factors,	   the	   Yamoussoukro	   IV	   recognised	   NPRAG	   as	   a	   government	   of	   a	  “sovereign”	  territory.476	  Given	  Taylor’s	  power	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  IGNU,	  BFS	  remained	  confident	  that	  the	  NPFL	  would	  win	  the	  civil	  war	  and	  that	  NPRAG	  would	  assume	  control	  over	  Liberia	  in	  its	  entirety.477	  As	  such,	  developing	  a	  relationship	  with	  Taylor	  would	  have	  been	  increasingly	  important	  if	  the	  Firestone	  were	  to	  continue	  operating	  in	  Liberia	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
Another	  significant	  issue	  revealed	  through	  this	  study	  is	  the	  influence	  of	  geo-­‐political	  and	  geo-­‐economic	  variables	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  corporate	  actors.	  The	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  MNCs	  in	  conflict	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  address	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  resources	  and	  geopolitics	   in	   defining	   the	   role	   played	   by	  MNCs	   in	   conflict	   zones.	   This	   in	   spite	   of	   the	  fairly	   broad	   acknowledgment	   that	   resource-­‐reliant	   MNCs	   often	   elect	   to	   continue	  operating	  despite	  the	  instability	  wrought	  by	  civil	  war.	  The	  Firestone	  case	  study	  reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  geopolitics	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  in	  determining	  whether	  a	  company	   might	   become	   a	   target	   in	   the	   conflict.	   The	   revenue	   brought	   in	   through	   the	  export	   of	   rubber	   from	   the	   plantation	   made	   it	   “an	   engine	   for	   wealth	   creation”478	  for	  NPRAG	   and	   the	   resources	   available	   became	   essential	   to	   NPFL	   operations	   in	   the	   early	  1990s	   (and	   Operation	   Octopus	   in	   particular).	  Moreover,	   the	   plantation’s	   proximity	   to	  Monrovia	  put	  a	  red	  target	  on	  Firestone	  Liberia.	  Due	  to	  the	  immobility	  of	  its	  key	  asset,	  its	  rubber	   trees,	   the	   company	   found	   itself	   bound	   to	   a	  particular	   geographic	   site	   that	   also	  happened	  to	  be	  an	  attractive	  target	  during	  the	  conflict.	  	  
Ultimately,	   more	   recognition	   needs	   to	   be	   afforded	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   factors	  constrain	  the	  agency	  of	  foreign	  business	  actors	  and	  influence	  decision-­‐making	  in	  conflict	  situations.	   With	   these	   points	   in	   mind,	   the	   following	   chapter	   provides	   a	   summary	   of	  findings	  and	  addresses	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  for	  further	  research	  on	  the	  topic.	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  Waugh,	  Charles	  Taylor	  and	  Liberia.	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  Schremp,	  letter	  from	  John	  Schremp	  to	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  Mornorkonmana.	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  Rosenau	  et	  al.,	  Corporations	  and	  Counterinsurgency,	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CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
5.1.	  Concluding	  Remarks	  	  
This	   thesis	   was	   an	   investigation	   of	   the	   possible	   motivations	   behind	   a	   company’s	  decision	  to	  adopt	  strategies	  that	  might	  impact	  conflict	  dynamics.	  It	  investigated	  the	  role	  played	  by	  Firestone	  Liberia	  and	   its	  parent	  company,	  Bridgestone/Firestone,	   Inc.	   in	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War.	  Analysis	  shows	  that	  activities	   involving	  payments	   in	  cash	  and	  kind	  and	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  support	  did	  have	  negative	  consequences	  for	  conflict	  dynamics	  by	  providing	  Taylor	  (at	   least	   to	  an	  extent)	  with	  the	  means	  to	  withstand	  pressure	  from	  ECOMOG,	  the	  IGNU	  and	  other	  armed	  factions	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  However,	  the	  existing	  literature	  neglects	  the	  influence	  of	  some	  key	  factors	  in	  analysing	  not	  only	  the	  Firestone	  Liberia	  case,	  but	  also	  the	  corporate–conflict	  nexus	  more	  broadly.	  These	  factors	  include	  geo-­‐political	   and	   geo-­‐economic	   characteristics,	   corporate	   structure,	   and	   the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  conflict	  itself.	  
Due	  to	  the	  geo-­‐political	  and	  geo-­‐economic	  significance	  of	  its	  Harbel	  plantation,	  Firestone	  Liberia	  was	  unwillingly	  drawn	  into	  the	  conflict	  dynamics	  of	  the	  First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  and	  faced	  with	  two	  dilemmas.	  The	  first	  dilemma	  was	  whether	  to	  cease	  operations	  and	  withdraw	  or	   to	   continue	  operating	   in	   spite	  of	   the	   surrounding	  conflict.	  However,	  both	  options	  –	  to	  stay	  or	  to	  go	  –	  were	  poisoned,	  meaning	  that	  either	  would	  have	  earned	  the	  company	  criticism.	  Withdrawing	  would	  have	  meant	  a	   loss	  of	   influence	  on	  the	  future	  of	  those	   assets	   and	   employees	   left	   behind	   in	   a	   conflict	   defined	   by	   shocking	   levels	   of	  violence.	  Alternatively,	  returning	  to	  the	  conflict	  meant	  engaging	  with	  actor(s)	   involved	  in	  the	  conflict,	   thus	  contributing	  towards	  conflict	  dynamics.	  The	  extreme	  brutality	  that	  defined	   the	   Liberian	   Civil	   War	   meant	   that	   the	   company	   would	   need	   to	   procure	  protection	  to	  insulate	  it	  and	  its	  employees	  from	  violence.	  Ultimately,	  Firestone	  was	  left	  with	  two	  options,	  neither	  of	  which	  was	  desirable:	  either	  go	  and	  leave	  the	  rest	  to	  suffer,	  or	  return	  and	  engage	  with	  conflict	  actors	  to	  ensure	  stability	  on	  the	  plantation.	  
Its	   fears	   supposedly	   assuaged	   by	   the	   promise	   of	   Yamoussoukro	   IV	   (as	   well	   as	   other	  factors	   previously	   discussed),	   Firestone	   Liberia	   returned	   to	   Liberia	   under	   the	  instruction	   of	   its	   parent	   company.	   On	   its	   return,	   Firestone	   was	   faced	   with	   a	   second	  dilemma:	   deciding	   which	   actors	   to	   engage	   with.	   At	   first,	   the	   company	   attempted	   to	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remain	   neutral	   by	   “picking	   all	   sides”.479	  However,	   by	   this	   stage	   in	   the	   conflict,	   the	  plantation	  was	   situated	   squarely	   within	   Taylor’s	   Greater	   Liberia.	   Now	   faced	  with	   the	  reality	   of	   a	   “peculiarly	   horrible”480	  conflict,	   there	  was	   little	   option	   but	   to	   acquiesce	   to	  Taylor’s	  demands	   in	  order	   to	  restore	  some	  degree	  of	  stability	   to	   the	  plantation.	  Again,	  this	   decision	   earned	   Firestone	   Liberia	   considerable	   criticism,	   first	   from	   the	   IGNU	   and	  ECOMOG	   and	   later	   from	   the	   media	   more	   broadly.	   The	   predominant	   narrative	   in	   the	  literature	  is	  that	  ECOMOG	  (and	  the	  IGNU,	  by	  association)	  represented	  a	  force	  of	  “good’”	  while	  Taylor’s	  NPFL	  epitomised	  the	  “bad”.	  In	  reality,	  though,	  all	  factions	  (including	  state	  soldiers)	   committed	   atrocities	   during	   the	   conflict. 481 	  While	   Firestone	   was	   heavily	  criticised	   for	   its	   decision	   to	   deal	   with	   Taylor,	   there	   was	   no	   guarantee	   which	   faction	  would	  have	  been	  the	  “good”	  choice	  for	  matters	  of	  business	  –	  if	  one	  existed	  at	  all.	  Every	  deal	  would	  have	  been	  with	  a	  “devil”.	  
The	  abovementioned	  factors	  constrained	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  agency	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  Liberian	  Civil	  War.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Firestone	  or	  BFS	  ought	  to	  be	  commended	  for	  their	  efforts,	  but	   rather	   that	   the	  company	   likely	  did	  what	   it	   thought	  was	  best	   in	  a	  bad	  situation.	  Moreover,	   just	   as	   the	   line	   between	   “good”	   and	   “bad”	   conflict	   actors	   is	   often	  blurred,	   so	   too	   are	   the	   implications	   of	   corporate	   behaviour.	   The	   resources	   and	   geo-­‐political	  site	  of	  the	  Firestone	  plantation	  inevitably	  put	  it	  on	  the	  NPFL’s	  warpath.	  Thus,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  a	   target	  regardless	  of	  whether	  Firestone	  management	  was	  absent	  or	  present.	   This	   is	   enforced	   by	   the	   NPFL’s	   presence	   on	   the	   plantation	   after	   the	   first	  evacuation	  of	   the	  expatriate	  staff	  and	   its	  continued	  presence	  on	  management’s	   return.	  By	   returning	   to	   Liberia,	   Firestone	   was	   able	   to	   at	   least	   wield	   a	   degree	   of	   influence	   in	  safeguarding	   its	   assets,	   in	   providing	   necessary	   protection,	   food	   and	   medical	   care	   to	  employees	  and	  civilians	  on	  the	  plantation,	  and	  in	  generating	  some	  income	  to	  cover	  gross	  debts	  incurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  
In	  addition,	  as	  rubber	  trees	  are	  fragile	  and	  immobile,	  abandoning	  the	  plantation	  for	  the	  duration	  of	   the	  civil	  war	  would	  have	   likely	   led	   to	   the	  complete	  destruction	  of	   its	  most	  vital	   asset.	   This	   would	   have	   made	   restarting	   operations	   after	   the	   war	   an	   even	   more	  costly	   endeavour,	   potentially	   leading	   BFS	   to	   shut	   down	   the	   plantation.	   Firestone	  was	  and	   remains	   to	   this	   day	   Liberia’s	   most	   significant	   private	   employer.	   As	   such,	   closing	  down	  the	  plantation	  would	  have	  had	  a	  very	  negative	  impact	  on	  employment	  in	  Liberia	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  et	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and,	  consequently,	  on	  its	  economy.	  This	  would	  also	  have	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  and	  development	   in	  Liberia,	   as	  Firestone	   invested	  over	  US$135	  million	  in	  rebuilding	  homes,	  healthcare	  facilities,	  schools	  and	  other	  infrastructure,	  in	  addition	  to	  repairing	  the	  damage	  to	  the	  plantation	  after	  the	  conflict.482	  
While	  none	  of	  this	  negates	  or	  mitigates	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia’s	  strategy,	  it	  does	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  complex	  reality	  of	  the	  corporate–conflict	  nexus.	  
5.2.	  Future	  Research	  
The	   secondary	   aim	   of	   this	   study	  was	   to	   address	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   findings	   on	  monitoring	   the	   role	   of	   corporate	   actors	   in	   conflict	   zones.	   In	   so	   far	   as	   monitoring	  corporate	   behaviour	   is	   concerned,	   company	   shareholders	   could	   be	   a	   potential	  mechanism	  to	  influence	  “good”	  corporate	  behaviour	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  In	  a	  publicly	  held	  company	  like	  the	  Bridgestone	  Corporation,	  shareholders	  do	  not	  officially	  own	  or	  run	  the	  company,	   nor	   are	   they	   liable	   for	   risks	   incurred,	  monetary	   damages	   imposed	   or	   harm	  caused	  by	  a	  subsidiary	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  individual	  investment.483	  However,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  shareholders	  of	  a	  publicly	  listed	  company	  lies	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  dump	  their	  shares,	  causing	  the	  company’s	  market	  value	  to	  drop.484	  As	  such,	  shareholders	  constitute	  a	   market	   force	   that	   can	   influence	   the	   decisions	   made	   by	   the	   company’s	   directors.	   In	  particular,	  majority	  shareholders	  or	  holders	  of	   large	  blocks	  of	  shares	  can	  have	  a	  more	  direct	   influence	   through	   such	   means	   as	   board	   elections,	   for	   example.485	  To	   prevent	  shareholders	   from	   divesting,	   a	   company’s	   executive	   will	   often	   act	   to	   keep	   investors	  happy.	   As	   engaging	   in	   conflict	   dynamics	   can	   lead	   to	   negative	   publicity	   for	   an	   MNC,	  shareholder	   accountable	   might	   thus	   be	   a	   possible	   mechanism	   for	   inducing	   “good”	  corporate	  behaviour	  in	  such	  situations.	  
However,	  in	  a	  complex	  organisational	  structure,	  shareholders	  are	  typically	  far	  removed	  from	   the	   goings-­‐on	   of	   various	   subsidiaries.	   Unless	   media	   coverage	   of	   a	   situation	   is	  extensive,	   geographic	   distance	   and	   the	   convolution	   of	   command	   in	   the	   corporate	  structure	  typically	  mean	  that	  shareholders	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ultimate	  holding	  company	  are	  not	  involved	  in	  issues	  relating	  to	  subsidiaries.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Firestone	  Liberia,	  there	  was	  no	   significant	   coverage	   of	   Firestone’s	   presence	   in	   Liberia	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   conflict.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  482	  Firestone	  Natural	  Rubber	  Company,	  “Home.”	  	  483	  Ruggie,	  “Multinationals	  as	  Global	  Institution,”	  4.	  484	  Ibid.,	  13.	  485	  Ibid.	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Moreover,	   the	   “worst-­‐case	   scenario”	   (that	   is,	   the	   loss	   of	   the	   worth	   of	   the	   company)	  would	   not	   have	   significantly	   impacted	   Bridgestone	   or	   its	   investors.	   As	   such,	  shareholders	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  corporate	  accountability	  would	  not	  have	  been	  useful	  in	  this	  situation.	  However,	  further	  research	  on	  the	  potential	  of	  shareholder	  accountability	  in	  regulating	  corporate	  behaviour	  is	  still	  warranted	  given	  the	  diverse	  nature	  of	  the	  cases	  that	  characterise	  the	  corporate-­‐conflict	  nexus.	  
With	   regards	   to	   the	   broader	   issue	   of	   MNC	   behaviour	   in	   contemporary	   conflict,	   the	  current	   trend	   in	   the	   literature	   is	   to	   reprimand	  MNCs	   for	   exacerbating	   conflicts	   while	  simultaneously	   calling	   on	   them	   to	   contribute	   to	   their	   prevention	   and	   resolution.486	  However,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  indicate	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  corporate–conflict	  nexus	   are	   infinitely	   complex,	   and	   more	   low-­‐n	   studies	   that	   account	   for	   intervening	  factors	  are	  needed	  to	  generate	  a	  working	  framework	  for	  positive	  corporate	  engagement.	  The	  role	  of	  geo-­‐political	  and	  geo-­‐economic	  factors	  needs	  to	  be	  accounted	  for,	  as	  do	  the	  particular	   characteristics	   of	   the	   conflict	   itself.	   Moreover,	   further	   research	   needs	   to	  approach	  these	  cases	  by	  recognising	  that	  a	  company’s	  decisions	  and	  actions	  are	  affected	  by	  conflict	  dynamics,	  just	  as	  conflict	  dynamics	  affect	  the	  risks	  and	  roles	  of	  the	  company.	  	  
This	   study	   sought	   to	   show	   that	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   motivations	   behind	  corporate	  behaviour	  is	  needed	  first	  in	  order	  to	  conceptualise	  an	  operational	  framework	  for	  proactive	  corporate	  engagement	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  It	  began	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  existing	  principles	   that	   dictate	   “good”	   corporate	   behaviour	   in	   conflict	   zones	   are	   inadequate	   as	  they	  are	  “declaratory	  rather	  than	  operational”.487	  It	  thus	  concludes	  that	  any	  mechanisms	  for	  monitoring	  coporate	  behavior	  and	  ensuring	  good	  business	  practices	  need	  to	  account	  for	  the	  limited	  agency	  of	  many	  foreign	  business	  actors	  in	  conflict	  situations.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  this	  study	  will	  inform	  this	  process	  by	  providing	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  research.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  486	  Berman,	  “Boardrooms	  and	  Bombs.”	  487	  Wennmann,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Conflict	  Financing,”	  435.	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